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Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege
[against self-incrimination] is available outside of criminal court proceed-
ings and serves to protect persons... from being compelled to incriminate
themselves. We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of
in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's
will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so
freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to
exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be ade-
quately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights
must be fully honored.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
When you violate Miranda, you're not violating the Constitution. Mi-
randa is not in the Constitution. It's a court-created decision that affects the
admissibility of testimonial evidence and that's all it is. So you don't violate
any law. There's no law says you can't question people [after they have
asserted their] Miranda [rights]. You don't violate the Constitution. The
Constitution doesn't say you have to do that. It's a court decision. So all
you're violating is a court decision controlling admissibility of evidence. So
you're not doing anything unlawful, you're not doing anything illegal,
you're not violating anybody's civil rights, you're doing nothing improper.
Videotape: Questioning: "Outside Mirandd' (Greg Gulen Produc-
tions 1990).
INTRODUCTION
Miranda v. Arizona' may be the United States Supreme Court's
best-known decision. Anyone who has watched a television police
drama during the last thirty years undoubtedly has heard the famous
warnings that Miranda established and that have come to bear its
name. Miranda is a strong pronouncement by the Court about the
primacy of Fifth Amendment values and about the conduct that ought
to occur in the station house. In explaining what conduct ought to
occur, the Court described a set of procedures that it considered nec-
essary to protect suspects' ability to assert the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination. 2 The Court linked Miranda's rules
directly to the Constitution.
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 See id. at 478-79.
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But Miranda is not the last word on Miranda; much has been writ-
ten since. In the years since Miranda, the Supreme Court periodically
has revisited parts of its holding, creating significant incentives for po-
lice to violate its strictures. Although the Court has never retracted its
stated expectation of how police should behave during a custodial in-
terrogation, it has termed Miranda's warnings and its requirement
that interrogation cease after a suspect asserts his or her rights as
mere "prophylactic" rules that are not required by the Constitution.3
In addition to driving this wedge between Miranda and the Fifth
Amendment, the Court has held that a prosecutor may impeach the
testimony df an accused with statements that police took without ad-
ministering the warnings or without honoring a request for counsel. 4
In a final stroke, the Court has ruled that if police obtain statements
in violation of Miranda, but use them to uncover other evidence and
other witnesses, then the prosecution, under some circumstances, may
introduce that evidence and call those witnesses.5 In light of these
decisions, some have come to view Miranda not as a strong statement
about the constitutional dimensions of custodial interrogation but,
rather, as a weak, non-constitutional rule of evidence that should not
affect what happens in the station house. As this interpretation of
Miranda has spread, officers in a number of jurisdictions have been
trained that it is permissible to continue to question a suspect who has
asserted the right either to counsel or to remain silent. Under this
view, violating Miranda is not inherently wrong, but any statement or
evidence that police so obtain may have only a limited use at trial.
This Article asks whether the Supreme Court's original vision of
Miranda has vanished and, if so, whether we should attempt to recap-
ture that vision. Part I examines the history, values, and principles of
the original vision and explores its transformation into a modest rule
of evidence. That Part also discusses the drafting of the Miranda opin-
ion and demonstrates that the Justices intended to link Miranda's
rules directly to the Constitution. Part II investigates the growing
practice of questioning suspects in direct violation of Miranda, a prac-
tice that many often dub questioning "outside Miranda." Questioning
"outside Mirandd' stems naturally from the Supreme Court's decisions
that both pull Miranda from its constitutional base and provide of-
3 E.g., Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433, 446 (1974).
4 See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1975) (holding that a voluntary
statement occurring after invocation of the right to counsel is admissible for impeach-
ment); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (holding that a prosecutor may im-
peach credibility with a statement that police took without warnings).
5 See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985) (holding that a defendant's
second statement is not tainted as a fruit of an initial Miranda-violative statement); Tucker,
417 U.S. at 450-52 (ruling that a witness's testimony was admissible, even though police
learned about this witness through a statement they took in violation of Miranda).
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ficers an incentive to disobey Miranda's rules. This Article presents
the first substantial evidence that police officers in some jurisdictions
are systematically trained to violate Miranda. Part III addresses the
two competing views of Miranda and concludes that we ought to retain
the original vision. Only the original vision adequately protects Fifth
Amendment values by providing clear guidance to both courts and
police and by relieving some of the compelling pressures that are in-
herent in a station house interrogation. Only the original vision fits
with our Fifth Amendment jurisprudence and maintains respect for
our law. Part IV contends that the Court should "re-constitutionalize"
Miranda and-at the same time-should re-examine Miranda's exclu-
sionary rule. Courts should exclude from evidence, for all purposes,
statements that police have taken in violation of Miranda, as well as
evidence that has derived from these statements, when officers objec-
tively have acted in bad faith. This exclusionary calculus would re-
store Miranda's original purpose: protecting the privilege against self-
incrimination and its underlying values by influencing police behavior
during custodial interrogations. The Court should address these two
visions and the exclusionary rule sooner rather than later, given the
mounting evidence of police non-compliance with Miranda.6
I
VISIONS OF MIfRANDA
A. Due Process, Psychological Coercion, and the Search for
Bright-Line Rules
Miranda v. Arizona combines several distinct holdings. The Court
primarily ruled that a suspect may invoke the Fifth Amendment in the
station house and that a custodial interrogation applies "inherently
compelling pressures" that undermine a suspect's ability to exercise
his or her Fifth Amendment rights.7 Over time, other portions of the
decision, namely those requiring warnings and waiver 8 and those
mandating that officers cease questioning when a suspect asserts Fifth
Amendment rights, have overshadowed these parts of Miranda.9 Un-
less officers give warnings and obtain a waiver, the Court held, any
resulting statement by the suspect was presumably obtained in viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment. 10 Similarly, Miranda deemed as com-
pelled any statement that police take after the invocation of rights.1
6 Given the increased number of interrogations that violate Miranda, as described
infra Part II, the Court should have an opportunity to address the issue in the near future.
7 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
8 See id. at 467-79.
9 See id. at 473-74.
10 See id. at 476-77.
11 See id. at 474.
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The Supreme Court fashioned these bright-line rules to protect
the ability of suspects to invoke their Fifth Amendment rights and to
provide clear guidance to both the courts and the police. Although
the Supreme Court long had barred the prosecution from obtaining a
conviction based upon a coerced or involuntary statement, pre-Mi-
randa decisions set out a soft, value-laden standard that the courts and
the police found difficult to apply. Clear rules were needed.
Beginning in 1936 with the seminal case of Brown v. Mississippi,12
the Supreme Court used the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to overturn a series of convictions obtained with confes-
sions deemed involuntary because of brutality, torture, extended in-
terrogation, threats, or other unsavory methods of questioning, or
because the accused was somehow incapacitated.13 Although the
Court invoked the Fifth Amendment as early as 1897 to overturn a
conviction that had rested upon a coerced confession,14 the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provided the primary
mechanism to review police interrogations until Malloy v. Hogan15 ap-
plied the Fifth Amendment to the states in 1964.16
The Court's early voluntariness cases seemed to turn on the fear
that coerced statements were unreliable,' 7 though later decisions es-
tablished more clearly that courts would not admit even trustworthy
12 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
13 See id. at 286-87 (ruling that a statement that police obtained through brutality and
torture violated the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534
(1963) (holding that police coerced a statement from defendant by telling her that the
state would end aid for her children and take them from her unless she cooperated);
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307-09, 322 (1963) (remanding for a hearing to determine
whether defendant received a "truth serum," which would have rendered statements invol-
untary); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944) (finding that a statement was
involuntary because police questioned a suspect for 36 hours by relays of officers); Ward v.
Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 555 (1942) (holding that police violated due process by obtaining a
confession by moving the suspect at night, by "telling him of threats of mob violence," and
by "questioning him continuously"); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238-41 (1940) (de-
termining that a statement police took after five days of interrogation violated the Due
Process Clause).
14 In Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), the Supreme Court overturned a
federal conviction, where the police had suggested to a defendant during an interrogation
that he would benefit by confessing. See id. at 564-65. Finding a violation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Court affirmed that a confession
"'must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or
implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.'" Id. at
542-43 (quoting 3 WM. OLDNALL RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 478
(6th ed. 1896)).
15 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
16 See id. at 3.
17 See, e.g., Ward, 316 U.S. at 555 (noting that the accused "was willing to make any
statement that the officers wanted him to make"); Chambers, 309 U.S. at 238-39 (discussing
officers' tactics, which were "calculated to break the strongest nerves and the stoutest
resistance").
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statements if police had violated the Constitution in obtaining them. 18
The Court eventually adopted a "totality of the circumstances" ap-
proach that required trial judges to examine both the conduct of the
police and its impact on the accused. 19 In assessing police conduct
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court essentially equated
Fifth Amendment "coercion" with Fourteenth Amendment "involun-
tariness."20 In examining the impact of police questioning upon the
suspect, the Court required lower courts to determine whether a con-
fession was "the product of a rational intellect and a free will"2 1 or
whether the accused's "will was overborne" 22 by police tactics.
Despite this shift in focus from weighing the overall reliability of a
statement to scrutinizing police conduct, the Supreme Court did not
articulate the "totality of the circumstances" standard with any real
specificity. Unhelpful declarations, such as "[t] here is no guide to the
decision of cases such as this, except the totality of circumstances" 23
and "[t]he limits in any case depend upon a weighing of the circum-
stances of pressure against the power of resistance of the person con-
fessing,"24 riddled the Court's opinions. Because this inquiry into
police conduct necessarily included value-laden judgments about the
type of behavior that our society would tolerate, the Court could
hardly avoid imprecision. An increased awareness that police could
18 See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961) ("[T]he admission into
evidence of confessions which are involuntary... cannot stand... because the methods
used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal
law ... To be sure, confessions cruelly extorted may be... found to be untrustworthy.
But the constitutional principle of excluding confessions that are not voluntary does not
rest on this consideration." (citations omitted)); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320
(1959) ("The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn
alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that
the police must obey the law while enforcing the law ....").
For a full discussion of the development of the voluntariness test and, particularly, the
decreased emphasis on reliability, see Yale Kamisar, On the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations,
Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MIcH. L. REv. 929, 936-41 (1995).
19 E.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957) ("The totality of the circumstances
that preceded the confessions in this case goes beyond the allowable limits.").
20 The Court's later decisions combine the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment stan-
dards by applying its Fifth Amendment "coercion" case to voluntariness determinations.
See, e.g., Malloy, 378 U.S. at 6-7 (holding expressly that Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532
(1897), applies in state and federal prosecutions); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154
n.9 (1944) (applying Brain and noting that Brain and a Fourteenth Amendment case to-
gether "hold that a coerced or compelled confession cannot be used to convict a defen-
dant in any state or federal court"). Stephen Schulhofer roundly criticizes the Court for
conflating the Fifth Amendment's concept of compulsion with the Due Process Clause's
concept of involuntariness, explaining that this combination has led to confusion about
the actual holding in Miranda. See Stephenj. Schulhofer, ReconsideringMiranda, 54 U. CHI.
L. Rav. 435, 440-46 (1987).
21 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960).
22 Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440 (1961).
23 Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 55 (1962).
24 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185 (1953).
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obtain statements through psychological as well as physical coercion,
coupled with a growing concern about police treatment of minorities
and the poor, perhaps also contributed to the Justices' inability to ex-
press a more precise test. As the Court acknowledged in 1964, just
two years before deciding Miranda, "Expanded concepts of fairness in
obtaining confessions have been accompanied by a correspondingly
greater complexity in determining whether an accused's will has been
overborne .... "25
Of course, courts universally condemned acts such as torture and
physical beatings. But as even the Supreme Court acknowledged,
courts found the generalized "totality of the circumstances" test diffi-
cult to apply, especially "where it [was] necessary to make fine judg-
ments as to the effect of psychologically coercive pressures and
inducements on the mind and will of an accused."26 The Court even-
tually conceded that "as law enforcement officers become more re-
sponsible, and the methods used to extract confessions more
sophisticated, our duty to enforce federal constitutional protections
does not cease. It only becomes more difficult because of the more
delicate judgments to be made. '27 These "delicate judgments" in-
cluded, for example, assessing whether a "mentally dull 19-year-old
Negro" had made voluntary statements to the police after the police
arrested him without a warrant, did not advise him of his rights, gave
him just two sandwiches over forty hours, and told him that people
wanted to "get him" (held: involuntary);28 whether a thirty-one year-
old college graduate had made voluntary statements after police de-
nied his request for counsel and then interrogated him for fourteen
hours, giving him only coffee, milk, and a sandwich soon after his
arrest (held: voluntary);29 and whether a "foreign-born young man"
with only some high school education had made voluntary statements
after police denied his request to speak with his attorney, which re-
sulted in a confession after eight hours of questioning by prosecutors,
police, and a childhood friend (held: involuntary).3° If these cases
challenged the members of the Supreme Court, one only can imagine
the daunting task facing trial judges and police officers, required to
glean the permissible limits of interrogation from the Court's impre-
cise balancing approach and from each Justice's particular sense of
equity and fair play.
25 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 390 (1964).
26 Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963).
27 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321 (1959).
28 Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 564, 567 (1958) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
29 See Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 435, 437-40 (1958).
30 Spano, 360 U.S. at 317-20, 321-23.
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Apart from its voluntariness cases, the Supreme Court, prior to
Miranda, made another highly significant attempt to influence con-
duct in the station house. 31 In the 1964 case of Escobedo v. Illinois,32
the Court held that police had violated the Sixth Amendment by tak-
ing a suspect into custody and denying him the opportunity to consult
with his retained counsel.3 3 The Court ruled that when the police
focus their investigation on a particular suspect in custody and when
"the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult
with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his
absolute constitutional right to remain silent," then they violate the
suspect's Sixth Amendment rights.34 As a result, "no statement elic-
ited by the police during the interrogation may be used against him at
a criminal trial. 35 As a Sixth Amendment decision, however, Escobedo
created problems. The Supreme Court never before had indicated
that a suspect could invoke his or her Sixth Amendment right to
counsel prior to formal criminal charges.3 6 Moreover, the Escobedo
Court relied on the police's failure to warn the suspect of the right to
remain silent.3 7 Yet prior to Escobedo, the Sixth Amendment had never
31 In addition to the Sixth Amendment decisions discussed here, the Court also for-
mulated what has come to be called the "McNabb-Mally Rule," deriving from McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). These
cases together hold that courts should exclude statements from evidence if there was un-
necessary delay in arraigning the accused. See Mallory, 354 U.S. at 454-55; McNabb, 318 U.S.
at 341-42, 344-45. This Article does not discuss McNabb and Mallory further because they
arise from the Supreme Court's supervisory power over federal prosecutions and are not
constitutional holdings applicable to the states. A federal statute applicable in federal
criminal cases, 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (1994), subsequently superceded the McNabb-Mallory
Rule.
32 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
33 See id. at 490-91.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 491.
36 In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Court applied the Sixth Amend-
ment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment by finding that the right to counsel
was fundamental for "one charged with crime." Id. at 344. In earlier decisions, the Court
had overturned state capital convictions under the Fourteenth Amendment when defend-
ants lacked counsel at "critical stages" of the proceedings. See, e.g., White v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (per curiam) (overturning the conviction because no counsel was pres-
ent at preliminary hearing); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961) (overturning the
conviction because no counsel was present at arraignment); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 52-53, 73 (1932) (overturning the conviction because the defendants had no real op-
portunity to secure counsel after arrest and prior to trial); cf. Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964) (finding a Sixth Amendment violation when agents elicited state-
ments from the defendant after indictment, in absence of his attorney). No case had held
that a "critical stage" could predate even a formal accusation. After Escobedo, the Supreme
Court made clear that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at the first formal
court proceeding against the accused. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428 (1986);
United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187-89 (1984).
37 See Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 491.
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guaranteed such a right.38 Further, as the Supreme Court itself noted
in Escobedo, Gideon v. Wainwright3 9 only recently had made the Sixth
Amendment obligatory upon the states.40 Thus, just as states were
wrestling with their Sixth Amendment obligations, Escobedo's holding
raised several additional issues. How would the states implement and
the courts interpret Escobedo? Danny Escobedo had a retained attor-
ney, but what about an indigent suspect who could not afford to hire a
lawyer? When did these Sixth Amendment rights inhere? What did it
mean for an investigation to "focus" on a suspect?4' These questions
needed answers and, thus, Escobedo set the stage for Miranda.
B. The Original Vision of Miranda
At the start of the 1965 Term, the Justices culled from hundreds
of petitions for writs of certiorari that raised interrogation issues, seek-
ing to identify those most suitable for review.42 On November 22,
38 For these reasons, even lawyers supporting the defendants in Miranda acknowl-
edged that Escobedo was difficult to maintain solely on Sixth Amendment grounds. See Brief
of the American Civil Liberties Union, Amicus Curiae at 8 n.2, Miranda (No. 759) (discuss-
ing Escobedo and noting that "[plut on a straight right to counsel approach, it might well be
doubtful that police interrogation would constitute a 'critical stage' absent the self-incrimi-
nation privilege" (citation omitted)). Judge Henry Friendly also predicted that most even-
tually would see Escobedo as a Fifth and not a Sixth Amendment decision. See HENRY J.
FRIENDLY, A Postscript on Miranda, in BENCHMARKS 266, 266-67 (1967).
39 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
40 See Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 487, 491.
41 These were not easy questions for lower courts to resolve in the wake of Escobedo.
Compare, e.g., United States ex rel Russo v. NewJersey, 351 F.2d 429, 436-37 (3d Cir. 1965)
(holding that police violated the right to counsel when "focus" shifted from a general
inquiry into an accusatory process and stating that right to counsel did not depend upon a
request for a lawyer), vacated, 384 U.S. 889 (1966), and People v. Dorado, 398 P.2d 361,
369-71 (Cal. 1965) (stating that police violated the right to counsel when investigation
focused on the accused and there were no warnings of right to counsel or right to remain
silent), overruled by People v. Cahill, 853 P.2d 1037 (Cal. 1993), with United States v. Cone,
354 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1965) (en banc) (rejecting Russo approach of dividing officers'
actions into "investigatory" and "accusatory" phases).
42 Chief Justice Earl Warren directed his law clerks to segregate all of the Escobedo
cases on the docket and to suggest a few that best raised the relevant issues. See Memoran-
dum [from ChiefJustice Earl Warren] to the Conference 1-2 (Oct. 27, 1965) (on file with
the Library of Congress in the Papers of Earl Warren, Container 286, File "O.T. 1965,
Misc.-Escobedo Cases" [hereinafter EW Papers I]); see also Memorandum from Law Clerks to
the Chief Justice (Oct. 25, 1965) (on file with the Library of Congress in EW Papers I,
supra) (suggesting cases that raised Escobedo issues); Memorandum from Michael Smith to
the ChiefJustice (Oct. 1, 1965) (on file with the Library of Congress in EW Papers I, supra)
(same); Memorandum from Michael Smith to the Chief Justice (Sept. 30, 1965) (on file
with the Library of Congress in EW Papers I, supra) (same). Justices Harlan, Douglas,
Brennan and White also helped identify petitions that raised Escobedo claims. See Letter
from Justice William 0. Douglas to ChiefJustice Earl Warren (Oct. 6, 1965) (on file with
the Library of Congress in EW Papers I, supra); Letter from Justice Byron R. White to
Justice William J. Brennan (Sept. 30, 1965) (on file with the Library of Congress in EW
Papers I, supra); Letter from Justice John M. Harlan to Justice William J. Brennan (Sept.
28, 1965) (on file with the Library of Congress in EW Papers I, supra); Letter from Justice
WilliamJ. Brennan to ChiefJustice Earl Warren (Sept. 23, 1965) (on file with the Library
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1965, the Court held a conference to consider 101 "Escobedo cases."43
The Justices granted review in four separate cases-now known collec-
tively as Miranda v. Arizona-to decide whether the Fifth Amendment
required police officers to advise suspects of their rights before pro-
ceeding with a custodial interrogation. 44 Not surprisingly, in their
merits briefs the defendants' lawyers sought to follow Escobedo and re-
lied primarily upon the Sixth Amendment.45 Instead of relying on
of Congress in EW Papers I, supra). Forwarding White's list of cases to Warren, Brennan
noted, "There ain't no end to them!" Letter from Justice Byron R. White to justice William
J. Brennan, supra.
43 See [Docket List] For Conference, Monday, November 22, 1965 (Nov. 15, 1965) (on
file with the Library of Congress in EW Papers I, supra note 42). Even after the November
conference, the Justices continued to collect "Escobedo cases." See Escobedo Cases Distributed
Since November 22 Conference (undated) (on file with the Library of Congress in EW
Papers I, supra note 42) (listing 25 additional cases).
44 Phoenix police officers questioned Ernesto Miranda at the station, but did not ad-
vise him that he had a right to counsel. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491-92. New York City
police interrogated Michael Vignera in custody, but did not warn him of his right to coun-
sel or right to remain silent. See id. at 493-94. Kansas City police arrested Carl Westover
and interrogated him for 14 hours without advising of any rights. Westover did not make a
statement to the local police, but he was then turned over to FBI agents. The agents did
advise him of his rights, though they did not obtain a waiver. After several hours of interro-
gation, Westover confessed. See id. at 494-96. Los Angeles police arrested Roy Allen Stew-
art and did not advise him of any rights. Stewart confessed during his ninth interrogation
session. See id. at 497-99. The four cases were Westover v. United States, No. 761 (Oct. Term,
1965), Vignera v. New York, No. 760 (Oct. Term, 1965), Miranda v. Arizona, No. 759 (Oct.
Term, 1965), and California v. Stewart, No. 584 (Oct. Term, 1965). The Court took a fifth
case, Johnson v. NewJersey, No. 762 (Oct. Term, 1965), on certiorari with these four and set
it for argument with them, see 34 U.S.L.W. 3183 (Nov. 23, 1965), but the Court decided it
separately. SeeJohnson v. NewJersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
45 See Opening Brief for the Petitioner at 16-37, Westover v. United States, 384 U.S.
436 (1966) (No. 761) (decided with Miranda) (raising both Fifth and Sixth Amendment
claims, but leading with a discussion of Escobedo and focusing on the right to counsel); Brief
for the Petitioner at 12-37, Vignera v. New York, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 760) (decided
with Miranda) (arguing that interrogation was unconstitutional under both the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments, but raising the Sixth Amendment as the lead argument); Brief for
Petitioner at 33, Miranda (No. 759) (stating that "[t]he issue is whether, under the Sixth
Amendment .... there is the same right to counsel at interrogation of an arrested suspect
as there is at arraignment," without discussing the Fifth Amendment at all); Respondent's
Brief and Motion to Dismiss Writ of Certiorari at 20-50, California v. Stewart, 384 U.S. 436
(1965) (No. 584) (decided with Miranda) (contending that the interrogation violated the
Sixth Amendment, as construed in Escobedo, and also that Stewart's five-day detention made
his statements involuntary under the Due Process Clause).
The parties and amici curiae were represented by able and experienced counsel. John
Frank and John Flynn, lawyers with national reputations, represented Ernesto Miranda.
William Norris was counsel for Roy Stewart. Norris had clerked for Justice Douglas and
later served with distinction on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Solicitor
General Thurgood Marshall argued for the United States. Telford Taylor, a Columbia
University law professor and former counsel at Nuremberg, filed a brief for 29 states as
amicus curiae. Anthony Amsterdam and Paul Mishkin, who were both then on the faculty
of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties
Union as amicus curiae. See Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, Amicus Curiae,
Miranda (No. 759). Other than Amsterdam and Mishkin, the lawyers placed primary reli-
ance upon the Sixth Amendment. The Court had decided Escobedo a mere two terms
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this ground, however, the Court followed the basic approach of the
amicus curiae brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, and con-
cluded that Escobedo's right to counsel simply effected the accused's
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
46
In the majority opinion by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court
ruled that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is
available to a suspect during a custodial interrogation.47 The opinion
reviews police interrogation manuals48 and discusses the nature of in-
custody interrogation. Custodial interrogations, the Court deter-
before, making it a natural point of departure. Further, a number of contemporary com-
mentators had discussed confession problems in terms of when the right to counsel would
attach under the Sixth Amendment. SeeYale Kamisar, Miranda: The Case, the Man, and the
Players, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1074, 1080 n.26 (1984) (reviewing LrvA BAKER, Miranda: Crime,
Law and Politics (1983)) (describing several commentators). During oral argument, it
quickly became clear that the Court was beginning to focus on the Fifth Amendment as-
pects of custodial interrogations, and counsel adroitly shifted their arguments. For an ex-
cellent account of the oral arguments, see BAKER, supra, at 131-48.
John Flynn, who argued on behalf of Ernesto Miranda, had a sense of humor about
the Court's eventual reliance on the Fifth Amendment. As he told the Ninth CircuitJudi-
cial Conference in 1972:
When cert. was granted and we were asked by the American Civil Liberties
Union to prepare and file the brief, we had a meeting in our law office in
which we agreed that the briefs should be written with entire focus on the
Sixth Amendment... because that is where the [C]ourt was headed after
Escobedo, and, as you are all aware, in the very first paragraph [of the Mi-
randa opinion] ChiefJustice Warren said, "It is the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution that is at issue today."
(Laughter)
That was Miranda's effective use of counsel.
(Laughter)
Panel Discussion, The Exclusionary Rule, 61 F.R.D. 259, 278 (1972) (remarks ofJohn Flynn).
46 See Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, Amicus Curiae at 6-9, Miranda (No.
759). The brief also contends that the privilege against self-incrimination is central to the
holding in Escobedo. See id. at 8-9.
47 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
48 See id. at 448-55; see also Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, Amicus Curiae
at 22-31, Miranda (No. 759) (describing interrogation manuals used by police and arguing
that, given these tactics, the actual presence of counsel is necessary to protect suspects'
Fifth Amendment rights). Before including a discussion of the manuals in his opinion,
Warren had the Supreme Court Librarian contact the publishers of two of the manuals,
inquiring about the total distribution of the books and the extent of their use among the
police. See Memorandum from Kenneth Ziffren to ChiefJustice (May 2, 1966) (on file with
the Library of Congress in the Papers of Earl Warren, Container 617, File "Nos. 759-761 &
584-Miranda Folder No. 3" [hereinafter EW Papers II]) (enclosing copies of letters in-
quiring about police manuals); see also Letter from Charles Hallam, Librarian, to C.O.
Reville, Jr., Executive Vice President, Williams and Wilkins Co. (May 9, 1966) (on file with
the Library of Congress in EW Papers II, supra) (replying to Reville's response to May 2
letter); Letter from Charles Hallam, Librarian, to Charles C. Thomas, Publisher (May 2,
1966) (on file with Library of Congress in EW Papers II, supra) (requesting information
regarding CHARLs O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVEGATION (1959)); Letter
from Charles Hallam, Librarian, to Williams and Wilkins Co. (May 2, 1966) (on file with
Library of Congress in EW Papers II, supra) (requesting information regarding FRED E.
INBAU &JOHN E. REID, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION (1953) and FRED E.
INBAU &JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1962)).
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mined, contain "inherently compelling pressures" that undermine the
ability of a suspect to remain silent.49 The opinion takes care to indi-
cate the particular impact of these pressures upon minorities and the
poor.50 To ensure a full opportunity to exercise the Fifth Amendment
privilege, the Court fashioned its famous warnings: police must in-
form a suspect of the right to remain silent and warn him or her that
anything said may be used against them;51 the police also must inform
a suspect of the right to speak with an attorney and have the attorney
present during questioning,5 2 and that an attorney will be appointed
if the person is indigent.5 3 If a suspect then indicates "in any manner"
that he or she wishes to speak with an attorney or remain silent, "the
interrogation must cease."'5 4 If the police fail to comply with these
procedures, whether or not a suspect already is aware of his or her
rights,5 5 a strong exclusionary rule will apply: "no evidence obtained
as a result of [the] interrogation can be used."5 6
The Court expressly tied to the Fifth Amendment the mandatory
warnings and the requirement that interrogation cease.5 7 To exercise
the Fifth Amendment privilege intelligently, the Court reasoned, a
suspect must be "aware not only of the privilege, but also of the conse-
quences of forgoing it."'58 Furthermore, the Court deemed the right
to counsel "indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment
privilege. '59 Finally, the Court insisted that interrogation cease upon
an invocation of either the Fifth Amendment right to counsel or right
to remain silent because "[w]ithout the right to cut off questioning,
the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to
overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has
been once invoked." 60 As the Court concluded, "The principles an-
nounced today deal with the protection which must be given to the
privilege against self-incrimination ... .-"61 By holding that the Fifth
49 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
50 See id. at 457 ("The potentiality for compulsion is forcefully apparent, for example,
in Miranda, where the indigent Mexican defendant was a seriously disturbed individual
with pronounced sexual fantasies, and in Stewart, in which the defendant was an indigent
Los Angeles Negro who had dropped out of school in the sixth grade.").
51 See id. at 467-69.
52 See id. at 471.
53 See id. at 473.
54 Id. at 473-74.
55 See id. at 468-69.
56 Id. at 479; see also id. at 476-77 (drawing no distinction between direct confessions
and statements that the prosecution may use to impeach, deeming both "incriminating"
and inadmissible).
57 See id. at 476.
58 Id. at 469.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 474.
61 Id. at 477.
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Amendment protects a suspect during a custodial interrogation, that
any such interrogation inherently coerces the suspect, and that only
particular procedures can dispel this inherent coercion, the Court es-
tablished an irrebuttable presumption: unless police properly follow
Miranda's procedures, they violate the Fifth Amendment.62
Miranda expressly represents a preference for Fifth Amendment
values over the interests of law enforcement officers in obtaining in-
criminating statements. The majority noted and rejected the "recur-
rent argument... that society's need for interrogation outweighs the
privilege. '63 Furthermore, in the Fifth Amendment "the Constitution
has prescribed the rights of the individual when confronted with the
power of government," and "[t]hat right cannot be abridged. '64
By the same token, Miranda was something of a compromise. 65
The Court did not forbid all interrogations without counsel,66 as some
had invited it to do67 and as others had feared it might hold in the
wake of Escobedo. Interrogations still could continue, but within set
procedures that would protect Fifth Amendment rights. Nor did the
Court prohibit police officers from questioning people who possess
relevant information, but are not suspects of any crime. By limiting its
application to custodial interrogations, the Justices narrowed Mi-
randa's bite to situations in which suspects legitimately need Fifth
Amendment protections because custodial questioning aims to elicit
incriminating information. 68 The Court also clearly stated that
although the procedures set forth in Miranda were the minimum nec-
essary to protect the Fifth Amendment, the states could implement
62 See id. at 467-69, 476-77; see also New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 662 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (stating that
without the warnings or a waiver, a presumption of coerciveness renders any statement
inadmissible).
63 Miranda, 884 U.S. at 479.
64 Id.
65 For discussions of Miranda as a compromise, see Lawrence Herman, The Supreme
Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old Days of Police Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 733,
735-36 (1987), Susan P- Klein, Miranda Deconstitutionalized: When the Self-Incrimination Clause
and the Civil Rights Act Collide, 143 U. PA. L. Rv. 417, 423-26 (1994), and Schulhofer, supra
note 20, at 460-61.
66 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 ("This does not mean, as some have suggested, that
each police station must have, a 'station house lawyer' present at all times to advise
prisoners.").
67 See Opening Brief for the Petitioner at 35-37, Westover v. United States, 384 U.S.
436 (1966) (No. 761) (decided ith Miranda) (contending that a confession is coerced as a
matter of law if police obtain it in the absence of counsel or other outside aid); Brief of the
American Civil Liberties Union, Amicus Curiae at 22-31, Miranda (No. 759) (arguing that
the actual presence of counsel is required to protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights).
68 The Court clearly was concerned with the interrogations of potential defendants
and not informal questioning of witnesses. In describing the "custody" aspect of Miranda,
the opinion states that "[t ] his is what we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an investiga-
tion which had focused on an accused." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 n.4.
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other procedures "so long as they are fully as effective... in inform-
ing accused persons of their right of silence and in affording a contin-
uous opportunity to exercise it. ' '69 The Constitution does not require
a "particular solution" to ameliorate the compelling pressures that are
inherent in custodial interrogations, the Court concluded, but any
proposed replacement for Miranda's rules must afford at least equally
effective protection of Fifth Amendment rights. 70
The Introduction to this Article posits that later decisions of the
Supreme Court undermined Miranda so severely that some scholars
and enforcement officers have abandoned the "original vision" of Mi-
randa as a constitutional rule mandating appropriate conduct in the
station house and firmly protecting a suspect's Fifth Amendment
rights.71 Rather, these scholars and officials now view Miranda as a
weak rule of evidence, divorced from the Constitution.72 In light of
these alternate formulations, one must ask whether this Article's char-
acterization of the Court's "original vision" is fair. Did the Justices
ever consider Miranda to be anything more than a relatively narrow
holding about the admissibility of evidence at trial? The remainder of
this section examines the Justices' opinions and personal papers, con-
cluding that the Court specifically intended to establish Miranda's pro-
cedures as a constitutional mandate.
First, some have argued that Miranda merely established the inad-
missibility of certain evidence at trial and did not articulate a greater
Fifth Amendment rule. 73 Although the Court in Miranda (and in Esco-
bedo as well) held that unless the police follow set procedures, a court
cannot admit the defendants' statements at trial,74 exclusion of evi-
dence and reversal due to the erroneous use of evidence comprise the
Court's sole sanction in the context of a criminal appeal. One cannot
disregard Miranda's constitutional basis simply because of the context
in which the case was decided. As already noted, the Court directly
tied Miranda's rules to the Fifth Amendment. The opinion reaffirms
that the Fifth Amendment is essential to the maintenance of the
proper allocation of authority to the government. The Court held
that the values embodied within the Fifth Amendment outrank the
69 Id. at 490.
70 Id. at 467.
71 See supra text accompanying notes 3-5.
72 See supra text accompanying note 5.
73 See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution: Distinguishing
Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 MicH. L. REv.
907, 917 (1989) (arguing that Miranda is solely a "trial-rights" and not a "police-practices"
case); Videotape: Questioning: "Outside Miranda," (Greg Gulen Productions 1990) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Miranda Videotape] (arguing that Miranda only affects admissi-
bility of testimonial evidence). For excerpts from the transcript of the videotape, see the
Appendix to this Article.
74 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476, 479; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964).
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prosecution's desire to obtain an admission of guilt from a suspect in
custody.75 One cannot read the majority opinion in Miranda to de-
scribe anything other than a normative vision about the constitutional
limits on a custodial interrogation. The Court included in Miranda
the long, didactic passages about the history of the Fifth Amendment,
about interrogation techniques, about evolving police practices, about
the impact of questioning upon minorities, and about the role of
counsel76 not only to support the Court's legal conclusions, but also to
persuade the police and the public. 77
Second, the Justices must have intended Miranda's procedures to
apply in the station house, whether or not Miranda made a statement
inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment. Miranda's bright-line rules
intended to ensure that compliance largely would avert the need to
negotiate the Court's prior Fourteenth Amendment involuntariness
standard. Through Miranda, the Court offered every suspect iron-clad
protection against coercive interrogation: a person need only ask for
counsel or state that he or she does not wish to speak with police. If
police properly administer Miranda's warnings and an accused fails to
take advantage of Miranda's protections, the accused will have diffi-
culty arguing that his or her will was overborne. Thus, if police deter-
mine to violate Miranda, they frustrate a primary purpose for the
ruling.
Third, although Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court ac-
knowledges that legislatures are free to promulgate substitutes for Mi-
randa's procedures, the Justices themselves concluded that the
Constitution requires either Miranda's specific procedures or other
equally effective safeguards. An exchange between ChiefJustice Warren
and Justice William Brennan exemplifies this point. Warren solicited
Brennan's views on an early draft before circulating his opinion to the
other Justices. 78 Brennan responded with a lengthy memorandum,
suggesting a major revision:
You may recall that at the initial conference to select the cases
for argument, I offered the following: that the extension of the
privilege against the states by Malloy v. Hogan inevitably required
that we consider whether police interrogation should be hedged
75 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479-81.
76 David Strauss has written that Miranda "reads more like a legislative committee
reportwith an accompanying statute." David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Praphylactic Rules, 55
U. CHI. L. REv. 190, 190 (1988); see also FRIENDLY, supra note 38, at 278 (criticizing the
Court for "utilizing the Bill of Rights to prescribe a detailed code of criminal procedure").
77 See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
78 See Draft Opinion, Miranda (No. 759) (May 9, 1966) (on file with the Library of
Congress in the Papers of William J. Brennan, Container 145, File "Miranda, Folder #3"
[hereinafter WJB Papers]). The ChiefJustice inscribed the draft, "Bill: This is not in circu-
lation but I would appreciate your views. EW." Id. at 1.
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about with procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
.... This is not the first time the Court has had to consider the
imposition of a requirement that the states provide procedural safe-
guards effective to secure a specific of the Bill of Rights extended
against the states. A familiar recent example is in the obscenity
area. In Marcus,79 Quantity of Books8 ° and Freedman v. Maryland[,]8
we held that the states were constitutionally required to provide pro-
cedures effective to safeguard non-obscene expression from sup-
pression. In the Fourth Amendment area, our imposition of the
exclusionary rule in Mapp v. Ohio8 2 is of the same order.
Before Malloy, when the problem was only that of federal inter-
rogation, we fashioned the safeguards ourselves, through the crimi-
nal rules and the exercise of our supervisory power. We went pretty
far.... Here, however, our powers are more limited. We cannot
prescribe rigid rules for the same reason that we did not do so in
Freedman v. Maryland: we are justified in policing interrogation prac-
tices only to the extent required to prevent denial of the right
against compelled self-incrimination as we defined that right in Mal-
loy. I therefore do not think, as your draft seems to suggest, that
there is only a single constitutionally required solution to the
problems of testimonial compulsion inherent in custodial interroga-
tion. I agree that, largely for the reasons you have stated, all four
cases must be reversed for lack of any safeguards against denial of
the right. I also agree that warnings and the help of counsel are
appropriate. But should we not leave Congress and the States lati-
tude to devise other means (if they can) which might also create an
interrogation climate which has the similar effect of preventing the
fettering of a person's own will?...
I agree fully that the opinion must demonstrate ... the dangers
necessarily inherent in custodial questioning .... We may thus es-
tablish that safeguards against those effects are constitutionally re-
quired to give substance to the [Fifth Amendment] right.8 3
Brennan urged that the Court allow the states a modicum of flexibil-
ity, in part because he believed that this allowance might appease
some critics of the Court and make the opinion more acceptable to
the general public.8 4 Although Brennan openly confessed to Warren
79 Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
80 Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
81 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
82 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
83 Letter from Justice William J. Brennan to Chief Justice Earl Warren 2-4 (May 11,
1966) (on file with the Library of Congress in WJB Papers, supra note 78) (citation omitted
and footnotes added).
84 Brennan wrote,
I think that to allow some latitude accomplishes very desirable results: it
will make it very difficult to criticize our action as outside the scope ofjudi-
cial responsibility and authority, and like Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954), it has an appeal to the conscience of our society, gaining
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that he could not "think of other procedures that [would] serve the
purpose," 5 he would not rule out the possibility that either Congress
or the states might fashion other safeguards. Nevertheless, Brennan
was careful to make clear that the Fifth Amendment required at least
some safeguards. Of any proposed replacement procedures, "none will
be deemed sufficient if any less effective than those provided by full
warning of rights to silence and counsel, scrupulously recorded and
observed.18 6 Warren reworked his draft to accommodate Brennan's
suggestions.87 Their exchange leaves no doubt that the principal au-
thors of Miranda considered its procedures the minimum required by
the Fifth Amendment.
The original vision of Miranda, then, was one of transformation.
Police practices would change. Officers would issue warnings to each
suspect, and each suspect, by uttering a few simple words, could pre-
vent the authorities from obtaining information and evidence from
his or her own mouth. Miranda would protect those suspects who
were the most vulnerable in police interrogations-minorities and the
poor-by informing them of their rights and empowering them
against coercive tactics. These simple procedures simultaneously
would advance Fifth Amendment values and would avert the need for
courts to decide the voluntariness of statements in an infinite variety
of circumstances. The Miranda Court had utter confidence that its
own pronouncements about the legitimacy of certain police practices,
together with a rule of exclusion, would in fact protect Fifth Amend-
ment rights and cause officers to change their conduct in the station
house.
on that account social acceptance of its necessity. I repeat that what we
must get the public to understand is that the courts are duty bound to sat-
isfy themselves that responses to custodial questioning are indeed the prod-
uct of the person's "unfettered choice."
Id. at 5 (citation added).
85 Id.
86 Id. at 9.
87 See Memorandum from Jim Hale, Mike Smith and Ken Ziffren to the ChiefJustice
(May 13, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress in the Papers of Earl Warren,
Container 616, File "Nos. 759-761 & 584-Miranda Folder #2") (describing new draft sec-
tions of the opinion in light of Brennan's suggestions). Brennan nevertheless prepared a
concurrence to emphasize this point. See [Draft Concurrence,] Nos. 759, 760, 761 & 584-
Miranda, etc. (undated) (on file with the Library of Congress in EW Papers II, supra note
48). Warren again redrafted the opinion to note that the states could promulgate equally
effective alternatives. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. He did not want Brennan to write
separately; a concurrence might have led some to conclude that Warren's majority opinion
did not even command five votes. See Memorandum from Jim Hale, Mike Smith and Ken
Ziffren to the Chief Justice (June 10, 1966) (on fie with the Library of Congress in EW
Papers II, supra note 48). Brennan relented and did not file a separate opinion.
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C. Seeds of a New Vision
In the decades since Miranda, the Court has tinkered with its ap-
plication in the margins,88 but only once has excused officers for fail-
ing to administer warnings or to cease questioning a suspect who has
asserted Fifth Amendment rights.8 9 The Justices have never retracted
the requirement that officers give warnings and honor invocations in
the core situation that Miranda addresses: questioning at the station
house. Indeed, in Edwards v. Arizona9° they reinforced the rule by
holding that police, without counsel present, may not reinterrogate a
suspect who invokes the right to counsel, unless the suspect initiates
contact with the police. 9' Although the Justices are unlikely to over-
rule Miranda in the foreseeable future, one can say fairly that the
Court has retreated from the holding of Miranda in several significant
respects. Principally, the Court has separated the warnings and waiver
requirement from its constitutional underpinning, consequently di-
minishing respect for the values embodied in the Fifth Amendment.
If the original vision of Miranda has been lost, this is why.
88 The warnings are necessary only for a suspect in "custody." Miranda, 384 U.S. at
444. The Justices have adopted a somewhat narrow definition of "custody," which has con-
stricted the universe of situations in which warnings are necessary. See, e.g., Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (holding that roadside questioning during traffic stop is
not custodial interrogation). The warnings are necessary only if the police intend to ask
incriminating questions. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). Thus, four
Justices have allowed officers to ask suspects "routine booking" information without a warn-
ing because those questions generally will not elicit an incriminating response. Penn-
sylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990) (opinion of Brennan, J.). Further, there is no
inherent coercion in questioning by a person whom the suspect does not know is a police
agent. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990).
TheJustices also have placed the burden on the suspect to articulate an unambiguous
invocation of rights. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (ruling that
only an unambiguous request for counsel triggers the duty to cease questioning); McNeil v.
Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178-79 (1991) (ruling that the appointment of counsel at a court
proceeding is not an invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel on an unrelated
charge); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529 (1987) (stating that a request for coun-
sel prior to giving written statement is a limited invocation of the Fifth Amendment that
does not prevent officers from obtaining an oral statement); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 426 (1986) (stating that Miranda gives the defendant-not his or her lawyer-some
control over the course of the interrogation). The Court, however, has never retreated
from the requirement that police give warnings and honor a clear invocation in the inter-
rogation room.
89 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984) (finding a limited "public safety"
exception to Miranda's warning requirements).
90 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
91 See id. at 485 (stating that "it is inconsistent with Miranda and its progeny for the
authorities, at their instance, to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly as-
serted his right to counsel"); see also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990) (hold-
ing that under Edwards, police may not reinitiate interrogation even after the accused has
consulted with counsel).
[Vol. 84:109
SAV1NG MIRANDA
The first wedge between Miranda and the Constitution came in
Harris v. New York.92 In this case the Court characterized as dicta Mi-
randa's absolute rule of exclusion and held that prosecutors can use
for impeachment purposes a statement from a suspect in custody who
did not receive Miranda warnings so long as "the trustworthiness of
the evidence satisfies legal standards,"93 meaning that it was voluntary
under the totality of the circumstances. As the Court also noted, Har-
ris "ma[de] no claim that the statements made to the police were co-
erced or involuntary."94 By the same token, however, Harris's facts did
not rebut the presumption of a Fifth Amendment violation due to the
failure to comply with Miranda. Because Harris's statements were
neither the result of coercion nor involuntary under Fourteenth
Amendment standards, the Court considered the police conduct to
represent only a "mere" Miranda violation. 95 By distinguishing a mere
Miranda violation from a traditional claim of coercion or involuntari-
ness, the majority tore Miranda loose from the Fifth Amendment.
Although the majority did not state expressly that a mere Miranda vio-
lation does not transgress the Constitution, that was surely the
implication.
The Court extended Harris in Oregon v. Hass.96 In Hass a suspect
initially waived his rights after receiving proper warnings.97 Later, on
the way to the station, Hass said that he wanted to telephone an attor-
ney.98 Following this invocation of the right to counsel, Hass pointed
out the location of a stolen bicycle. 99 The majority saw no reason to
distinguish the case from Harris;, like the defendant in Harris, Hass
made no allegation that his statements had been involuntary or co-
erced under traditional standards. 00 Yet as in Harris, no facts rebut-
ted the presumption of unconstitutionality stemming from the
Miranda violation. Hass, in tandem with Harris, pulled the Miranda
rule further from its constitutional roots. Indeed, Hass does not co-
here even with Escobedo, because both William Hass and Danny Esco-
bedo asked to contact their respective attorneys while in custody.' 0 '
To add insult to injury, the majority also noted and dismissed as "spec-
92 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
9 Id. at 224.
94 Id.
95 See id.
96 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
97 See id. at 715.
98 See id.
99 See id. at 716.
100 See id. at 722.
101 This fact may be one reason why Justice Brennan wrote in dissent that he was "un-
willing to join this fundamental erosion of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 725
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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ulative" the possibility that it was giving officers an incentive to disre-
gard the requirements of Miranda:
One might concede that when proper Miranda warnings have
been given, and the officer then continues his interrogation after
the suspect asks for an attorney, the officer may be said to have little
to lose and perhaps something to gain by way of possibly uncovering
impeachment material. This speculative possibility, however, is
even greater where the warnings are defective and the defect is not
known to the officer. In any event, the balance was struck in Harris,
and we are not disposed to change it now 02
What the Court implied in Harris and Hass, it stated expressly in
Michigan v. Tucker.'0 3 In Tucker the Supreme Court declined to sup-
press the testimony of a witness as the "fruit" of a Miranda violation,
where the police learned the identity of the witness because of the
violation. 10 4 In discussing the scope of Miranda's exclusionary rule,
Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that Miranda's "safeguards were
not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead
measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimina-
tion was protected."'10 5 Further, "the police conduct at issue here did
not abridge respondent's constitutional privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination, but departed only from the prophylactic standards
later laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard that
privilege."1 06
In characterizing Miranda's rules as not constitutionally required,
Justice Rehnquist relied upon the portion of Miranda that Chief Jus-
tice Warren had added at Justice Brennan's request, indicating that
the Constitution did not require "adherence to any particular solu-
tion" to cure the inherently compelling pressures of custodial interro-
gation.'0 7 Yet Rehnquist omitted the remainder of the quoted
passage from Miranda, which permitted a variance from Miranda's
rules only if they were replaced by alternatives that were equally as ef-
102 Id. at 723.
103 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
104 See id. at 450.
105 Id. at 444.
106 Id. at 445-46 (emphasis added). Geoffrey Stone has called this conclusion in Tucker
.an outright rejection of the core premises of Miranda" Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda
Doctrine in the Burger Court 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 99, 118. Yale Kamisar agrees. See Yale
Kamisar, The Warren Court and CriminalJustice, in THE WARREN COURT 116, 126 (Bernard
Schwartz ed., 1996). This refrain, describing Miranda as a non-constitutional prophylactic
rule, has been repeated time and again. See, e.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176
(1991); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985) (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446); Doyle
v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976).
107 Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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fective in protecting Fifth Amendment rights.10 8 Tucker was subse-
quently extended in Oregon v. Elstad,10 9 in which the Justices relied
upon this notion of Miranda as a non-constitutional "prophylactic"
rule and determined that a statement given after proper warnings can-
not be suppressed as the "fruit" of an earlier unwarned statement.110
The characterization of Miranda as non-constitutional and "pro-
phylactic" also helped the Court create a wholesale exception to the
warning requirement. In New York v. Quarles,"' the Justices held that
warnings are not necessary when officers ask a suspect questions aris-
ing from a reasonable concern for public safety.1 12 The majority ap-
plied a simple cost-benefit analysis: "the need for answers to questions
in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need
for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination."u 13 Although Quarks struck at the Court's
original vision of Miranda in several respects,1 14 it did not-as it turns
out-open the door to other large exceptions to the Miranda rule. In
the fourteen years since Quarles was decided, the Supreme Court has
not approved any other instances of custodial interrogations in which
warnings need not be given.
These cases planted the seeds of a new vision of Miranda. By al-
lowing prosecutors to use for impeachment and for the collection of
other evidence statements that police take in violation of Miranda, the
108 See id. (omitting portions of Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467). Justice Brennan also has
pointed out this serious omission in Tucker. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 349 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Kamisar, supra note 106, at 126 (discussing this passage in
Tucker); StephenJ. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly
Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 500, 553-54 (1996) (same).
109 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
110 See id. at 309.
111 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
112 See id. at 656.
113 Id. at 657.
114 First, as with prior decisions, Quarks reinforced the notion that the warning re-
quirement was divorced from the Fifth Amendment. Second, as Justice O'Connor indi-
cated sharply in dissent, the majority's cost-benefit analysis represents a wholly different
view of the value of the Fifth Amendment than was expressed in Miranda. According to
Justice O'Connor, Miranda already ranked the relative importance of a suspect's Fifth
Amendment rights and the government's need for information. See id. at 662 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Thus, "since there is noth-
ing about an exigency that makes custodial interrogation any less compelling, a principled
application of Miranda requires that [Quarles's] statement be suppressed." Id. at 665
(O'Connor,J., concurring in thejudgment in part and dissenting in part). Third, by creat-
ing a vague and ill-defined exception to the warning requirement, the Court reduced the
efficacy of Miranda's bright-line rules. Indeed, the majority recognized this point,
"acknowledgLing] that to some degree we lessen the desirable clarity of that rule." Id. at
658; see also id. at 663 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (stating that the "'public safety' exception unnecessarily blurs the edges of the clear
line heretofore established").
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Court has created an incentive for police to disregard Miranda."15 By
alienating Miranda's rule from the Fifth Amendment, the Justices
have undermined its legitimacy. After all, the Supreme Court cannot
promulgate non-constitutional rules of evidence for the state courts
because Article III expressly limits federal judicial power.'1 6 For this
reason, the "deconstitutionalization" of Miranda has led some public
officials to call for its abolition."17
One should not, however, paint too dark a picture. The Supreme
Court last spoke on the constitutional status of Miranda not in Quarles,
but in Withrow v. Williams.118 In this case Robert Williams brought a
federal habeas corpus petition because the police took a statement
from him without giving Miranda warnings. 1 9 Williams did not claim
that his statement had been involuntary under the Due Process
Clause. 120 The federal habeas corpus statute permits relief only when
the state obtains a conviction in violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States.121 The Court in Withrow held that Miranda viola-
tions could be reviewed on federal habeas corpus, stating that
"' [p]rophylactic' though it may be," Miranda protects an important
right.122 If the Court had viewed Miranda as truly non-constitutional,
115 See infra Part III.C.
116 See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (explaining that "it is not the
province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law
questions"); Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991) (stating that the authority of the
Supreme Court in deciding voir dire issues in state criminal case "is limited to enforcing
the commands of the United States Constitution"); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 569
(1967) (ruling that states have the power "to promulgate their own rules of evidence to try
their own state-created crimes in their own state courts, so long as their rules are not pro-
hibited by any provision of the United States Constitution").
117 Edwin Meese, who served as President Reagan's Attorney General from 1985 to
1988, perhaps has been the most visible public official in recent decades seeking to abolish
Miranda. He supported a report of a Justice Department office that urged the Court to
overrule Miranda That report cites the "deconstitutionalization" of Miranda as a reason to
abrogate it. See OFFICE OF LEGAL PoLcy, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRETRIAL INTERROGATION (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L.
REFoRM 437, 523-27, 542 (1989) [hereinafter OLP REPORT]. For descriptions of Meese's
efforts to challenge Miranda, see Jonathan I.Z. Agronsky, Meese v. Miranda: The Final Count-
down, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1987, at 86; Herman, supra note 65, at 740-42; Schulhofer, supra
note 20, at 435.
Meese has not been, of course, the only public official to attack Miranda. Richard
Nixon made Miranda one of the centerpieces of his 1968 "law and order" campaign for the
Presidency. See Richard M. Nixon, Toward Freedom from Fear, Statement in New York,
N.Y. 17 (May 8, 1968) (transcript available from the Richard M. Nixon Library & Birth-
place and on file with author) (arguing that Miranda and Escobedo "have had the effect of
seriously ham-stringing the peace forces in our society and strengthening the criminal
forces"). His assault on Miranda occurred prior to the decisions in Harris, Hass, and Tucker.
118 507 U.S. 680 (1993).
119 See id. at 683-84.
120 See id. at 696.
121 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994).
122 Withrow, 507 U.S. at 691.
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then it had little reason to refuse Withrow's invitation to take mere
Miranda violations out of federal habeas corpus. The Court in Withrow
thus kept the universe of Miranda claims within the Constitution.
Withrow stands as the most significant counterweight to the cases
upon which the new vision rests. Withrow places Miranda firmly along-
side other Supreme Court decisions that establish prophylactic rules
to protect constitutional rights.' 23 In addition to the obscenity cases
that Justice Brennan referenced in his memorandum to ChiefJustice
Warren, 24 constitutional law harbors at least two other familiar pro-
phylactic rules in North Carolina v. Pearce125 and New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan.126 In Pearce two defendants successfully challenged their
original convictions, but received more severe sentences following re-
trial. 127 The Court held that under the Due Process Clause, vindictive-
ness "must play no part" at a resentencing and, further, that the
defendant must "be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory moti-
vation."1 28 To assure the absence of any such motivation, the Court
prescribed a preventative measure: whether or not there exists actual
proof of an improper motivation, the imposition of a more severe sen-
tence following a retrial presumptively violates the Due Process
Clause. 129
Similarly, in Sullivan a city commissioner brought a libel action,
complaining that the New York Times had printed a false advertisement
about him.130 The Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments safeguard the ability of citizens to criticize public officials: 13'
"The [se] constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule
that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defama-
tory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with 'actual malice. ... '132 Though Pearce and
123 For discussions of Miranda and the use of "prophylactic" rules in constitutional
decisionmaking, see, for example, Strauss, supra note 76, at 195 (arguing that in constitu-
tional law "'[p]rophylactic' rules are . .. the norm, not the exception") and Wayne R.
LaFave, Constitutional Rules for Police: A Matter of Style 41 SYRACUSE L. REv. 849, 856-60
(1990) (contending that Miranda's prophylactic rules are appropriate and that the Fifth
Amendment would be "meaningless" without Miranda). For criticism of Miranda's prophy-
lactic rule, see Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article
Iff Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 100, 154-56 (1985) (contending that Miranda's prophylac-
tic rule is overbroad because it establishes an irrebuttable presumption).
124 See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
125 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
126 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
127 See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 713-14.
128 Id. at 725.
129 See id. at 726. The presumption would apply unless the higher sentence rested
upon information in the record showing "identifiable conduct on the part of the defen-
dant" that occurred after the date of the original sentencing. Id.
130 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256-58.
131 See id. at 269-70.
132 Id. at 279-80.
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Sullivan establish rules that one fairly may call "prophylactic," no one
disputes the constitutional authority of these decisions. Similarly, by
keeping Miranda violations within the scope of federal habeas corpus,
Withrow clearly affirms that even though Miranda may establish a "pro-
phylactic" rule, that rule contains a constitutional command. 133
II
QUESTIONING "OUTSIDE MIRANDA" AND THE NEW VISION
A new vision of Miranda-encouraged by Harris, Hass, and Elstad
and nourished by Tucker and Quarles-has begun to take root. Many
law enforcement officials in California have openly embraced this new
vision, and evidence indicates its existence in other states as well. This
new vision teaches that it is perfectly acceptable to violate Miranda
because Miranda, as only a mere non-constitutional rule of evidence,
has no application except to bar certain statements from the prosecu-
don's case-in-chief. Proponents of the new vision tell police that they
need not cease interrogating a suspect who has asserted his or her
Fifth Amendment rights. Ten years ago, Albert Alschuler hypothe-
sized about the advice that 'Justice Holmes' 'bad man of the law"'
might offer in a training manual. 34 Alschuler thought that a bad of-
ficer, one who cared only about the material consequences of and not
the reasons for his conduct, might author a manual advising police to
continue to interrogate a suspect whio asked for counsel or wished to
remain silent.13 5 Aschuler's writings proved prescient. In deciding
Harris, Hass, and Tucker, the Court could not have intended to give
police grounds to disobey this portion of Miranda deliberately, but
this disregard is the natural consequence of these decisions. Harris,
Hass, and Tucker together provide an unfortunate opening for the
quintessential "bad man of the law."
133 Since Withrow, the Clinton Administration has taken the position that Miranda was
a constitutionally based rule. In August 1997 the Justice Department filed a brief in an
appeal in the Fourth Circuit that relied in part upon Withrow and argued that in Miranda
"the Court... announced a constitutional rule based on its authority to explicate the
Constitution." Supplemental Brief for the United States at 24, United States v. Leong,
1997 INL 351214 (4th Cir.June 26, 1997) (No. 96-4876) (on file with author). At issue was
the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (a) (1994), which seemingly required a federal
court to admit into evidence any voluntary confession, even if the police obtained the
confession in violation of Miranda. The Justice Department refused to argue that the stat-
ute required a court to admit a Miranda-violative statement. See Supplemental Brief for the
United States at 23-24. This position is in marked contrast to the views of the Department
of Justice in the Reagan Administration. See sources cited supra note 117.
134 Albert W. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 HFazv. L.
REv. 1436, 1442 (1987) (quoting O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. Rxv. 457,
459 (1897)).
135 See id. at 1442-43.
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In 1995, several plaintiffs brought a lawsuit, California Attorneys for
Criminal Justice v. Butts,136 seeking to stop officers in two California
police departments from questioning suspects after the assertion of
Fifth Amendment rights. The litigation uncovered training materials
for law enforcement officials, teaching officers that it is permissible to
question suspects who have invoked the right to counsel or the right
to remain silent.13 7 Police officers commonly refer to this technique
as questioning "outside Miranda." The remainder of this Part of this
Article offers excerpts from these training materials, which starkly re-
flect this new vision of Miranda.
A training bulletin, which the California District Attorneys Associ-
ation published, expresses this new vision of Miranda by encouraging
officers to continue questioning a suspect who has invoked his or her
rights. According to the bulletin:
Despite having been on the books for twenty-nine years, Mi-
randa is still widely misunderstood by cops and lawyers, and miscon-
strued by trial and appellate courts, who keep treating it as a
constitutional imperative, the deliberate "violation" of which would
be improper, unlawful, unconstitutional and poisonous to call [sic]
resulting evidence. In fact, however, the warning and waiver com-
ponents of Miranda were simply a court-created "series of recom-
mended 'procedural safeguards' that were not themselves rights
protected by the Constitution."13 8
The bulletin concludes:
As long as officers avoid overbearing tactics that offend Four-
teenth Amendment due process, the mere fact of deliberate non-
compliance with Miranda does not affect admissibility for
impeachment .... And since Miranda is not of constitutional di-
mension, officers risk no civil liability for "benign" questioning
136 CV 95-8634-ER (C.D. Cal.).
137 Although officers receive training on questioning outside Miranda by agencies and
organizations that operate statewide, not all law enforcement officials necessarily agree
with the practice. For example, the Main County District Attorney has written that "Mi-
randa protections serve important community interests which this office fully and unequiv-
ocally supports. Officers should not attempt to intentionally violate a suspect's Miranda
rights." Jerry R. Herman, Using Statements Obtained in Violation of Miranda, MAIUN L. EN-
FORCEMErNT NEWSL. (Main County Dist. Attorney, Main County, Cal.),Jan./Feb. 1997, at 2
(on file with author).
138 Devallis Rutledge, Questioning "Outside Miranda," DID You KNoW... (California
Dist. Attorney's Ass'n, Sacramento, Cal.), June 1995, at 4 (on file with author) (quoting
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
443-44 (1974))). Devallis Rutledge is an Orange County Deputy District Attorney, and
Governor Pete Wilson appointed him to the California Commission on Peace Officer Stan-
dards and Training, which is part of the California Department of Justice.
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outside Miranda. Instead, they have "little to lose and perhaps
something to gain.. .."-19
A training manual that the California Department of Justice is-
sued to law enforcement instructors140 contains an entire section enti-
fled "Statements Obtained Outside of Miranda."141 The manual
teaches:
Voluntary statements obtained in non-compliance with Miranda's
guidelines ("outside" Miranda) statements [sic] can.., be used:
a. To impeach a defendant ....
b. As a basis for obtaining physical evidence.
c. For other investigative purposes, such as locating contraband,
locating the crime scene, identifying co-suspects, locating wit-
nesses, clearing cases in order to re-prioritize investigative time,
and putting to rest community fears. 142
The manual tells officers that "[n]on-coercive" questioning in viola-
tion of Miranda does not violate a suspect's civil or Fifth Amendment
rights and "is not itself unlawful."' 43 Further, " [w]hile the courts can
decide that police compliance with Miranda is prerequisite to confes-
sion admissibility, the courts have no authority to declare that non-
compliance is 'unlawful,' nor to direct the manner in which police
investigate crimes."'144
139 Id. (citations omitted and second omission in original). The last quoted phrase is
directly from Hass. The Court termed "speculative" the possibility that officers would vio-
late Miranda even if the Hanis-Hass rule gave them "little to lose and perhaps something to
gain." Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723 (1975).
At least one jurisdiction has adopted the training bulletin formally. The Chief of Po-
lice in Santa Monica, California issued a training bulletin that reproduced, almost verba-
tim, the bulletin that the California District Attorneys Association previously had
published. See James T. Butts, Jr., Questioning "Outside" Miranda, TRAINING BuLL. (Santa
Monica Police Dep't, Santa Monica, Cal.), Sept. 7, 1995, at 1-2 (on file with author).
140 See COMMISSION ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS & TRAINING, CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
INTERROGATION LAW INSTRUCTORS' OUTLINE (1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter CALI-
FORNIA INTERROGATION OUTLINE). The manual was issued by the California Commission
on Peace Officer Standards and Training ("POST"). POST derives its authority from the
state legislature, pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE § 13500 (West Supp. 1998). POST operates
as a commission within the California Department ofJustice. See id. The California Penal
Code sets forth POST's powers and duties, which include the following: developing training
programs for law enforcement officers, see id. § 13503(e) (West 1992); adopting minimum
standards for the "physical, mental, and moral fitness" of officers, id. § 13510(a) (West
Supp. 1998); establishing minimum standards for training of peace officers, see id.; and
making available advanced training programs for criminal investigators through a special
institute, see id. § 13511 (West 1992).
141 CALIFORNIA INTERROGATION OUTLINE, supra note 140, at 20.
142 Id. at 20-21 (citations omitted).
143 Id. at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted).
144 Id. Another government publication is the California Peace Officers Legal Sourcebook.
The Sourcebook has an entire section-four pages-under the heading "Deliberately Ignor-
ing an Invocation." CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CALIFORNIA POLICE OFFICERS LEGAL
SOURCEBOOK § 7.40a (Rev. Mar. 1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
According to the Sourcebook, when police intentionally fail to comply with Miranda, the law
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A training videotape, featuring the same deputy district attorney
who authored the California District Attorneys Association training
bulletin, is more explicit. Here are some excerpts:
What if you've got a guy [in custody] that you've only got one shot
at? This is it, it's now or never because you're gonna lose him-he's
gonna bail out or a lawyer's on the way down there, or you're gonna
have to take him over and give him over to some other officials-
you're never gonna have another chance at this guy, this is it. And
you Mirandize him and he invokes. What you can do-legally do-
in that instance is go outside Miranda and continue to talk to him
because you've got other legitimate purposes in talking to him
other than obtaining an admission of guilt that can be used in his
trial....
... [Y] ou may want to go outside Miranda and get information to
help you clear cases....
Or maybe it will help you recover a dead body or missing
person....
You may be able to recover stolen property....
Maybe his statement "outside Miranda" will reveal methods-
his methods of operation....
Maybe his statement will identify other criminals that are caper-
ing in your community....
Or, his statements might reveal the existence and location of
physical evidence. You've got him, but you'd kinda like to have the
gun that he used or the knife that he used .... [Y]ou go "outside
Miranda" and take a statement and then he tells you where the stuff
is, we can go and get all that evidence.
And it forces the defendant to commit to a statement that will
prevent him from pulling out some defense and using it at trial-
that he's cooked up with some defense lawyer-that wasn't true. So
if you get a statement "outside Miranda" and he tells you that he did
it and how he did it or if he gives you a denial of some sort, he's tied
to that, he is married to that... [P] erfectly legitimate said both the
California and U.S. Supreme Courts to use non-Mirandized state-
ment[s] if they're otherwise voluntary. I mean we can't use them
for any purpose if you beat them out of him, but if they're voluntary
statements .... [we can] use them to impeach or rebut. So you see
should still permit prosecutors to use a statement to impeach the suspect at trial, as long as
the statement is voluntary. See id. The Sourcebook reviews the cases on admissibility of a
statement that police take in violation of Miranda and characterizes Miranda's warning and
waiver requirements as mere "'suggested guidelines.'" Id. § 7.40b (Rev. Mar. 1997). An
updated version of the Sourcebook still contains this section, "Deliberately Ignoring an Invo-
cation," though the section was somewhat modified in the wake of People v. Peevy, 953 P.2d
1212 (Cal.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 595 (1998). See infra notes 396-98.
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you've got all those legitimate purposes that could be served by
statements taken "outside Miranda."'45
Does questioning "outside Mirandd' truly spell the end of Mi-
randa or at least of its original vision? As a practical matter, part of the
answer to that question depends upon how pervasive the practice has
become.
There can be no doubt that the practice of questioning "outside
Mirandd' has spread throughout California. The training materials
were distributed statewide. Confirming that officers in California
have followed this training, a substantial number of appellate deci-
sions have reported deliberate Miranda violations in interrogations in
counties all around the state.' 4 6 Further, the Los Angeles Police De-
partment ("LAPD")-the nation's third largest' 47-is involved in Cali-
fornia Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts. In that litigation, the City of
145 Miranda Videotape, supra note 73. The videotape features Devallis Rutledge, Dep-
uty District Attorney, Orange County, California and Member, California Department of
Justice, Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, but was produced and sold
to law enforcement subscribers by a private company.
The Appendix to this Article contains a larger excerpt from the videotape transcript to
establish the context in which Mr. Rutledge describes the advantages of questioning
.outside Miranda." This context is particularly important because Mr. Rutledge has denied
that he actually advises law enforcement officials to question "outside Miranda." See Deval-
lis Rutledge, Letter to the Editor, L.A. DAILYJ., Nov. 10, 1997, at 7 ("To say that I teach police
about the evidentiary implications of questioning without Miranda compliance is not to say
that I advise them to do it. I do not.") However, a fair reading of the larger excerpt shows
that Mr. Rutledge affirmatively encourages officers to question "outside Miranda," though
he also tells police that whether they ultimately decide to question "outside Miranda" is up
to them.
146 See, e.g., People v. Vasila, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 355 (Ct. App. 1995) (Sonoma County); In
re Gilbert E., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 866 (Ct. App. 1995) (Ventura County); People v. Bey, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 28 (Ct. App. 1993) (Los Angeles County); People v. Montano, 277 Cal. Rptr. 327
(Ct. App. 1991) (Contra Costa County); People v. Baker, 269 Cal. Rptr. 475 (Ct. App.
1990) (San Diego County); People v. McCarthy, 227 Cal. Rptr. 457 (Ct. App. 1986) (River-
side County) (opinion subsequently withdrawn); People v. Felix, 139 Cal. Rptr. 366 (Ct.
App. 1977) (Los Angeles County); People v. Rising Sun, 128 Cal. Rptr. 281 (Ct. App. 1976)
(Ventura County) (opinion subsequently withdrawn).
In Peevy, the California Supreme Court addressed a case in which a San Bernardino
County Deputy Sheriff questioned a suspect over the unambiguous assertion of the right to
counsel. According to the officer, he continued to question "for impeachment purposes."
Id. at 1215. The California Supreme Court was supplied with "outside Miranda" training
materials, but declined to take judicial notice of them because the issue of the officer's
training was not raised in the trial court and no effort was made to present the training
materials there. See id. at 1226-28 & n.4.
147 The Los Angeles Police Department, with 7,662 sworn officers in 1993, has the
third largest number of sworn officers of any state or local law enforcement organization in
the United States. See BuRAu OFJuSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, LAw ENFORcE-
MENT MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS, 1993: DATA FOR INDIVIDUAL STATE AND
LocAL AGENcIES wrrH 100 OR MORE OmcERs at vii tbl.B (1995) (reporting that the LAPD is
third behind the New York City Police Department (28,079 sworn officers) and the Chi-
cago Police Department (12,368 sworn officers)). By December 31, 1996, the LAPD ranks
increased to 9,204 sworn officers. See INFORMTIoN REsOURcES DEV. STATISTICAL UNIT, Los
ANGELES PoLIcE DEP'T, STATISTICAL DIGEST 7.7 (1996). During 1996, IAPD officers made
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Los Angeles admitted that it trains officers that they may engage in
"non-coercive questioning" of suspects who have asserted either the
right to remain silent or the right to counsel during a custodial inter-
rogation. 148 Counsel for the plaintiffs in the case also have obtained
LAPD reports of individual interrogations in which the interrogating
officers themselves describe questioning suspects after the invocation
of Fifth Amendment rights; two LAPD interrogation forms even have
a box for officers to check if they questioned "outside Miranda."'49
The practice of questioning "outside Mirandd' may pervade other
states as well. Although a study of 129 interrogations in Salt Lake
County in 1994 reported no evidence of police interrogation after the
invocation of Fifth Amendment rights,150 one finds court decisions
from Arizona, Colorado, and the District of Columbia in which of-
ficers have admitted that they deliberately violated Miranda to obtain
impeachment evidence or in which they deliberately refrained from
giving warnings until they already had obtained a statement from a
suspect.151 These cases stand apart from most other appellate deci-
sions, which merely record the fact of a Miranda violation without dis-
cussing the officers' motivations. In addition, decisions from thirty-
eight additional states report circumstances in which questioning con-
tinued after the suspect had asserted the right to remain silent or the
166,398 adult arrests, including 35,211 arrests for "Part I offenses" (homicide, rape, rob-
bery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny and vehicle theft). Id. at 3.2.
148 Ansver of Defendants City of Los Angeles, Raymond Bennett and Michael Crosby
to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint at 4, 5-7, California Attorneys for Criminal Jus-
tice v. Butts, No. CV 95-8634-ER (C.D. Cal. 1996) (on file with author). The City admitted
that
the Los Angeles Police Department has trained its officers that it is legally
permissible to continue non-coercive questioning of suspects who have as-
serted their right to remain silent [during a custodial interrogation] and
that prior to arraignment or indictment of a suspect, it is legally permissible
to continue non-coercive questioning of suspects who have asserted their
right to counsel.
Id.
149 See Los Angeles Police Dep't, Continuation Sheet (Sept. 9, 1991) (on file with au-
thor); Los Angeles Police Dep't, Defendant's Statement (May 31, 1995) (on file with
author).
150 See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical
Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 860-61 (1996).
151 See Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1224-27, 1249 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (ex-
plaining that Arizona officers decided, in advance of their interrogation of a rape suspect,
that they would not honor any invocation of his rights and that they would continue to
question him, in part to gain impeachment information and keep him off the stand at
trial); People v. Lowe, 616 P.2d 118, 122 (Colo. 1980) (stating that officer testified "that he
had no intention of advising the defendant of his rights until the defendant made a state-
ment to him"); Simpson v. United States, 632 A.2d 374, 379 (D.C. 1993) (finding that
officer interrogated suspect after the appointment of counsel and without advising of Mi-
randa rights and stating that the court found that the officer had talked with the suspect
"knowing... or at least thinking that [statements] could be used for impeachment" (quot-
ing the trial court)).
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right to counsel or in which police questioned a suspect without giv-
ing warnings. 15 2 None of these cases involved any question of whether
the suspect was truly in custody or unambiguously had invoked his or
her Fifth Amendment rights; hence, these cases, appear to describe
deliberate violations of Miranda.
152 See, e.g.,Jenkins v. Leonardo, 1992 WL 176665 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (violation of right to
remain silent), affd, 991 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1993); Blanco v. Dugger, 691 F. Supp. 308, 320
(S.D. Fla. 1988) (violation of right to counsel); Ex Parte Comer, 591 So. 2d 13, 14 (Ala.
1991) (violation of right to remain silent); Wilson v. State, 318 So. 2d 753, 757-59 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1975) (violation of right to counsel); D.P. v. State, 556 P.2d 1256, 1256 (Alaska
1976) (violation of right to remain silent); Hughes v. State, 712 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Ark.
1986) (violation of right to counsel); Webb v. State, 522 S.W.2d 406, 407-08 (Ark. 1975)
(violation of right to counsel); State v. Graham, 441 A.2d 857, 859-60 (Conn. 1982) (viola-
tion of right to remain silent); Tucker v. State, 411 A.2d 603, 604-05 (Del. 1980) (violation
of right to remain silent); Holmes v. State, 300 A.2d 6, 7 (Del. 1972) (violation of right to
remain silent); Nowlin v. State, 346 So. 2d 1020, 1022 (Fla. 1977) (no warnings given);
Linares v. State, 471 S.E.2d 208, 211 (Ga. 1996) (violation of right to counsel); State v.
Monroe, 645 P.2d 363, 364 (Idaho 1982) (violation of right to counsel); People v. Winsett,
606 N.E.2d 1186, 1190 (Ill. 1992) (violation of right to counsel); People v. Jackson, 535
N.E.2d 1086, 1093 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (violation of right to remain silent); Wall v. State,
441 N.E.2d 682, 683 (Ind. 1982) (violation of right to counsel); State v. Deases, 518 N.W.2d
784, 788-89 (Iowa 1994) (violation of right to remain silent); State v. Hilpipre, 242 N.W.2d
306, 309-10 (Iowa 1976) (violation of right to counsel); State v. Boone, 556 P.2d 864, 872
(Kan. 1976) (violation of right to counsel); Baril v. Commonwealth, 612 S.W.2d 739, 742-
43 (Ky. 1981) (violation of right to counsel); State v. McCarty, 421 So. 2d 213, 214 (La.
1982) (violation of right to counsel); State v. Durepo, 472 A.2d 919, 920-21 (Me. 1984)
(violation of right to remain silent); Bryant v. State, 431 A.2d 714, 719-20 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1981) (violation of right to counsel); Commonwealth v. Vincente, 540 N.E.2d 669,
670 (Mass. 1989) (violation of right to counsel); State v. Southern, 304 N.W.2d 329, 330
(Minn. 1981) (violation of right to counsel); McDougle v. State, 355 So. 2d 1386, 1388
(Miss. 1978) (violation of right to remain silent); State v. Wood, 559 S.W.2d 268, 270-72
(Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (violation of right to counsel and right to remain silent); State v.
Favero, 331 N.W.2d 259, 260-61 (Neb. 1983) (violation of right to counsel); State v. Smith,
774 P.2d 1037, 1039 (Nev. 1989) (no warning given and violation of right to counsel); State
v. Omar-Muhammad, 737 P.2d 1165, 1169-70 (N.M. 1987) (violation of right to counsel);
State v. Toms, 221 S.E.2d 94, 96 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976) (violation of right to remain silent);
State v. Knuckles, 605 N.E.2d 54, 55-56 (Ohio 1992) (violation of right to counsel); State v.
Williams, 452 N.E.2d 1323, 1332-33 (Ohio 1983) (violation of right to counsel); White v.
State, 674 P.2d 31, 36 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (violation of right to counsel); State v. Mills,
710 P.2d 148, 149 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (en banc) (violation of right to counsel); Common-
wealth v. Carbaugh, 514 A.2d 133, 134 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (violation of right to remain
silent); State v. Iovino, 524 A.2d 556, 560-61 (R.I. 1987) (violation of right to remain silent
and right to counsel); State v. Cody, 293 N.W.2d 440, 445 (S.D. 1980) (violation of right to
counsel); State v. Tidwell, 775 S.W.2d 379, 383-85 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989) (violation of
right to counsel); Pyburn v. State, 539 S.W.2d 835, 841 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976) (violation
of right to counsel); Reed v. State, 518 S.W.2d 817, 820-21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (viola-
tion of right to counsel); State v. Brunelle, 534 A.2d 198, 199 (Vt. 1987) (no warnings
given); Hines v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 403, 404-05 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (violation of
right to counsel); State v. Marcum, 601 P.2d 975, 977-78 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (violation
of right to counsel); State v. Randle, 366 S.E.2d 750, 752 & n.1 (W. Va. 1988) (violation of
right to remain silent); State v. Harris, 544 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Wis. 1996) (violation of right
to counsel); see also State v. Conner, 786 P.2d 948, 953 (Ariz. 1990) (violation of right to
remain silent); People v. Evans, 630 P.2d 94, 95 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (violation of right to
counsel); Wilkes v. United States, 631 A.2d 880, 881-82 (D.C. 1993) (no warnings given).
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The fact that these cases exist and that officers in some jurisdic-
tions receive training on questioning "outside Miranda' demonstrates
that Harris, Hass, Tucker, and Elstad indeed influence the police.
These state court cases and the California training materials, however,
do not establish the extent of this practice within each jurisdiction.
They do not establish how frequently officers continue to question
suspects following a suspect's invocation of Fifth Amendment rights in
states that train police to continue interrogation. One study, however,
provides some limited data. In 1992-1993, Richard Leo observed 182
interrogations conducted by three police departments in northern
California.1 53 According to Leo, suspects invoked their rights in
thirty-eight of the interrogations, but officers ignored the invocations
and continued to question in seven of these thirty-eight cases
(18%). 154 Officers did not question "outside Mirandd' in every in-
stance, but they did so in almost one of every five interrogations dur-
ing which suspects had asserted their rights.
In 1990 the Supreme Court decided Michigan v. Harvey,'55 ex-
tending the rule in Harris and Hass to Sixth Amendment violations.
Holding that prosecutors may impeach with evidence that they ob-
tained in violation of the Sixth Amendment, the Court said that Hass
had determined that the search for the truth outweighs the possibility
that admitting evidence that police obtained in violation of the Con-
stitution might give officers an incentive to ignore Miranda's stric-
tures: 56 "Hass was decided 15 years ago, and no new information has
come to our attention which should lead us to think otherwise
now.'u 57 This Article presents sufficient "new information" to think
otherwise. No longer the mere "speculative possibility" noted in Hass
and Harvey, deliberate disregard for Miranda threatens its core hold-
ings. Facing this burgeoning practice, the current rule of exclusion
153 He personally observed 122 interrogations and watched videotapes of 60 additional
interrogations conducted by three police departments in northern California. According
to Leo, Miranda warnings were required in 175 of these 182 interrogations. See Richard A.
Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86J. CaM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 268, 275 (1996). Leo
observed the 122 interrogations between late 1992 and mid-1993. He watched the video-
tapes during the same period, though they were undated and had been recorded earlier.
Leo believes that most of the videotaped interrogations occurred within a few years prior
to 1993. See Telephone Interview with Richard A. Leo, Assistant Professor of Criminology,
Law, and Society, University of California, Irvine (Aug. 26, 1997).
154 See Leo, supra note 153, at 276.
155 494 U.S. 344 (1990).
156 See id. at 351-52.
157 Id. at 352. In Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993), the Court also noted "that
Miranda came down some 27 years ago. In that time, law enforcement has grown in consti-
tutional as well as technological sophistication, and there is little reason to believe that the
police today are unable, or even generally unwilling, to satisfy Miranda's requirements." Id.
at 695.
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does not carry sufficient authority to lead officers to adhere to the
requirements of Miranda.
III
REASONS TO RESTORE T=E ORIGINAL VISION
The Court in Miranda expressly ranked a suspect's Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination during a custodial interroga-
tion above society's need for an inculpatory statement.158 Miranda
asserts a clear constitutional imperative: if the privilege against self-
incrimination exists in the station house, then officers acting pursuant
to a lesser authority may not abridge it. As part of the original vision
of Miranda, the Court linked Miranda's rules directly to the Constitu-
tion. Because the Court established these procedures as the mini-
mum necessary to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege, compliance
with Miranda's rules ranked above the desire of law enforcement of-
ficers to obtain a statement or other evidence.
The new vision of Miranda complicates this calculus. If Miranda's
rules merely protect the Fifth Amendment, but are not required by it,
as advocates of the new vision claim, then proponents of Miranda's
procedures cannot simply argue that a suspect's assertion of the Fifth
Amendment privilege per se trumps the desire of police to obtain a
statement. One instead must consider the values and interests that
Miranda's rules further and, ultimately, determine whether those val-
ues and interests should prevail over the needs of law enforcement.
This Part of the Article begins this inquiry and contends that we must
recapture Miranda's original vision.
A. The Original Vision Best Protects Fifth Amendment Values
The Court in Miranda described the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation as "founded on a complex of values." 159 Justice Goldberg cata-
loged some of these values in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,160
including the following: "our preference for an accusatorial rather
than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-in-
criminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and
abuses; our sense of fair play ... ; our respect for the inviolability of
the human personality . . . ; [and] our distrust of self-deprecatory
statements.' 61 In a later decision, the Court underscored the notion
158 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 (holding that government cannot abridge an individ-
ual's Fifth Amendment right); see also New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 662 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting the
express ranking in Miranda).
159 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460.
160 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
161 Id. at 55 (citations omitted). According to one commentator, Justice Goldberg's
statement in Murphy "invests the constitutional privilege with all of the values and interests
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that the Fifth Amendment protects the right to autonomy, stating that
the privilege against self-incrimination secures "values reflecting the
concern of our society for the right of each individual to be left
alone."162 The importance that our criminal justice system places
upon these values only has increased in the decades since the Court
decided Miranda. The original vision of Miranda provides the mini-
mum level of protection necessary to preserve these still-vital values.
1. Miranda and Our Accusatorial System
Miranda and its progeny are sometimes said to be required by a
system that is "accusatorial," not "inquisitorial.' 63 Language in Mi-
randa itself supports this view.' 64 Without further explication, this ar-
gument clouds more than it clarifies. After all, labeling a system
"accusatorial" or "adversarial" does little to reveal its specific, inherent
attributes.165 Furthermore, the American criminal justice process is
that underlay the common law privilege: the values of autonomy, dignity, privacy, and relia-
bility, and the interests in bodily and mental integrity." Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored
Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Con-
fession Rule (Part I), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 497, 513 (1992).
The Supreme Court revisited Murphy in United States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218 (1998).
The Justices reaffirmed Murphy's holding-that a witness given immunity by state authori-
ties still could assert the privilege due to fear of a future federal prosecution-but did so
on the basis of Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), which applied the Fifth Amendment to
the states. See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2226-30. In the context of Balsys' claim, the policies and
values that Murphy had described were insufficient to support an extension of the Fifth
Amendment privilege to the circumstance in which the witness feared a foreign prosecu-
tion. See id. at 2231-35. The Supreme Court, however, did not question that Murphy accu-
rately had described the policies and values that underlie the privilege against self-
incrimination. See id.
162 Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
163 See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 434, 468 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority's holding as a "startling departure" from the insight that our sys-
tem is " 'accusatorial'" and not "'inquisitorial'" and stating that the majority's view of the
lawyer "as a nettlesome obstacle to the pursuit of wrongdoers" is more compatible with an
inquisitorial system).
164 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 (stating that the Fifth Amendment is "the essential
mainstay of our adversary system" and that "our accusatory system of criminal justice de-
mands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against
him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compel-
ling it from his own mouth"); id. at 477 (noting that the principles announced deal with
the protections given to the Fifth Amendment during custodial interrogation and that "[i] t
is at this point that our adversary system of criminal proceedings commences, distinguish-
ing itself at the outset from the inquisitorial system recognized in some countries").
165 SeeJOsEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH AND THE LAW 46-52 (1993) (arguing that
this rhetoric is imprecise and obscures the Court's balancing, whatever the label); PHILLIP
E. JOHNSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 381-85 (2d ed. 1994) (describ-
ing the attributes of an "inquisitorial" system).
Moreover, features of an inquisitorial system provide significant protections for a crim-
inal defendant. For example, continental judges will not hear evidence of uncharged
crimes, even when this evidence probably would be admitted in common law courts (such
as when the evidence is relevant to modus operandi or intent). See Mirjan Damak a, Evi-
dentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121
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not purely adversarial. One year before the Court decided Miranda,
Yale Kamisar wrote his justly famous essay, EqualJustice in the Gatehouses
and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure,166 contrasting the few
rights of suspects in the police station (the "gatehouse") with the full
panoply of protections for the accused at trial (the "mansion"). A
pure adversarial model of criminal justice surely would not allow an
uncounseled suspect to surrender so much in the station house. It
instead would require, as some continue to advocate today, the state
to provide counsel for the accused during a custodial interrogation,
rather than merely offer advice of the right to counsel. 167 Though we
may not have an absolute adversarial system, one must acknowledge
that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination consti-
tutes an important and critical component of our predominantly adver-
sarial system. It is a critical part of our system. The virtue our society
places upon the adversary system, if anything, has become fixed more
firmly in the decades since Miranda. The Court decided Miranda just
three years after Gideon v. Wainwright, which guarantees state criminal
defendants the right to counsel.1 68 In the wake of Gideon and Mi-
randa, all jurisdictions have established assigned counsel programs.
The efforts of an expanded indigent defense bar, which receives fund-
ing from the public, have ensured that the adversarial nature of our
criminal justice system continues.
The history of the privilege against self-incrimination illustrates
its tie to the advent of counsel and to our predominantly adversarial
system. For example, in England, from where our adversarial system
derives, the modern privilege did not become firmly established until
the mid-nineteenth century.169 John Langbein forcefully argues that
U. PA. L. REv. 506, 518-19 (1973). Further, in most continental systems, though the ac-
cused may refuse to answer questions, but may not refuse to take the stand, the defendant
is not placed under oath and there are no adverse legal consequences even if the accused's
testimony is proven to be false. See id. at 527-28. In the United States, a defendant who
testifies falsely may face perjury charges. In federal prosecutions, a defendant may receive
a harsher sentence, based upon "obstruction ofjustice," when the judge concludes that he
or she has testified falsely, even without a formal criminal charge of perjury. See U.S. SEN-
TENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (1996) (providing an enhancement for "obstruction
of justice"); see also United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 98 (1993) (upholding this
enhancement). Italy's revised code of criminal procedure, which adopts many aspects of
adversarial systems, provides another example: only statements given by an accused to a
prosecutor or judge may be used as evidence-in-chief at trial. See LawrenceJ. Fassler, Note,
The Italian Penal Procedure Code: An Adversarial System of Criminal Procedure in Continental Eu-
rope, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 245, 254-55, 274-75 (1991).
166 YALE KAMIsAR, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Proce-
dure, in POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONs 27 (1980).
167 See CharlesJ. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize
Miranda, 100 HaRv. L. REv. 1826, 1842-45 (1987).
168 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
169 This point is not without controversy. Until relatively recently, the common wis-
dom has held that the privilege against self-incrimination became established in English
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the "accused speaks" trial-that is, a trial in which the defendant effec-
tively cannot decline to testify-was the norm in England until the
late eighteenth or early nineteenth century.170 At that time, the mod-
em form of criminal trials, which permit the defendant to test the
prosecution's evidence, began to displace the existing system.' 7 '
Langbein contends that at least several developments secured the
privilege against self-incrimination. First, in 1848 Parliament passed
Sir John Jervis' Act,172 which allowed the accused to refuse to answer
questions during the pretrial inquiry and required ajudicial officer to
advise the defendant that any answers might appear as evidence at
trial.173 Given that a trial is a forum to consider evidence that the
parties already have gathered, a legal system cannot ensure the privi-
lege against self-incrimination until an accused can exercise the privi-
lege in pretrial proceedings. 174 Second, defense counsel began to
appear more regularly in criminal cases in the late eighteenth cen-
tury.175 A defendant could not invoke the privilege against self-in-
crimination meaningfully until he or she could speak by proxy.'7 6
Finally, the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries saw the de-
velopment of other formal attributes of a modem criminal trial-such
as the burden of production of evidence, burden of proof, presump-
tion of innocence, and the law of evidence-that helped create a set-
ting in which an accused could assert more readily the privilege and
law in the mid-seventeenth century. Leonard Levy writes that the privilege was secured
largely as a reaction to the abusive oath ex officio and to the Crown's excesses during the
political prosecutions of John Lilburne. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORiGINS OF THE FIFrH
AMENDMENrT 277-83, 313-14 (1968); see alsoJohn H. Wigmore, The Privilege Against Self-Crimi-
nation; Its History, 15 HARv. L. REv. 610, 633-36 (1902) (discussing the development of the
privilege against self-incrimination in the English courts). Yet even Levy acknowledges that
it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that the privilege was respected during pretrial
proceedings. See LEvY, supra, at 329.
170 SeeJohn H. Langbein, The Privilege and Common Law Criminal Procedure: The Sixteenth
to the Eighteenth Centuries, in THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 82, 91-92 (R.H.
Helmholz et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter Langbein, The Privilege]; John H. Langbein, Shap-
ing the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 1,
123-34 (1983) [hereinafter Langbein, Shaping].
171 See Langbein, The Privilege, supra note 170, at 91-92; Langbein, Shaping, supra note
170, at 83-84, 123-34.
172 11 & 12 Vict., ch. 42.
173 The Act provided that during a pretrial examination before ajustice of the peace,
the justice shall read the accused the depositions (statements) of other witnesses,
and shall say to him these Words, or Words to the like Effect: "Having
heard the Evidence, do you wish to say any thing in answer to the Charge?
you are not obliged to say any thing unless you desire to do so, but whatever
you say will be taken down in Writing, and may be given in Evidence against
you upon your Trial."
id § XvIII.
174 See Langbein, The Privilege, supra note 170, at 90-92.
175 See id. at 82-83, 96-97.
176 See id.
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test the prosecution's case. 177 In this country, the Fifth Amendment
contains the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, and a
number of states adopted some form of the privilege in their early
constitutions. 17 8 Even so, the privilege developed in America much as
in England; the assertion of the right remained largely attendant
upon the expansion of the defense bar and its concomitant efforts on
behalf of those accused of crime. 179
This history demonstrates that the privilege is bound up with
other core modem features of our criminal justice system, particularly
the right to counsel. The privilege not to speak has little value with-
out an advocate who will speak. Of course, a defendant not repre-
sented by counsel may choose to stay off the stand, yet still examine
other witnesses and participate in the trial. But it surely would puzzle
a jury if the defendant did everything at trial except give his or her
side of the story; the jury probably would find it difficult not to penal-
ize the accused in some way for declining to take the stand. Further-
more, the modem theory of the criminal process, which permits the
defendant to stay off the stand and test the prosecution's evidence,
breaks down unless the defendant can prevent the prosecution from
using his or her pretrial statement to convict. With respect to rebut-
ting the prosecution's case, an accused more likely will waive the privi-
lege and testify if he or she needs to explain a statement or its fruits.
The Court in Michigan v. Tucker reiterated the concern of many Fifth
Amendment decisions-"that an inability to protect the right at one
stage of a proceeding may make its invocation useless at a later
stage." 180 Thus, "a defendant's right not to be compelled to testify
against himself at his own trial might be practically nullified if the
prosecution could previously have required him to give evidence
against himself before a grand jury."18' In this light, the privilege
against self-incrimination stands as one cornerstone of our modem
adversarial system.
The original vision of Miranda advances this Fifth Amendment
value and preserves our preference for an adversarial system. By re-
17z7 See id. at 97-100.
178 See Eben Moglen, The Privilege in British North America: The Colonial Period to the Fifth
Amendment, in THE PRrVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, supra note 170, at 109, 133-38.
179 See id. at 138-44.
180 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1974).
181 Id. at 441. The Court also has held consistently that the prosecution may not com-
ment at trial upon the accused's postarrest assertion of Miranda rights. See, e.g., Wain-
wright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 295 (1986) (finding the use of an assertion of the right
to counsel to rebut an insanity defense fundamentally unfair); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610,
618-19 (1976) (concluding the use of postarrest silence to impeach fundamentally unfair).
Although these cases rest on Fourteenth and not Fifth Amendment grounds, they work to
preserve the ability of defendants to decide whether or not to testify at trial, without suffer-
ing any penalty for the exercise of their rights prior to the trial.
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quiring police to inform suspects of their privilege against self-incrimi-
nation and to allow suspects to assert this privilege effectively in the
station house, the original vision of Miranda protects the ability of de-
fendants to invoke the privilege later-just as SirJervis' Act helped to
ensure the vitality of the privilege in England'8 2 and just as the Court
noted in Michigan v. Tucker. Furthermore, the Miranda Court held
that by requesting counsel a suspect asserts Fifth Amendment rights.
The history of the privilege demonstrates that the right to remain si-
lent and the right to counsel are inextricably intertwined. Indeed,
Miranda came just two years after Malloy v. Hogan, which applied the
Fifth Amendment to the states;18 3 the Court decided Malloy, in turn,
just one year after Gideon v. Wainwright.
2. Miranda and Individual Autonomy
Miranda also protects individual autonomy, another Fifth Amend-
ment value. In Connecticut v. Barrett,'8 4 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writ-
ing for the Court, stated that "[t]he fundamental purpose of the
Court's decision in Miranda was 'to assure that the individual's right to
choose between speech and silence remains unfettered throughout the
interrogation process. '" 8 5 Other Supreme Court decisions carefully
restrict the amount of information that a suspect must receive before
he or she chooses between speech and silence.'8 6 By both limiting the
amount of mandatory police disclosure and, at the same time, requir-
ing officers to cease interrogation once a suspect determines not to
talk, Miranda affords absolute respect for a small but vital zone of indi-
vidual autonomy in the station house. Put another way, Miranda cre-
182 See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
183 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
184 479 U.S. 523 (1987).
185 Id. at 528 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469).
186 While a premise of Miranda's warning requirement may be that any waiver of the
Fifth Amendment should be informed, many have interpreted this requirement to mean
something much different than "informed consent." Officers, for example, do not have to
reveal the subject matter of the interrogation prior to obtaining a waiver. See Colorado v.
Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 (1987). In Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986), the Court
ruled that officers need not disclose that a suspect's lawyer is trying to talk with him,
although a person surely would find this information useful in choosing whether to speak
with the police. See id. at 427. Burbine, perhaps more than any other case, demonstrates
the Justices' views about the extent of autonomy in the station house. According to the
Court, "[e]vents occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to
him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a
constitutional right." Id. at 422. In refusing to find that officers are required to tell a
suspect of his attorney's efforts to speak with him, the Justices noted that in Miranda they
had rejected the claim that a custodial interrogation requires the actual presence of a
lawyer. See id. at 426. Thus, while the warning requirement seeks in part to make a suspect
aware "that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interest," Miranda, 384
U.S. at 469, full disclosure might prove fatal to the process of custodial interrogation, and
the Court has not gone that far.
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ates a minimum, but not an optimum, condition in which an accused
may exercise autonomy.
It is difficult to overstate the extent to which our criminal system
relies upon respect for autonomy. Students of the Constitution no
doubt can name a panoply of rights that inhere to a person accused of
a crime, such as the right to a speedy and a public trial before an
impartial jury, the ability to confront witnesses, and the right to use
compulsory process to obtain the testimony of witnesses.' 8 7 In spite of
these rights, if someone unfamiliar with our Constitution were to ob-
serve our criminal justice system in practice, that person might con-
clude that our system primarily affords defendants the simple ability
to make informed decisions at critical points in his or her case.
For example, most criminal defendants whose cases are not dis-
missed plead guilty rather than go to trial. In the most recently re-
ported year, 91.8% of these defendants in federal court pleaded
guilty.' 8 A person monitoring their prosecutions might watch bail
and motion hearings and then see a strange proceeding in which the
defendant pleads guilty and waives, rather than asserts, all of his or
her highly touted constitutional rights. At that hearing, the court pri-
marily considers whether the defendant knows of the charges and
penalties and whether he or she enters a plea freely and voluntarily.
At a plea proceeding, the judge generally is not concerned with
whether a plea agreement is a good choice; rather, the judge primarily
is concerned with whether the plea is a permissible choice.i89 Defend-
ants also assert or waive their constitutional rights at various other
stages of the proceedings-they may waive, for example, the right to
counsel or the right to jury trial-and the court only will inquire
about whether the waiver is informed and voluntary, rather than ques-
tion its wisdom. 190 Even in the case of a well-represented defendant
187 See U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
188 In the 12-month period ending September 30, 1997, there were 56,541 criminal
defendants in federal district court whose cases were not dismissed. Of those, 51,918
(91.8%) pleaded guilty or nolo contendere. See STATISTICS DIv., ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 1997 REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR 224 tbl.D-7 (1997).
189 FED. R CRM. P. 11(c), for example, requires that ajudge taking a guilty plea from
a federal criminal defendant advise the accused of his or her rights. FED. R. ClM. P. 11 (d)
requires that the judge ensure that the plea is "voluntary, and not the result of force or
threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement." Id. While the court may accept or
reject the plea agreement, see id. 11(e), the procedures do not require the court to deter-
mine whether the agreement is a "good deal" for either party. See id.
190 An accused has the absolute right to conduct his or her own defense. See Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975). More recently, the Court declined to adopt a differ-
ent standard for competency to waive the right to counsel than for competency to stand
trial. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396-97 (1993). Most in the criminal justice
system regard a defendant's assertion of Faretta to be a disastrous choice. Likewise, Moran
represents an elevation of autonomy over many other values; other than furthering the
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who goes to trial, certain decisions belong solely to the client, not the
lawyer. The client decides whether or not to testify and thereby
whether to give up the protections of the Fifth Amendment.191 In
sum, courts do not engage in a colloquy with the accused over
whether the decision to testify or not amounts to a wise tactical choice
so long as the decision is informed and voluntary.
With the Supreme Court's institutionalization of the practice of
plea-bargaining and other procedures that rely upon the defendant's
formal election, 92 the extent to which our system depends upon re-
spect for the accused's informed choices only has increased since Mi-
randa was announced. 193 The original vision of Miranda fits with and
fosters this view of the criminal justice system. Under this theory, Mi-
randa seeks to create a "time-out" from the pressures of a custodial
interrogation. At one particular moment in a station house, the po-
lice provide a suspect with a modicum of information and ask
whether, in light of that information, he or she wishes to speak with
them. The Fifth Amendment protects the accused who chooses not to
speak; it does not protect one who agrees to answer questions. A sus-
pect who waives the Fifth Amendment may be questioned at length
and may even be subjected to some fairly extreme tactics, such as lies
accused's right to autonomy, little else is served by allowing a marginally competent defen-
dant conduct his or her own defense.
191 See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
includes the right of the defendant to testify "should he decide it is in his favor to do so");
ABA CRIMINALJUsTICE STANDARDS COMm., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE standard
4-5.2(a) (3d ed. 1993) ("Control and Direction of the Case") ("The decisions which are to
be made by the accused after full consultation with counsel include: (i) what pleas to enter;
(ii) whether to accept a plea agreement; (iii) whether to waive jury trial; (iv) whether to
testify in his or her own behalf; and (v) whether to appeal.").
192 See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (holding that when a
guilty plea is induced by a promise, that promise must be fulfilled); Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970) (deeming guilty plea voluntary even though motivated by fear of
the death penalty); see also supra note 190 (discussing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806
(1975)).
193 This is not to say that our criminal justice system absolutely respects all claims of
autonomy. Thus, for example, physical evidence, such as blood samples, may be taken
from suspects over their objection. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72
(1966). The government also may force an accused to testify over a claim of privilege, so
long as an order of immunity is obtained. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453
(1972). Finally, witnesses are subpoenaed to court daily and are forced to testify against
their will. In Balsys, the Court noted that absolute protection of "personal inviolability"
would seem to prohibit uninvited questioning altogether, and the law has not gone that
far. United States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218, 2232 (1998). Of course, acknowledging that
our system will afford only limited protection to principles of autonomy does not establish
those limits. In these situations the state neither refuses to honor a critical choice that the
law affords to an accused, nor seeks to use a suspect's actual words against him or her at
trial.
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and trickery,194 though Miranda also gives the suspect the right to cur-
tail the interrogation if these tactics prove too discomforting.
3. The New Vision and Fifth Amendment Values
In addition to preserving our predominantly adversarial system
and protecting autonomy, other Fifth Amendment values include cur-
tailing police misconduct, avoiding false confessions, and complying
with our sense of fair play. Some suggest that the Miranda-Edwards
rule serves these values by decreasing the use of coercive tactics; in-
deed, it gives officers an incentive not to make the interrogation so
difficult that suspects will ask for a lawyer.195 Furthermore, as ex-
plained below, to the extent that the original vision of Miranda con-
templates a set of bright-line rules that prevent the police from
obtaining an involuntary statement, Miranda directly furthers these
values.196
By contrast, the new vision of Miranda does not even minimally
protect these Fifth Amendment values. The new vision transforms the
duty of officers to cease interrogation into a weak rule of exclusion:
officers may continue to question, but courts will only exclude result-
ing statements from the prosecution's case-in-chief. Denying suspects
the effective ability to assert the privilege against self-incrimination
during a custodial interrogation lessens the adversarial nature of our
system. Excluding statements from the prosecution's case-in-chief
does not protect the privilege adequately. The police still may gather,
and the prosecution still may introduce, evidence that results from a
statement. This use of evidence may influence the ability of a suspect
to assert the privilege and stay off the stand at trial, thereby keeping
the focus of the case on the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence.
Perhaps more significantly, the new vision does not respect indi-
vidual autonomy at all. If Miranda and our voluntariness jurispru-
dence rest even in part upon the notion that the law must permit a
194 See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969) (holding that under the "totality
of the circumstances" a factual misrepresentation did not make confession involuntary);
United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1087-89 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding that a statement
was not involuntary even though officer stated falsely that the codefendant was being re-
leased because he cooperated against the accused); United States v. Petary, 857 F.2d 458,
460-61 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that a statement was not involuntary when officers falsely
stated that a codefendant was giving a full statement); United States v. Castaneda-Cas-
taneda, 729 F.2d 1360, 1362-63 (11th Cir. 1984) (ruling that a confession was not involun-
tary even though officers falsely stated that the defendant's wife confessed). For an
overview of cases in which the police have used trickery or deception during interroga-
tions, see Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. Rzv.
425, 427-32 (1996).
195 See WilliamJ. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REv. 761, 820-21
(1989).
196 See infra Part III.D.
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suspect to elect whether to speak or to remain silent, then the law
must honor the suspect's choice. 197 A system built on the premise
that defendants are entitled to make choices, even foolish ones, must
respect those choices. The new vision of Miranda does not afford this
respect and thus demonstrates a fundamental disregard for an individ-
ual's autonomy.
The original vision of Miranda, then, seeks to establish a mini-
mum level of respect for the values that underlie the Fifth Amend-
ment. The new vision upsets this approach and significantly reduces
the protections for the Fifth Amendment's "complex of values." Un-
less we truly believe that it is time to recalibrate the rights of the citi-
zen and the power of the state, the original vision of Miranda best
protects our Fifth Amendment values and is consonant with the attrib-
utes of our modem criminal justice system.
B. The Original Vision Provides the Closest Fit with Existing
Law and Practice
The Miranda Court held that a suspect's request for counsel or
statement that he or she wishes to remain silent per se invokes the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The new vision
of Miranda permits the police to continue to question over the invoca-
tion of this privilege. In so doing, the new vision directly conflicts with
existing law and practice.
The law currently provides a mechanism through which the State
can obtain a statement over a claim of privilege. When a person as-
serts the privilege against self-incrimination before an administrative,
legislative, or judicial body,198 the government may request an order
of immunity and then compel that person to talk. The government
must arrange a grant of immunity before it may compel any testi-
mony. Although a court in a later prosecution must exclude evidence
197 In Balsys, the Court reaffirmed that principles of autonomy are relevant to the pres-
ervation of the privilege within our domestic tradition. See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2232. At the
same time, the Justices declined to accept autonomy as a prima facie justification to extend
the Fifth Amendment privilege when a person feared the use of his compelled statement
in a foreign prosecution. See id. at 2231-35.
198 One may assert the privilege against self-incrimination in either civil or criminal
contexts, so long as there is a risk that the witness' testimony or statement may later be
used in a criminal proceeding. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 256-57
(1983) (allowing privilege in civil deposition); Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801,
803-04, 809 (1977) (allowing privilege in election law investigation); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
49-50 (1967) (allowing privilege in juvenile proceeding); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S.
493, 496-500 (1967) (allowing privilege in investigation into police corruption); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6-12 (1964) (allowing privilege in state gambling investigation); Wat-
kins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187-88 (1957) (allowing privilege in congressional hear-
ing); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 38-40 (1924) (allowing privilege in civil
bankruptcy proceeding); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562-64 (1892) (allowing
privilege in grand jury proceeding).
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that derives from nonimmunized, compelled testimony, the predic-
tion that a court subsequently would have to exclude the evidence "is
not enough to satisfy the privilege against compelled self-incrimina-
tion."1 99 The most common forms of immunity consist of "transac-
tional" and "use" immunity. The former protects a person from
prosecution for any act relating to his or her testimony; the latter pre-
vents prosecution by means of the immunized testimony. 200 An order
of immunity at least must provide protection coextensive with the
privilege. 201
For example, in Kastigar v. United States202 the Supreme Court
held that use immunity affords the minimum protection required by
the Fifth Amendment and prevents both direct and derivative
("fruits") use of the immunized testimony.20 3 Kastigarwas followed by
New Jersey v. Portash,204 in which the Justices ruled that the prosecution
cannot use immunized testimony even for impeachment.20 5 If the
prosecution grants use immunity to a person who later faces criminal
prosecution, the State bears the burden of establishing that its evi-
dence derived from a source that was "wholly independent" of the
immunized testimony.20 6 Purging the "Kastigar taint" often proves dif-
ficult for the prosecution.20 7 Due to the significant consequences of
granting immunity, prosecutors typically decide to seek these orders
only after careful reflection.20 Thus, apart from the rather limited
199 Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2228 n.8.
200 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 449, 453 (1972).
201 See id. at 449; McCarthy, 266 U.S. at 42.
202 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
203 See id. at 453; see also Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 117 (1988) (explaining
that the government may not prosecute with immunized testimony, either directly or
derivatively).
204 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
205 See id. at 458-59.
206 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460.
207 The high-profile criminal prosecution of Lt. Colonel Oliver North provides an ex-
treme example of the difficulty of purging the "Kastigar taint." North received use immu-
nity and testified before the Iran-Contra congressional committees. He later faced
prosecution by an independent counsel and was convicted on criminal charges. Though
the independent counsel exercised extraordinary efforts to keep witnesses from making
use of the immunized testimony, the court of appeals reversed North's conviction and
remanded for a full Kastigarhearing to decide whether any use whatsoever was made of the
immunized testimony. The Court of Appeals instructed the district court, on remand, to
review the trial record "witness-by-witness; if necessary... line-by-line and item-by-item."
United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1990), modified and reh'g denied in part,
920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990). During the Kastigar hearing on remand, former National
Security Advisor Robert McFarlane stated that North's appearance before the congres-
sional committees had influenced his testimony deeply. The independent counsel deter-
mined that he could not purge the Kastigar taint. On the prosecution's motion, the court
dismissed the charges against North. See David Johnston, Judge in Iran-Contra Trial Drops
Case Against North After Prosecutor Gives Up, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 17, 1991, at Al.
208 Thus, in upholding the ability of a witness to assert his Fifth Amendment rights in a
civil deposition, even though federal prosecutors previously had afforded the witness use
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public safety exception to Miranda that was announced in Quarles, the
Supreme Court has held that the assertion of Fifth Amendment privi-
lege is an absolute barrier to further questioning and information
gathering and that prosecutors can overcome that barrier only by af-
fording the suspect a form of protection equal to the privilege itself.
The new vision, with its practice of questioning "outside Mi-
randa," contravenes these fundamental principles. The practice of
questioning "outside Mirandd' allows officers-not courts or prosecu-
tors-to obtain a statement over a clear assertion of Fifth Amendment
rights. More importantly, it does not provide the accused with protec-
tion that is fully coextensive with the privilege. Officers who question
"outside Mirandd' seek statements for impeachment, or they attempt
to discover other evidence that prosecutors may use at trial. Yet Kasti-
gar and Portash forbid both direct and derivative use of statements
taken over a claim of privilege. Consequently, the original vision,
which requires officers to respect a claim of privilege, provides the
best fit with Kastigar, Portash, and Fifth Amendment doctrine.
As long as Kastigar and Portash stand, the new vision is difficult to
maintain. One thoughtful writer, Akhil Amar, contends that Kastigar
conflicts with other Fifth Amendment decisions, so the Court should
overturn it.209 Arguing that the Fifth Amendment only prohibits com-
pelled testimony, he asserts that it does not bar the use of the fruits of a
forced statement.210 Amar proposes a new and elaborate procedure
that in his view restores consistency to Fifth Amendment jurispru-
dence and adheres closely to the text of the Constitution. He argues
that the Fifth Amendment ought to permit the government to compel
all suspects to testify truthfully prior to trial and that the fruits of their
testimony, but not the testimony itself, may be admissible at trial.211
Courts may hold in contempt those defendants who refuse to testify,
and those who give a false statement may face prosecution for per-
jury.2 12 Amar would require courts to provide lawyers for all defend-
ants, and he would move the interrogations from police stations to
hearing rooms, where they would resemble civil depositions.213
immunity, the Supreme Court noted that "[i]f the Government is engaged in an ongoing
investigation of the particular activity at issue, immunizing new information... may make
it more difficult to show in a subsequent prosecution that similar information was obtained
from wholly independent sources." Pillsbury Co. v. Cunboy, 459 U.S. 248, 260 (1983).
209 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1997).
210 See id. at 61-65.
211 See id. at 70-71.
212 See id. at 70.
213 See id. at 76-77. Amar argues for his view of the Fifth Amendment in part by con-
tending that Miranda has permitted courts to overlook uncivilized police tactics leading to
"genuine out-of-court coercion." Id. at 56. Yet he is less than clear as to whether he would
permit any interrogation in the station house. At one point he indicates that he might
favor a rule prohibiting all questioning without a lawyer present, see id. at 76, though he
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Amar's views have prompted much dispute. Yale Kamisar, for exam-
ple, has delivered a powerful critique of Amar's construction of the
relevant cases and of the implications of his proposals. 214
But we need not visit such a sea change upon our criminal justice
system 215 to bring consistency to our Fifth Amendmentjurisprudence.
Although Amar correctly notes that the Supreme Court has permitted
the State to compel a suspect to produce physical evidence even when
the evidence may prove incriminating, 216 the presence of physical evi-
dence does not render the privilege against self-incrimination irrele-
vant. Compelled production of physical evidence implicates the Fifth
Amendment when the act of production "testifies to the existence,
possession, or authenticity of the things produced."217 The Court has
never gone so far as to require a suspect to tell officers about evidence
that prosecutors may use against him or her at trial; forcing an ac-
cused to testify about the existence of physical evidence certainly
amounts to a testimonial act of production. Thus, Kastigar, which pro-
hibits the use of physical evidence that police obtain through a forced
oral or written statement, can cohere with cases requiring the actual,
though nontestimonial, production of physical evidence.218
There is a simpler answer for those who crave consistency in in-
terrogation law and practice: restore the original vision of Miranda.
Consider a station house assertion of the right to counsel or the right
to remain silent to be an invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege
also professes to be open to a "more relaxed" scheme, id. at 77. If Amar truly believes that
formal deposition-like procedures are necessary prior to trial because of uncivilized, coer-
cive tactics by the police, one wonders why he would be willing to allow those tactics prior
to the formal pretrial deposition.
214 See Kamisar, supra note 18.
215 It seems hardly necessary to point out the sort of radical revision of our predomi-
nantly adversarial system that Amar's proposals entail. Moreover, his suggestions present
enormous practical difficulties. If some members of law enforcement dislike the restric-
tions of Miranda, they may rebel at the notion that suspects generally may face questioning
only in the presence ofjudges and lawyers. Moreover, these proposals likely will not assist
the State significantly, especially in serious cases. One can foresee, for example, that a
defendant charged with murder would accept a sanction for civil contempt rather than
give an under-oath statement that leads police to evidence that would secure a conviction.
In such a circumstance, the most that the prosecution would gain by this process is the
ability to tell the jury that the defendant has refused to testify.
216 See AMAR, supra note 209, at 61-65; see also United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-7
(1973) (holding that forced production of voice exemplars is non-testimonial); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221-24 (1967) (concluding that participation in a lineup is
non-testimonial); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764-65 (1966) (holding that com-
pelled production of blood sample is non-testimonial).
217 Baltimore City Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 555 (1990) (citing
Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 209 (1988)).
218 Amar's suggestions also contravene other well-established principles, such as those
that prevent the prosecution from commenting upon the defendant's exercise of the Fifth
Amendment privilege. See, e.g., Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 611 (1976); Griffin v. Califor-
nia, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
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and treat as compelled any statement that police deliberately take
over that assertion.
C. The New Vision Exacerbates the Compelling Pressures
Present in Custodial Interrogations
The new vision teaches that compliance with Miranda's rules is
optional; officers only need to give warnings and cease questioning
when seeking a statement for the prosecution's case-in-chief. Under
the new vision, the police probably will still give the warnings because
if warnings are given and a suspect waives his or her rights, a court will
admit at trial any resulting statement for all purposes. In most in-
stances, only after a suspect has invoked his or her rights, and an of-
ficer has failed to obtain a waiver, will questioning continue "outside
Mirandd' in an effort to obtain a statement that has a limited use at
trial or that may lead to other evidence. The majority in Miranda ex-
amined training manuals and concluded that custodial interrogations
contain "inherently compelling pressures."219 A review of current
manuals confirms that the majority's conclusion is still appropriate to-
day. To be sure, police no longer conduct week-long incommunicado
interrogations. 220 Likewise, physical abuse rarely occurs; as the Mi-
randa Court noted, "the modem practice of in-custody interrogation
is psychologically rather than physically oriented."221 Nevertheless, as
the following subsections discuss, the underlying psychology of police
interrogation has not changed since 1966. The current literature
demonstrates that interrogation has become ever more sophisticated
and that the new vision and the tactic of questioning "outside Mi-
randd' easily may lead to a compelled statement.222 In addition, the
new vision has spawned an innovative and uniquely pernicious inter-
rogation tactic, and statements that police obtain through that tactic
are particularly suspect.223
219 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
220 The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment requires that suspects in
custody receive a judicial determination of probable cause to detain within 48 hours. See
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 57 (1991).
221 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448. Physical coercion still surfaces occasionally. See, e.g.,
United States v. Jenkins, 938 F.2d 934, 939-41 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding confessions were
involuntary when defendant was beaten and threatened with death); Cooper v. Scroggy,
845 F.2d 1385, 1391-92 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding statements were involuntary when police
hit at least one defendant); Zuliani v. State, 903 S.W.2d 812, 818-19, 823 (Tex. App. 1995)
(holding statements were involuntary when officer lifted defendant off ground, shoved
him against the wall, and made threats to get his "attention"); see also Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385, 399-402 (1978) (holding statements were involuntary when officers did not
touch defendant, but continued to question him while he was in great pain in a hospital
bed).
222 See infra Part III.C.1.
223 See infra Part III.C.2.
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1. Questioning "Outside Miranda" and the Psychology
of Interrogation
There are several theoretical constructs of police interrogation.
John Reid and his colleagues in Chicago have developed the most in-
fluential model and have published the leading interrogation manual
for law enforcement officers. The Reid Model conceives of interroga-
tion as "the undoing of deception" and posits that avoidance behavior
primarily motivates a suspect's attempts at deception. 224 To obtain a.
confession, officers must (1) weaken the accused's resistance to mak-
ing a statement and (2) increase his or her desire to talk to the po-
lice. 225 Although confession may be good for the soul, it is lousy for
the defense.226 Thus, in a typical case, to obtain statements from un-
willing suspects, officers themselves must employ some form of decep-
tion. The police succeed by minimizing the perceived consequences
of giving a statement or by demonstrating the futility of denying
guilt.227 Moreover, they must give a suspect a reason to speak with
them.228 They do this "by strategically manipulating the suspect's
analysis of his immediate situation, structuring the choices before him
and dwelling on the likely consequences that attach to these
choices." 229 In this light, Richard Leo has aptly described police inter-
rogation as a "confidence game. '2 0 "The essence of the con ... lies
in convincing the suspect that he and the interrogator share a com-
mon interest, that their relationship is a symbiotic rather than an ad-
versarial one. '23 1
The majority's opinion in Miranda prominently features the first
edition of Reid's interrogation manual (which Fred Inbau co-au-
224 Brian C. Jayne, The Psychological Principles of Criminal Interrogation reprinted in FRED E.
INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 327, 327 (3d ed. 1986). Brian
Jayne is the Director of Reid College of Detection of Deception, John E. Reid and Associ-
ates, Chicago. See id. For descriptions of the Reid Model and of other psychological mod-
els of interrogation, see Gisti H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS,
CONFESSIONS AND TESTIMONY 62-72 (1992).
225 See Brian C. Jayne & Joseph P. Buckley, Criminal Interrogation Techniques on Tria4
PROSECUTOR, Fall 1991, at 23, 26; see alsoJayne, supra note 224, at 332 ("An individual will
confess (tell the truth) when he perceives the consequences of a confession as more desira-
ble than the continued anxiety of deception.").
226 For this reason, "[a ] ll approaches to the analysis of human behavior that presume
rationality would, if applied superficially, classify confession as an irrational act." RichardJ.
Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation: The Theory and Classifica-
tion of True and False Confessions, 16 STUD. L. POL. & Soc'Y 189, 194 (1997).
227 SeeJayne & Buckley, supra note 225, at 26-28.
228 See id.
229 See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 226, at 194.
230 Richard A. Leo, Miranda's Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence Game, 30 LAw
& Soc'Y Rav. 259, 260-61 (1996) (stating that "the process, sequence, and structure of
contemporary police interrogation bears many of the essential hallmarks of a confidence
game").
231 Id. at 266.
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thored).232 In the current third edition,233 Reid and his co-authors,
Fred Inbau and Joseph Buckley, advocate a "nine step" approach to
the interrogation of a suspect whose guilt appears reasonably certain.
Inbau, Reid, and Buckley's first step directs interrogators to initiate a
"direct, positive confrontation" with the accused.2 34 At the very begin-
ning of the first step, "the interrogator should finger through the case
folder to create the impression that it contains material of an incrimi-
nating nature."2 35 In the second step, officers develop and maintain a
theme.2 36 Some themes soften up a suspect (suggesting, for example,
that a crime was morally justified); other more contentious themes
seek to convince the suspect that remaining silent merely postpones
the inevitable. 237 Under the third step, an interrogator deals with the
suspect's expected denials. The manual explains that an accused usu-
ally denies guilt initially, and it directs the interrogator to confront the
suspect again. The interrogator should not permit the accused to
continue to deny, for this will bring "psychological fortification."238
"In some instances, . . . the interrogator [may need] to feign annoy-
ance as a tactic to stop a guilty suspect from repeating [the] de-
nial."239 By following these steps, the interrogator hopes to weaken
232 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449-55. As already noted, while drafting the opinion, Chief
Justice Warren asked the Supreme Court Librarian to contact Inbau and Reid's publisher
to confirm that the book was distributed widely among members of law enforcement. See
supra note 48.
233 See INBAU ET AL., supra note 224. Three Supreme Court opinions cite the third
edition. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 470 n.4 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring);
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324 (1994) (per curiam); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 459 n.45 (1986) (Stevens,J., dissenting). As one expert has written, "[a]lthough many
police interrogation manuals have been produced. . . , undoubtedly the most authoritative
and influential manual is the one written by Inbau, Reid and Buckley." GUDJONSSON, supra
note 224, at 31; see also Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards
Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 105, 118 (1997) (stating it is
"[t]he most widely used manual"); Young, supra note 194, at 431 n.31 (stating it "is the
best known manual on police interrogations").
234 INBAu Er AL., supra note 224, at 84.
235 Id. at 84-85.
236 See id. at 93.
237 See, e.g., id. at 97-99 (sympathizing with the suspect); id at 99-101 (reducing feelings
of guilt by minimizing moral seriousness of the offense); id. at 102-06 (suggesting a less
revolting and more acceptable motivation for the offense); id. at 106-18 (blaming the vic-
tim, accomplice, or anyone else); id. at 120-25 (suggesting that victim may have exagger-
ated, and the truth can only be learned from the suspect); id. at 126-27 (pointing out
futility of continued criminal behavior); id. at 128-29 (getting an admission of lying about
an incidental aspect of the offense and then using this lie against the suspect in the interro-
gation); id. at 130 (having the suspect place himself or herself at the scene); id. at 131
(convincing the suspect that the evidence is overwhelming and there is no point in deny-
ing involvement); id. at 132-86 (playing one suspect off against another).
238 Id. at 142-44.
239 Id. at 147.
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the suspect's resistance. 240 Interrogators then must increase the per-
son's desire to confess. According to followers of the Reid model:
One way to accomplish this objective is to express a concern to
the suspect that if he does not tell the truth people may make false
assumptions about why he committed the crime. The' technique
culminates by asking the suspect "alternative questions" which offer
two descriptions about some aspect of the crime. The alternative
questions are phrased so that either choice is incriminating.241
Other interrogation manuals convey similar messages. One man-
ual, for example, instructs officers to "[e] stablish a friendly atmos-
phere, but never let the suspect develop any doubt about your
competence and your complete control of the interrogation. ' 242 The
interrogator must "undermine [the accused's] confidence in escap-
ing."245 Then an officer may try to make submission seem "tolerable"
and downplay the negative consequences of a confession.244 Accord-
ing to another expert, "it is safe to say that modem practices of in-
custody interrogation are psychologically based and similar in some
respects to brainwashing techniques. " 245 The same expert notes that
the interrogation room should be free from distractions, emphasizing
the invincibility of the police. In this unfamiliar environment and
away from friends, the suspect becomes "dependent on the investigat-
ing officer."246
Richard Leo's study of police interrogations in three northern
California cities confirms the use of these techniques. He tracked the
tactics that officers employed during 182 interrogations and reported
the percentage of interrogations in which police had used these tac-
tics. Police frequently confronted the suspect with evidence of guilt
(85% of interrogations); undermined the suspect's confidence in de-
nial (43%); identified contradictions in the story (42%); offered
moral justifications or excuses (34%); confronted the suspect with
false evidence of guilt (30%); and minimized the moral seriousness of
the offense (22%).247 He notes that a common strategy was "to tell
the suspect that they are here to discuss why, not whether, the suspect
committed the crime. '248 Consistent with their training to avoid ex-
press promises of leniency, they effectively communicated these
240 SeeJayne & Buckley, supra note 225, at 26-27.
241 Id. at 28.
242 ROBERT F. ROYAL & STEVEN R. SCHUTT, THE GENTLE ART OF INTERVIEWING AND IN-
TERROGATION 119 (1976) (emphasis omitted).
243 Id. (emphasis omitted).
244 Id. at 122-28.
245 A. DANIEL YARMEY, UNDERSTANDING POLICE AND POLICE WORK 157 (1990).
246 Id. at 158.
247 See Leo, supra note 153, at 278.
248 Leo, supra note 230, at 274.
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promises implicitly by inviting the suspect to imagine how prosecutors
or juries would perceive the case if no statement was made. 249
Several experimental psychologists have demonstrated the power-
ful impact of Inbau, Reid, and Buckley's techniques. Saul Kassin and
Karlyn McNall tested subjects' reactions to interrogation transcripts
that included "minimization" and "maximization" strategies. 250 In the
"minimization" condition, the officer offered the suspect an excuse or
moral justification for the crime; in the "maximization" condition, the
officer used high-pressure tactics, such as "exaggerating the strength
of the evidence and the seriousness of the offense."'251 Suspects who
endure questioning with the maximization techniques, Kassin and Mc-
Nall's subjects believed, would receive harsher sentences than a con-
trol group of suspects who were not interrogated. 252 Kassin and
McNal also determined that although minimization techniques may
appear non-coercive (at least under legal definitions of coercion),
these techniques create expectations of leniency just as effectively as
explicit promises of leniency.2 5  More recently, Kassin and Katherine
Kiechel constructed an experiment in which subjects were falsely ac-
cused of deleting data accidentally as they typed letters on a com-
puter.2 54 In a group of subjects that typed the letters rapidly
(apparently increasing their willingness to believe that they could
have deleted the data accidently with a wrong keystroke), 69% signed
written confessions admitting that they had deleted the data and 12%
internalized or came to believe that they in fact had committed the
false act.2 5 5 Kassin and Kiechel repeated the same experiment with
another group of subjects, but modified it to include a common inter-
rogation tactic: a witness claims to have seen the subjects hit the com-
puter key that deleted the data. In this situation, every subject signed
a written confession admitting the false allegation, and 65% internal-
ized the false claim.2 5 6 Other researchers have explored the varying
impacts of these interrogation techniques upon suspects with differ-
ent personality types, noting the danger of false confessions under
generally noncoercive circumstances. 257
249 See id. at 275-79.
250 See Saul M. Kassin & Karlyn McNall, Police Interrogations and Confessions: Communicat-
ing Promises and Threats by Pragmatic Implication, 15 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 233 (1991).
251 Id. at 236.
252 See id. at 237-38.
253 See id. at 241.
254 See Saul M. Kassin & Katherine L. Kiechel, The Social Psychology of False Confessions:
Compliance, Internalization, and Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. Sci. 125, 126-27 (1996).
255 See id. at 127.
256 See id.
257 See, e.g., Gisli H. Gudjonsson, One Hundred Alleged False Confession Cases: Some Norma-
tive Data, 29 BRrr. J. OF CLInCAL PSYCHOL. 249 (1990) (reporting highly significant differ-
ences in intelligence, suggestibility, and compliance among groups of subjects referred by
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The Court justified Miranda's rules on the grounds that the custo-
dial interrogations of the time, such as those that Inbau and Reid's
first edition addresses, contain inherently compelling pressures and
that the Fifth Amendment must require certain procedures to dispel
them. One now must ask whether the current interrogation tech-
niques, such as those described in the third edition of Inbau, Reid,
and Buckley's manual, still produce these influences and whether the
conjunction of these techniques, and the strategy of questioning
"outside Miranda," acts to relieve or intensify any of these pressures.
The remainder of this subsection argues that the justification for Mi-
randa holds today.
First, the current interrogation manuals, along with field and ex-
perimental research, show that station house interrogations remain
inherently coercive.25 8 Inbau, Reid, and Buckley's third step, for ex-
ample, instructs officers not to allow a suspect to continue with his or
her denials.259 Surely conduct that prevents an accused from assert-
ing innocence coerces the suspect.260 Moreover, telling suspects that
lawyers and courts as having allegedly confessed falsely, compared with other forensic re-
ferrals). Several articles offer overviews of interrogation tactics, personality types, and theo-
ries and descriptions of false confessions. See, e.g., GUDJONSSON, supra note 224, at 205-59;
Gisli H. Gudjonsson & Hannes Petursson, Custodial Interrogation: Why Do Suspects Confess
and How Does It Relate to Their Crime, Attitute and Personality, 12 PERSONALrY & INDIVIDUAL
DIFFERENCES 295 (1991) (investigating offenders' stated reasons for confessing); Saul M.
Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 221 (1997) (advocating
further research to study risk of false confessions); Richard J. Ofshe and Richard A. Leo,
The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENY. U. L. REv. 979
(1997) (analyzing causes of false confession); White, supra note 233, at 121-35 (describing
various examples of false confessions). But see Paul G. Cassell, Balanced Approaches to the
False Confession Problem: A Brief Comment on Ofshe, Leo, and Alschuler, 74 DENv. U. L. REv.
1123, 1125-26 (1997) (arguing that studies lack empirical evidence that false confessions
occur with substantial frequency).
258 The second edition of Inbau and Reid's interrogation manual shows quite starkly
how little Miranda changed overall interrogation tactics, apart from requiring police to
administer warnings and obtain waivers. In the introduction to the second edition, pub-
lished shortly after Miranda, the authors state:
As we interpret the June, 1966, five to four decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Miranda v. Arizona, all but a very few of the
interrogation tactics and techniques presented in our earlier publication
are still valid if used after the recently prescribed warnings have been given
to the suspect under interrogation, and after he has waived his self-incrimi-
nation privilege and his right to counsel. The Court's critical comments
about the procedures we advocated were, we believe, for the purpose of
establishing the necessity for the warnings rather than as a condemnation
of the procedures themselves.
FRED E. INBAU &JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS I (2d ed. 1967)
(footnote omitted).
259 See I[NBAu ET AL., supra note 224, at 142-44.
260 In State v. Hermes, 904 P.2d 587 (Mont. 1995), the court upheld a finding that a
statement was involuntary when the officer's "entire interrogation... was premised on
[the officer's] belief" that the accused had committed the crime. Id. at 589. The officer
structured his questions so that the defendant "could not effectively deny" hisinvolvement.
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silence will lead to "false assumptions" about their behavior coerces a
suspect as well, arguably misleading him or her about the legal conse-
quences of asserting the Fifth Amendment right. Even with proper
Miranda warnings, this technique might lead a suspect to believe that
asserting the right to remain silent will have negative repercussions at
trial. Aside from whatever conclusions reasonable persons would
draw from the interrogation manuals themselves, psychological stud-
ies show the powerful coercive impact of sophisticated interrogation
techniques upon suspects-even upon those who have done nothing
wrong.
Second, when coupled with these interrogation techniques, the
practice of questioning "outside Mirandd' exacerbates the pressures
that are present in a custodial interrogation. Questioning "outside
Mirandd' precisely matches the modem psychology and strategy of in-
terrogations. The interrogator strives to convince the accused that it
is futile to deny culpability and that the interrogator has complete
control. Nothing communicates that message more powerfully than
an officer's express statement that the right to remain silent and the
right to counsel exist only in theory and that the officer will not re-
spect them. Suspects quickly discover the intentional implication:
only those who give a statement may leave the interrogation room.
Ironically, this practice may impact repeat offenders most harshly. Be-
cause of their greater experience with the law, they are more likely to
appreciate the extreme nature of the officers' conduct and therefore
have a greater reason to fear the worst.26 1 Although "outside Mi-
randa' training materials warn officers to avoid "coercion"26 2 when
questioning "outside Miranda," teaching officers that it is permissible
to continue "non-coercive" questioning after the invocation of Fifth
Amendment rights ignores the inherently coercive impact of such
questioning and provides no useful guidance or limits. Thus, the
practice of questioning "outside Miranda' significantly intensifies the
pressures already inherent in a station house interrogation, for it takes
away suspects' ability to cut off questioning and does so in a way that
underscores the raw, seemingly unchecked, power of the
interrogator. 26 3
Id. While this was only one factor in the totality of the circumstances, it was a strong factor
supporting the conclusion that the statement was involuntary. See id.
261 I am grateful to Richard Ofshe for this observation.
262 See supra notes 139, 143, 148 and accompanying text.
263 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that continuing to question over an invoca-
tion of the Fifth Amendment intensifies these coercive pressures. In Arizona v. Roberson,
486 U.S. 675 (1988), the Court ruled that after a suspect invokes the Fifth Amendment,
officers may not reinterrogate the suspect even if the interrogation concerns a different
offense. See id. at 677-78. The majority noted that "to a suspect who has indicated his
inability to cope with the pressures of custodial interrogation by requesting counsel, any
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2. The Newest Tactic
Taken to its logical extreme, the new vision allows aggressive mis-
use of Miranda to help convince suspects to talk to police. Because
officers who subscribe to the new vision believe that violating Miranda
produces only limited evidentiary consequences, some officers assure
defendants that they cannot incriminate themselves because they have
invoked their Fifth Amendment rights. Richard Leo reports this prac-
tice in the interrogations he observed. In each of the interrogations
in which officers questioned an accused who had invoked the Fifth
Amendment, "the detective(s) informed the suspect that any informa-
tion the suspect provided to the detective could not and therefore
would not be used against him in a court of law. The detective told
the suspect that the sole purpose of questioning was to learn 'what
really happened.' 264 Appellate courts in Nebraska, Georgia, and Cali-
fomia also have noted this tactic. 2 65
The interrogation of James McNally, one of the plaintiffs in Cali-
fornia Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts, shows the impact of ques-
tioning "outside Mirandd' and the power of this new, aggressive
technique. Police arrested McNally for a homicide, and detectives
from the Santa Monica Police Department questioned him. He ini-
tially waived his rights and made a statement.266 After detectives said
that they did not believe his story, however, McNally told them that he
did not want to make a further statement and that he wanted to talk
with a lawyer.267 The questioning continued:
further interrogation without counsel having been provided will surely exacerbate
whatever compulsion to speak the suspect may be feeling." Id. at 686.
264 Leo, supra note 153, at 276. As Leo pointed out:
Of course, what the detectives knew and did not tell the suspect was that
although the prosecution could not use such evidence as part of its case-in-
chief, any information the suspect provided to the detective could be used
in a court of law to impeach the suspect's credibility, and indirectly incrimi-
nate the suspect if he chose to testify at trial.
Id. (footnote omitted).
265 See People v. Bey, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 28, 30 (Ct. App. 1993) (reporting that officers
told suspect, "you realize you didn't waive your rights. That means we can't use 'em [state-
ments] in court," and asked the suspect if he was familiar with "outside Miranda" (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Linares v. State, 471 S.E.2d 208, 211 (Ga. 1996) (noting that
officer continued to question after the assertion of the right to counsel, telling the defen-
dant "'that any information that he may give could not be used against him'"); State v.
Favero, 331 N.W.2d 259, 261 (Neb. 1983) (noting that officer continued to question after
invocation of right to counsel "and stated that as long as an attorney was not present, any
statement made could not be used as an admission in court, so the defendant could tell
him 'off the record' what his side of the story was"); State v. Harper, 304 N.W.2d 663, 668
(Neb. 1981) (finding that after accused invoked right to counsel, "the police promised the
defendant that any statement made would never be used against him").
266 See Transcript of Interview of James McNally at 2-5, People v. McNally (No. SA-
013191) (Mar. 2, 1993) (on file with author).
267 Id. at 42-46, 53-54.
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Det. Talbot:
McNally:
Det. Talbot:
McNally:
Det. Talbot:
The officers persis
Det. Talbot:
McNally:
Det. Talbot:
McNally:
Det. Talbot:
Det. Cooper:
Okay, now, let me, let me explain to you what's happened.
You've basically invoked your Right to have an attorney
Right.
... okay? At this point, nothing that you say can be used
against you in Court... in California because you have
invoked your Right to have an attorney.
Right.
I still would like to know what happened now because-
well, I'll tell you where I come from. I don't trust anything
that anybody tells me after they've talked to an attorney
and the D.A. that will be working with us on this case
doesn't either.2 68
sted:
... [I]f you were in our place, would you trust something
that somebody told you after they talked to an attorney?
... [T]he deal is here. It's up to them.., to talk about it.
The only thing is, everything that falls after this-we'll go
in one direction based on the physical evidence and the
statements that we have. If we don't have anything to the
contrary, that's the direction we're gonna' go and we're
gonna push it.
Right.
Okay, and fluck your attorney. It's just-I don't care
about him anymore.
Yeah.
Okay. As far as I'm concerned, you know, they really mess
up the system. I wanna' know now what you're gonna tell
me later. It can't be used against you. We...
This is your opportunity.
Det. Talbot: ... told you that.
Det. Cooper: And it's--this is your opportunity and it's not gonna' be
used against you ...
McNally: ... Alright. I'll... and this can't be used against me.
Det. Cooper: No, absolutely... [W] e're promising you, it's not gonna'
be used against you-in the case in chief-against you,
okay? Just, this is for our edification of what happened.
McNally: Well, anyway, he picked me up outside, outside the Oar
House, okay? He asked me if I wanted to go have some
beers .... 269
At its logical conclusion, the new vision transforms Miranda from
a decision that protects a suspect into a new and aggressive tool for
268 Id. at 54-55.
269 Id. at 56-58.
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law enforcement. Under this practice, officers comply with the warn-
ing requirements of Miranda, but then represent that the suspect's
assertion of rights makes a full statement perfectly safe. Of course,
given the current use of the statements to impeach and to discover
other evidence, the officers' assurances at best mislead the suspect
and at worst directly deceive him or her regarding the true state of the
law. In the interrogation of James McNally, the officers subtly added
that the prosecutor could not use any statement against him "in the
case in chief." This statement may correctly represent their interpre-
tation of the law, but it deliberately revises Miranda's warnings in a
manner that suspects will not likely understand. This interrogation
tactic represents the unappealing endgame of the new vision. If it
ever pervades our system, we inevitably will realize that half a Miranda
rule is worse by far than no rule at all.
D. We Still Need Bright-Line Rules
Although the Supreme Court intended Miranda's bright-line
rules to prevent police from using coercive tactics and to decrease the
number of due process challenges to the admission of statements, Mi-
randa does not displace the Fourteenth Amendment entirely. An ac-
cused may move to suppress custodial statements under both Miranda
and the Fourteenth Amendment. 270 Decisions such as Harris v. New
York, Oregon v. Hass, and Michigan v. Tucker, by undermining Miranda,
give defendants a real incentive to raise Fourteenth Amendment
claims in addition to those under Miranda because an involuntary
statement is inadmissible for any purpose, including impeachment.2 71
The Court has refined the test for voluntariness under the Four-
teenth Amendment in the years since it decided Miranda, but it still
has not articulated a precise standard. The Supreme Court has ruled
that courts cannot suppress a statement as involuntary absent some
action by the police, for without state action there can be no "coer-
cion."2 72 For example, the fact that a suspect is mentally ill and that
his or her statement is something other than the product of a "free
will" 273 does not qualify the statement as involuntary under the Four-
teenth Amendment; police conduct must contribute to eliciting the
270 An accused who has made a statement under circumstances in which officers do
not need to give Miranda warnings, such as when a defendant is not in custody, cannot
raise Miranda, but still may move to suppress the statement as involuntary. See, e.g., United
States v. Walton, 10 F.3d 1024, 1028-32 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that a statement made by an
out-of-custody defendant was involuntary when agent promised that the conversation was
'off the cuff").
271 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1978) (finding that involuntary state-
ments made while defendant was hospitalized could not be used in court).
272 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165-67 (1986).
273 Id. at 169-70. Albert Alschuler contends that the pre-Connelly efforts to assess
whether a confession was the product of a free will were misguided, and he forcefully
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statement. Nevertheless, the test remains soft and value-laden. In
Miller v. Fenton274 the Court refused to treat a state court determina-
tion of voluntariness as a finding of fact that would be presumed cor-
rect on federal habeas corpus review. 275 The question of
voluntariness, Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court, "has always had a
uniquely legal dimension," turning on whether the officers' tech-
niques comport with our accusatorial system.2 76 Once again, the
Court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment provides no precise
standard and concluded that the "hybrid quality of the voluntariness
inquiry" subsumes "a 'complex of values."' 2 77
The Court may have revisited the traditional test for voluntariness
since Miranda, but the essential character of this test remains un-
changed. It draws upon and reflects the values of an ever-shifting ju-
diciary and an ever-changing society. Admittedly, certain forms of
police conduct, such as threats of physical violence 278 and threats con-
cerning the custody of children,279 usually will lead to a finding of
involuntariness-even under a totality of the circumstances approach.
Yet apart from these plain cases, appellate decisions fall to give police
and trial courts adequate guidance on what conduct will make a state-
ment involuntary, particularly when a suspect claims that police used
psychological coercion.280 In these circumstances, the voluntariness
argues that the shift in focus to police conduct is entirely appropriate. See Albert W. Al-
schuler, Constraint and Confession, 74 DENv. U. L. REv. 957, 958-60 (1997).
274 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
275 See id. at 115-18.
276 Id. at. 116.
277 Id. (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960)).
278 See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287-88 (1991) (holding that state-
ment was involuntary due to credible threat of physical violence).
279 See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963) (holding confession involun-
tary because of oral threat that aid to children would be cut off and children would be
taken away unless the accused cooperated); United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1335-37
(9th Cir. 1981) (finding statement involuntary when officer's comments led the suspect to
believe that unless she cooperated, she would not see her child for a long time).
280 Compare, e.g., Thompson v. State, 768 P.2d 127, 131-32 (Alaska Ct App. 1989)
(statement not made involuntary by officer's suggestion that if the defendant talked, he
might be guilty only of a lesser charge and serve only two to five years), McIntyre v. United
States, 634 A.2d 940, 944-45 (D.C. 1993) (statement voluntary when officer lied about evi-
dence implicating the accused), People v. Hardy, 391 N.W.2d 412, 413, 416-17 (Mich. Ct
App. 1986) (statement held voluntary despite officer's promise to talk to prosecutor and
"possibly" get a reduction on criminal charges), State v. Marini, 638 A.2d 507, 512-13 (R.I.
1994) (statement not coerced by officer's comment that the defendant would be better off
by confessing and even could get probation), and State v. Kelly, 603 S.W.2d 726, 729-30
(Tenn. 1980) (defendant's will not overborne by officer's promise to ask prosecutor not to
oppose probation), with People v. Cahill, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Ct. App. 1994) (statement
held involuntary when, among other things, officer impliedly promised that the defendant
could avoid first degree murder by giving a confession that showed no premeditation),
People v. Gordon, 149 Cal. Rptr. 91-94 (Ct App. 1978) (statement held involuntary when
parole officer told the defendant that the parole authorities might wonder why he had
refused a polygraph and that the results of the polygraph would be made available to the
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inquiry has not advanced-much since 1963, when the Supreme Court
noted that the line between permissible and impermissible police con-
duct "is, at best, a difficult one to draw. '281
Given the inability of the courts to articulate a precise test for
voluntariness, a primary virtue of Miranda remains its clarity, as the
Supreme Court has stated repeatedly.28 2 In Tucker, Justice Rehnquist
wrote for the Court that Miranda seeks "to help police officers con-
duct interrogations without facing a continued risk that valuable evi-
dence would be lost. '28 3 For this reason, several Justices who initially
had opposed Miranda later modified their views,284 and the decision
police), State v. Rhiner, 352 N.W.2d 258, 263 (Iowa 1984) (statement held involuntary
when officers told the defendant that other charges might be filed against him unless he
cooperated), State v. Grey, 907 P.2d 951, 954-55 (Mont. 1995) (statement held involuntary
when officer lied about strength of prosecution's, evidence and the extent of thefts), State
v. Hermes, 904 P.2d 587, 588-90 (Mont. 1995) (statement held involuntary when officer
asked questions in a way that assumed guilt and did not permit the defendant to effectively
deny incident), Commonwealth v. Nester, 661 A.2d 3, 5-6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (statement
coerced by caseworker's promise of counseling and claim that it would be harder to talk
with the police), and State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 225-27 (Utah 1989) (remand for hearing
on voluntainess when officer told the suspect that if he talked, he could get second- in-
stead of first-degree murder).
281 Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963).
282 See, e.g., Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 151 (1990) ("The merit[s] of the
Edwards decision lies in the clarity of its command and the certainty of its application.");
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680 (1988) ("A major purpose of the Court's opinion in
Miranda... was 'to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies
and courts to follow.'") (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 425 (1986) ("As we have stressed on numerous occasions, '[one] of the principal
advantages' of Miranda is the ease and clarity of its application.") (quoting Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 430 (1984)); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979) ("Mi-
randa's holding has the virtue of informing police and prosecutors with specificity as to
what they may do in conducting custodial interrogation, and of informing courts under
what circumstances statements obtained during such interrogation are not admissible.").
283 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443 (1974).
284 Justice Tom Clark was one of the dissentingJustices in Miranda. He wrote that the
majority's decision would impair, if not wholly frustrate, the ability of police to secure
confessions. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 499-503 (Clark, J., dissenting). Just two years later,
however, he modified this opinion. See Tom C. Clark, Observations: Criminal Justice in
America, 46 TEX. L. REv. 742, 745 (1968) (admitting that he erred in predicting that Esco-
bedo and Miranda would have an adverse effect upon the investigation and prosecution of
crimes).
Justice Byron White, another of the original dissenters, wrote a passionate opinion
contending that the decision would weaken law enforcement measurably. See Miranda, 384
U.S. at 526, 541-42 (White, J., dissenting). A frequently quoted portion of his dissent states
that "[i]n some unknown number of cases the Court's rule will return a killer, a rapist or
other criminal to the streets... to repeat his crime whenever it pleases him." Id. at 542.
White never changed his view that Miranda was wrongly decided. See Clifford May, On
Judges and Justice: Byron White Reflects on Court and Critics, RocKY MOUNTAIN NEws, June 30,
1996, at 69A ("I thought Miranda was wrong. I still do, but it's the law." (quoting Byron
White)). Nevertheless, White would go on to write the majority opinion in Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), which adopted a bright-line rule to protect the ability of a
suspect to invoke the right to counsel, and he joined the five-to-four majority in Withrow v.
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subsequently has gained a large measure of support among members
of the law enforcement community.285
Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993), which kept Miranda claims within the reach of federal
habeas corpus.
Justice Harry Blackmun was not on the Court when it decided Miranda. He later de-
scribed himself as "no great fan of that decision." Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun
to Justice Byron White 1 (Dec. 23, 1980) (on file with the Library of Congress in the Papers
of William J. Brennan, Container 568, File "Edwards v. Arizona, No. 79-5269"). Yet like
White, Blackmun joined the majority opinions in Edwards and Withrow.
Justice Lewis Powell, Jr. also was not on the Court when it decided Miranda. He served
on a Presidential Commission prior to his appointment to the bench, however, and issued
a minority statement attacking Miranda. A separate statement he joined suggested that
whatever could be done "to right the present imbalance through legislation or rule of
court" should have priority; failing that, he suggested a constitutional amendment to over-
rule Miranda. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE Socin, 679-80 (1967) (Additional Views of Messrs. Leon
Jaworski, Ross L. Malone, Lewis F. Powell,Jr., and Robert G. Storey). Powell's opinions on
Miranda and the Warren Court, among other things, brought him to the attention of the
Nixon Administration and helped lead to his nomination to the Supreme Court. SeeJOHN
C. JEFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEwis F. PowELL, JR. 214 (1994). Once on the Court, however,
Powell also moderated his views. Though he generally sided with the majority in cases that
interpreted Miranda narrowly, he did not seek to overturn Miranda. See id. He even wrote
the opinion for the Court in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), which protected suspects'
ability to invoke their Fifth Amendment rights by holding that prosecutors could not com-
ment on defendants' postarrest silence. As Powell's biographer has noted, Powell opposed
Miranda when it was announced, but "accepted it when he came to the Court several years
later. By that time, much of the price for the reform of police practices had already been
paid, and the benefits derived from the rule were more and more apparent." JEFFRIES,
supra, at 403-04 (footnote omitted).
ChiefJustice Warren Burger also joined the Court after it had decided Miranda Yet
his rulings while he served on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, together with
his writings and speeches prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court, made clear that
he did not favor the ruling. See BAKER, supra note 45, at 194-97, 274-75. Shortly after Bur-
ger joined the Court, he told the other Justices that they should overrule a number of
Warren Court decisions, including Miranda, and Burger looked carefully for the votes to
do so. See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1939-1975: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
WILtAM 0. DOUGLAS 231-32 (1980). By 1980, Burger had come to an accomodation, writ-
ing that "[t]he meaning of Miranda has become reasonably clear... ; I would neither
overrule Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this late date." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291, 304 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring in thejudgment).
285 Four police organizations (the Police Foundation, Police Executive Research Fo-
rum, International Union of Police Associations, and National Black Police Association)
and 51 former prosecutors filed an amicus curiae brief in Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680
(1993). They asked the Court not to take Miranda claims out of the reach of federal
habeas corpus in part because "[t]he law enforcement community has seen the enforce-
ment of Miranda and its progeny lead to an increased professionalism within police and
sheriff's departments throughout the country. Miranda's bright-line rules have proved rel-
atively easy to follow." Brief Amici Curiae of The Police Foundation et al. in Support of
Respondent at 7, Withrow (No. 91-1030). Others in law enforcement share these views. See,
e.g., Conrad V. Hassell, In Defense of Fairness: The Need for Miranda, POLICE CHIEF, Dec. 1987,
at 12 (defending Miranda, a former FBI section chief writes that "[r]ather than being anti-
law enforcement, Miranda could be viewed as an heroic attempt by the Warren Court to
rescue law enforcement from a situation that had become impossibly confused and diffi-
cult"); Eduardo Paz-Martinez, Police Chiefs Defend Miranda Decision Against Meese Threats,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 5, 1987, at 25 (stating that members of the Massachusetts Police Asso-
ciation felt that "the demise of Miranda would set civil rights in law enforcement back to
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The years after Miranda have not diminished the need for bright-
line rules. Abandoning the original vision of Miranda leaves courts
and police to struggle with case-by-case determinations of voluntari-
ness. In contrast, by complying with Miranda, officers largely avert the
need for a voluntariness inquiry. In the overwhelming majority of
cases, a court will find that a suspect who received proper warnings
and waived his or her Fifth Amendment rights made a voluntary state-
ment.286 Furthermore, apart from the notion that a fully informed
waiver usually negates a claim of coercion, Miranda has made it easier
to resolve a motion to suppress a statement under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Because courts typically view an officer's violation of Mi-
randa as a significant indicator of a coerced statement under the total-
ity of the circumstances analysis, 28 7 complying with Miranda bolsters a
prosecutor's position under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Some critics of Miranda, however, argue that we do not need
bright-line rules because other procedures adequately safeguard Fifth
Amendment rights. For example, Paul Cassell, possibly Miranda's
most ardent critic today, proposes that the Court modify the warnings
to dispense with the offer of counsel, and he suggests that courts no
longer require officers to terminate the interrogation when a suspect
invokes his or her rights.288 He also argues that "[v]ideotaping inter-
rogations would certainly be as effective as Miranda in preventing po-
lice coercion and probably more so."289 But these proposals give no
the gray days of the early 1960s"); Burt Solomon, Meese Sets Ambitious Agenda That Challenges
Fundamental Legal Beliefs, 17 NAT'L J. 2640, 2641-42 (1985) ("'The Miranda wamings are
simple and easy to give and are known by everyone .... There's real benefit in keeping
things stable.'" (quoting former Associate Attorney General Rudolph Giuliani)); Benjamin
Wittes, DOJForced to Review Merits of Miranda Law, RECORDER, Aug. 15, 1997, at 1 (quoting
legislative assistant with the Fraternal Order of Police as stating that there "wouldn't be a
movement among law enforcement organizations to change Miranda... [A]nd our mem-
bers are not telling us this needs to happen. It's been around for 30 years"). This com-
mentary does not mean, of course, that this view predominates in the law enforcement
community.
286 Even several experts who reject the premise of Miranda-that interrogations may
be psychologically coercive-argue that "if the suspect has made no attempt to terminate
the interrogation, he cannot legitimately claim that his confession was compelled." Jayne
& Buckley, supra note 225, at 30.
287 See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 399 (1978); People v. Esqueda, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 126, 134-35 (Ct. App. 1993); Linares v. State, 471 S.E.2d 208, 212 (Ga. 1996); Hof
v. State, 655 A.2d 370, 380 (Md. 1995); State v. Burris, 679 A.2d 121, 135-36 (N.J. 1996);
State v. Taillon, 470 N.W.2d 226, 229 (N.D. 1991); Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 98-99
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996); State v. Mabe, 864 P.2d 890, 893 n.6 (Utah 1993).
288 See Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L.
REv. 387, 496-97 (1996). These proposals also were made by the Justice Department's
Office of Legal Policy in its 1986 report. See OLP REPORT, supra note 117, at 554-56, 560.
Cassell served as Associate Deputy Attorney General under Edwin Meese from 1986-1988.
289 Cassell, supra note 288, at 487, 497; accord Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The
Grand llusion of Miranda's Defenders, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1084, 1118-24 (1996) (arguing that
videotaping is an appropriate substitute for Miranda).
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guidance at all to police and the trial courts.290 Telling officers that
they need not cease questioning when a suspect invokes his or her
rights simply sends police and courts back into the Fourteenth
Amendment morass of soft standards. Without a bright-line rule, how
does an officer or ajudge decide the point at which questioning over-
comes a suspect's will? The number of times an accused asserts his or
her rights certainly plays a role in the voluntariness inquiry. But must
a suspect invoke several times to show that he or she is truly serious
about remaining silent? Miranda simply presumes coercion when in-
terrogation continues after a single invocation of the right to counsel
or the right to remain silent. Will we eventually replace this clear rule
with a three, five, or fifteen invocation rule?29 1 Admittedly, videotap-
ing would help resolve disputes about what was actually said and done
during an interrogation; further, officers who know that they are on
videotape also may refrain from clearly inappropriate conduct.292 Yet,
in the end, videotaping cannot replace Miranda. Ajudge may review
the videotape to decide a suppression motion, but will still decide the
motion under a soft and value-laden standard.
The Supreme Court fashioned Miranda's rules in part to provide
clear guidance for both law enforcement officials and trial judges.
The Fourteenth Amendment voluntariness test may capture our soci-
ety's notions ofjustice and fair play broadly, but it does not set precise
limits for police. Our voluntariness jurisprudence has not advanced
substantially in the years since Miranda. We still need bright-line rules
in the station house.
E. The New Vision Fosters Disrespect for Government
and the Law
For over thirty years, the Supreme Court has stated consistently
that when a person in custody asserts his or her Fifth Amendment
rights, all questioning must cease. Though the proponents of the new
vision of Miranda argue that Harris, Hass, and Tucker together hold
that officers may continue to question a suspect who has asserted Fifth
Amendment rights, the Court has never expressly permitted police to
persist in questioning for the limited purpose of collecting impeach-
290 For a more detailed critique of these proposals, see Schulhofer, supra note 108, at
556-60.
291 Even Cassell concedes that "[c]ontinued persistence to convince a suspect to
change his mind will, at some point, render a confession involuntary and thus inadmissible
under Fifth Amendment principles." Cassell, supra note 288, at 497 n.634. However, Cas-
sell fails to indicate when an interrogation reaches this "point."
292 For these reasons, others (including supporters of Miranda) also have urged the
taping of interrogations. See, e.g., YALE KAMIsAR, Brewer v. Williams-A Hard Look at a Dis-
comfiting Record, in POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONs, supra note 166, at 113, 132-37;
Richard Leo, The Impact of Miranda Reisited, 86 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 681-92
(1996); Schulhofer, supra note 108, at 556-57; White, supra note 233, at 153-55.
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ment or other evidence. Rather, apart from the Quarles "public safety"
exception, the Court consistently and unequivocally has declared that
all questioning must cease when a suspect invokes his or her rights. 293
The new vision of Miranda allows officers to treat this unambiguous
command as nothing more than a hortatory sentiment, which fosters
disrespect for both government and the law.
By providing police officers with no incentive to obey clear judi-
cial commands, the new vision diminishes the authority of the
Supreme Court and of the courts that have sought to implement Mi-
randa. In several respects, the new vision bears more than a passing
resemblance to our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence prior to Mapp
v. Ohio. The Supreme Court determined in Wolf v. Colorado that the
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
but held that the exclusionary rule was not an essential component of
that right.294 As a result, citizens held the right in theory, but not in
practice.295 The Mapp Court eventually applied the Fourth Amend-
ment exclusionary rule to the states in part because of its belief that
"[n] othing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to
observe its own laws."' 296 Here, any wound to the Supreme Court's
authority from allowing the practice of questioning "outside Mirandd'
is mostly self-inflicted. After all, the Supreme Court itself has en-
couraged the practice by driving a wedge between Miranda and the
Fifth Amendment and by creating incentives to violate Miranda. Nev-
293 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 (1994) ("If a suspect requests
counsel at any time during the interview, he is not subject to further questioning."); Mc-
Neil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176-77 (1991) ("Once a suspect asserts the right [to coun-
sel] .... the current interrogation [must] cease."); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153
(1990) ("[W]hen counsel is requested, interrogation must cease."); Arizona v. Roberson,
486 U.S. 675, 682 (1988) ("[A]fter a person in custody has expressed his desire to deal with
the police only through counsel, he 'is not subject to further interrogation.'" (quoting
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1980))); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523,
528 (1987) ("[O]nce the accused 'states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must
cease.'" (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966))); Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485 (once the
right to counsel is "exercised by the accused, 'the interrogation must cease'" (quoting Mi-
randa, 384 U.S. at 474)); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979) ("[A]n accused's
request for an attorney is per sean invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights, requiring that
all interrogation cease."); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74 ("If the individual indicates in any
manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the
interrogation must cease." (footnote omitted)).
294 See 338 U.S. 25, 28-33 (1949).
295 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
296 Id. at 659. More recently, the Court has stated:
Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best
when each part of the government respects both the Constitution and the
proper actions and determinations of the other branches. When the Court
has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province of the
Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997) (citation omitted).
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ertheless, the Supreme Court's clear public rulings-that questioning
must cease upon a proper invocation-diverge so greatly from actual
police interrogation practices that,whatever the cause, this gap threat-
ens the integrity of the law and its institutions.297 Obviously aware of
this gap between the language in court opinions and police practice,
authors of "outside Mirandd' training materials boldly tell officers that
"the courts have no authority to declare that non-compliance [with
Miranda] is 'unlawful,' nor to direct the manner in which police inves-
tigate crimes."298
Moreover, by permitting officers to question suspects in violation
of Miranda, the new vision adds to the public's distrust of law enforce-
ment and complicates the work of the police. President Johnson's
Crime Commission noted in 1967 that the way in which a police of-
ficer exercises discretion may "have an immediate bearing on the
peace and safety of an entire community, or a long-range bearing on
the work of all policemen everywhere." 299 The police rely upon citi-
zens to report crimes and to assist with criminal investigations. 300 In-
deed, the current movement towards community-oriented policing
aims mostly at fostering mutual trust and cooperation between law
enforcement and the public, and it responds to the limitations of the
isolating and reactive earlier model of policing.30 To the extent that
297 Proponents of the new vision might attempt to counter this point by arguing that
the new vision does not promote disrespect for the law because it is the law, as articulated
in Harris and its progeny, that permits officers to question an accused over the assertion of
the Fifth Amendment. The Court, however, has never expressly sanctioned such question-
ing. Instead, the Court publicly and repeatedly has pronounced that all questioning must
cease. If the Court in the future expressly sanctions this conduct, that holding would con-
stitute a retreat from earlier rulings but would not promote disrespect for the law-at least
not in the same sense argued in this Article.
298 CALIFORNIA INTERROGATION OUTLINE, supra note 140, at 21.
299 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OFJUsTICE, supra note 284,
at 92.
300 See, e.g., Police Brutality: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 219 (1991) (statement of Gerald I. Williams,
Chief of Police, Aurora, Colo. and President, Police Executive Research Forum) ("In order
to be effective, the police must enjoy a good working relationship with their communities,
predicated on feelings of mutual trust and understanding."); CHARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRIMI-
NAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINALJUSTICE 204-05 (1978) (noting that the more that members of the
public know and trust police, the greater the chances of solving and reducing crime); Lee
P. Brown, Police-Community Power Sharing, in POLICE LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA 70, 71-74 (Wil-
liam A. Geller ed., 1985) (advocating for police and community partnership because each
possesses unique power and information that the other lacks).
301 See, e.g., JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FWE, Anove THE LAW 251-52 (1993)
(describing community-oriented policing as a response to the recognition that riding in
two-person patrol cars does not reduce public fear of crime or engender trust in the po-
lice); BuREAu OF JUsTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNDERSTANDING COMMu~lUNITY
POLICING: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 15-16 (1994) ("Establishing and maintaining mutual
trust is the central goal of the first core component of community policing-community
partnership.... This trust will enable the police to gain greater access to valuable informa-
tion from the community that could lead to the solution and prevention of crimes.. ..");
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the public believes that officers do not play by the rules, the public
may be more reluctant to work with the police.30 2 At the extreme end
of the spectrum, some of our nation's most pronounced recent peri-
ods of social unrest occurred when the public perceived that officers
had acted above the law or that the law tolerated these actions.303
Miranda is fast becoming a rule that the courts will not enforce
and the police will not obey. Maintaining an unenforced and highly
visible rule fosters disrespect for the government and legal institu-
tions. We might do far better to abrogate Miranda than to allow its
rules to exist in theory but not in practice.
F. The Answer Is Not in the Numbers
If we accept the new vision's premise that Miranda's rules are
non-constitutional, we ought to ask whether the original vision prop-
erly ranks Fifth Amendment values and other interests over the needs
of the police. As part of this inquiry, we should consider both Mi-
randa's costs and its benefits. First, one must concede that this is truly
a difficult endeavor. A cost/benefit analysis is utterly unsuited to the
task, for there is no single metric that can encompass Miranda's costs
and its benefits. No empirical measure can capture dignitarian and
certain other values, such as Miranda's respect for individual auton-
omy. Second, even if we could find some hypothetical. yardstick to
assess Miranda's benefits and costs, a simple balancing would not de-
termine whether Miranda stands or falls. Miranda is a powerful ex-
pression of societal norms. We ought not sacrifice our fundamental
principles for reasons of cost and expediency. Finally, Paul Cassel's
George L. Kelling & Mark H. Moore, The Evolving Strategy of Policing, PERSP. ON POLICING,
Nov. 1988, at 12 ("Community policing relies on an intimate relationship between police
and citizens."); George L. Kelling &James K. Stewart, Neighborhoods and Police: The Mainte-
nance of CivilAuthority, PERSP. ON POLICING, May 1989, at 7-9 (criticizing police for maintain-
ing the metaphor of officers as a "thin blue line" because the metaphor continues to
separate officers from their communities).
302 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 273, at 974-75 (arguing that police deception during
interrogation "may breed mistrust for the police, limiting their ability to secure the cooper-
ation of suspects, other citizens, and jurors who may be tempted to 'send them a message'"
(footnote omitted)).
303 See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAWr ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OFJUsncE, supra
note 284, at 92 ("Most of the recent big-city riots were touched off by commonplace street
encounters between policemen and citizens."); REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COmm'N ON
CIVIL DISORDERS 116-23, 299-322 (1968) (describing triggering events of riots, which often
included incidents involving the police, and making recommendations for reform); Paul
Hoffman, The Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The Need for an Effective Federal Role in Controlling Police
Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1453, 1461-88 (1993) (discussing police abuse in
Los Angeles and the disorder that followed the Simi Valley trial of the officers who beat
motorist Rodney King); Robert M. Press, Miami Riots: Don't Blame the Cubans, CHRnsTiAN Sci.
MONITOR, June 10, 1980, at 23 (describing the riots in Miami that followed not guilty ver-
dicts in the trial of officers who beat to death an African American insurance salesman).
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work has illustrated that any reliable reckoning of Miranda's "costs"
still remains unattainable.
With respect to the first point, we must acknowledge that one
cannot establish empirically the ordering of Fifth Amendment values
(as well as the other interests embedded in the original vision) and
the needs of law enforcement. These values, interests, and needs are
incommensurate; they cannot be measured along the same scale. 30 4
One may describe the advantages of a particular interpretation of Mi-
randa. One similarly may attempt to describe the impact that the orig-
inal vision of Miranda has upon law enforcement. Nevertheless, the
study of Miranda's costs and benefits is a qualitative, not a quantative,
inquiry. A reliable "cost" estimate might inform this study, but would
not determine it.
The benefits of Miranda defy empirical analysis. Even if it were
possible to quantify the cases that Miranda renders "lost," or not sub-
ject to legitimate prosecution, one cannot measure empirically the
Fifth Amendment value of respect for individual autonomy or the
value of retaining the predominantly adversarial character of our
criminal justice system. Likewise, how does one weigh the need for a
consistent Fifth Amendmentjurisprudence or determine the extent to
which Miranda has deterred the police from overreaching, given the
sophisticated, psychological interrogation techniques that officers
now employ? Even more difficult, how does one measure the loss of
respect for the rule of law when officers deliberately determine not to
follow clear Supreme Court rulings? These shortcomings of the em-
pirical method demonstrate that one cannot place Fifth Amendment
values and police expedience together on the same scale.
With respect to the second point, the Court in Miranda carefully
described the values and interests that the decision furthers. In pre-
scribing procedures to secure the privilege against self-incrimination
and its corresponding values, the Court also sought to ease the impact
of those procedures upon law enforcement. That the Justices consid-
304 Different writers define "incommensurability" in different ways. See, e.g., Matthew
Adler, Law and Incommensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1169, 1170-84 (1998) (describing
three distinct usages of the term "incommensurability" employed by contributors to a sin-
gle law review symposium). In addition, there is some debate over whether values or
choices can ever be deemed incommensurate. See generally Richard Craswell, Incommensura-
bility, Welfare Economics and the Law, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1419 (1998) (arguing that most
writings on incommensurability focus on individual choice and are not necessarily extend-
able to governmental action); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92
MICH. L. Rnv. 779 (1994) (setting out a provisional definition of incommensurability and
arguing that different kinds of valuation cannot be reconciled without significant loss).
Without attempting to resolve these debates, this Article uses the term "incommensurabil-
ity" to mean that Fifth Amendment values and the "costs" of Miranda may not be measured
on a cardinal scale. No empirical method exists to compare the benefits and costs of the
original and new visions of Miranda.
1998]
CORNELL LAW REVEW
ered the effect of their decision.upon the police does not mean, as
some have suggested, that -rulings in Miranda and subsequent cases
represent "a purely pragmatic, cost-benefit assessment. '8 0 5 Given its
determination that the Fifth Amendment requires safeguards, one
cannot fault the Court for implementing safeguards that have the
least deleterious effect on law enforcement efforts. The Court's deci-
sions do not contain any indication that one can place the values and
interests Miranda protects on a scale alongside an estimate of "costs"
and simply discard whenever costs seem to outweigh Miranda's proce-
dures. As with any rule that provides fundamental protections to
those accused of crime, law enforcement pays a cost. We tolerate
those costs because doing so ensures that our legal processes rest on
long-standing principles instead of ever-changing balance sheets; be-
cause it affords fair process to the accused in accord with our tradi-
tions and beliefs; and because doing so ennobles us as a society, giving
us added confidence of ajust outcome of the case. If the Constitution
does not require us to place Fifth Amendment values and other inter-
ests above the needs of law enforcement, then we ultimately must de-
termine their relative importance in light of our own preferences,
traditions, and beliefs. 30 6
Finally, none of those who have evaluated Mirandd~s costs and
benefits have established a reliable measure of its costs. Though many
contemporary observers conclude that officers have adjusted to Mi-
randa and that the ruling does not unduly interfere with law enforce-
ment,30 7 Paul Cassell has sought to demonstrate that Miranda
significantly damages law enforcement efforts. This Article discusses
his writing because it represents the most detailed and determined
empirical effort to measure Miranda's costs. Cassell argues that the
Court should abandon Miranda's rules in favor of less costly, less pro-
305 Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on
Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1129 (1998).
306 Herbert Packer made much the same point 30 years ago, positing two models of
the criminal justice system (the "Grime Control" and "Due Process" models), each resting
upon different underlying values. See HERBERT L. PAcKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION 149-73, 186-94 (1968).
307 See, e.g., SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIMINALJUSTICE IN A FREE SOC'Y OF THE ABA CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SECTION, CRIMINALJUSTICE IN CRISIS 28-34 (1988) (reporting the results of commit-
tee hearings and a telephone survey and concluding that Miranda does not present serious
problems for law enforcement); Leo, supra note 230, at 285 (writing that Miranda has
.transform[ed] police power inside the interrogation room without undermining its effec-
tiveness"); Schulhofer, supra note 20, at 455-60 (collecting studies and arguing that Mi-
randa has not impaired law enforcement); Yale Kamisar, Editorial, Landmark Ruling's Had
No Detrimental Effect, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 1, 1987, at A27 (quoting Senator Arlen Specter,
who as a prosecuting attorney participated in one of the early "impact" studies of Miranda,
as stating that "whatever the preliminary indications... I am now satisfied that law enforce-
ment has become accomodated to Miranda"). But see OLP Report, supra note 117, at 543-
49 (arguing that Miranda has impaired the prosecution function and has damaged public
confidence in the law).
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tective alternatives. Yet even after using highly uncertain methodolo-
gies to calculate Miranda's costs, he cannot assess its "benefits," of
course, by the same metric. Indeed, in arguing that Miranda costs too
much to maintain, he largely avoids any analysis of Miranda's
virtues.308
Cassell has published a series of articles in which he attempts to
show that Miranda has generated a significant number of lost confes-
sions and cases. In one article, he draws upon a collection of studies
and asserts that Miranda is responsible for a drop of 16.1% in the con-
fession rate,30 9 leading to a loss of 3.8% of all prosecutions. 310 In an-
other article, Cassell and Bret Hayman report the results of a 1994
study of interrogations in Salt Lake City and infer that the current
confession rate dropped after Miranda became effective.31'
In these articles, Cassell seeks answers to cost questions that are
more than merely difficult to research empirically; they may well be
unresearchable. Legal and ethical considerations forbid the construc-
tion of a rigorous, controlled experiment in which some defendants
face interrogation under Miranda and some do not. For that reason,
Cassell's earliest articles revisit dated studies of pre- and post-Miranda
confession rates or seek to compare current confession rates with the
pre-Miranda rates of those studies. These data, however, cannot prop-
erly support his conclusions because pre-Miranda studies are difficult
to synthesize and both our country and criminal justice system have
changed since Miranda. Consequently, the old data do not establish a
sure baseline.
Stephen Schulhofer and other scholars have challenged Cassell's
methodology and the conclusions of his earliest articles in far more
detail than may be discussed here.312 Schulhofer reviews Cassell's
findings and estimates that the correct rate of decrease in confessions
of the earlier studies is 4.1%, with at most 0.78% of convictions "lost"
308 At the conclusion of their Salt Lake City study, which focuses on costs and does not
analyze benefits, Cassell and Hayman argue that "the benefits of Miranda seem slim while
the costs seem substantial." Cassell & Hayman, supra note 150, at 921; see also Cassell, supra
note 288, at 486-97 (arguing that Miranda imposes unnecessary costs, but not evaluating
Miranda's benefits); Cassell & Fowles, supra note 305, at 1126-32 (arguing again that Mi-
randa imposes unnecessary costs given other possible alternatives, such as videotaping, but
not analyzing whether Fifth Amendment values would be protected under those
alternatives).
309 See Cassell, supra note 288, at 416-17.
310 See id at 438.
311 See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 150, at 917-18.
312 See Schulhofer, supra note 108, at 506-15 (criticizing Cassell's reliance on the old
studies); George C. Thomas III, Plain Talk About the Miranda Empirical Debate: A "Steady-
State" Theoy of Confessions, 43 UCLA L. REv. 933, 944-57 (1996) (critiquing Cassell and
Hayman's use of data in their Salt Lake City study); see also Cassell, supra note 289 (re-
sponding to Schulhofer's critique); StephenJ. Schulhofer, Miranda and Clearance Rates, 91
Nw. U. L. REv. 278, 278-79 (1996) (standing by his earlier critique of Cassell's work).
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due to Miranda.313 Cassell's methodology is problematic: he revisits
certain older studies, disregards unfavorable data (including the re-
sults of a Los Angeles study that finds an increase in confessions after
Miranda), and calculates an "average" pre-Miranda confession rate.3 14
But most of the pre- and post-Miranda studies that Cassell uses oc-
curred prior to 1970.315 Thus, even if one accepts Cassell's questiona-
ble revisions to the original data, one cannot assume that the
confession rates of 1966 bear any relationship to current confession
rates. Without more, a drop in confession rates in the immediate
wake of Miranda demonstrates nothing of continuing significance.
Our criminal justice system has changed since the 1960s. When
the Supreme Court announced Miranda in 1966, Gideon v. Wainwright
had been on the books for only three years. Miranda came in the
midst of a criminal procedure revolution. Moreover, police-commu-
nity relations in this country surely have evolved since 1966, and sus-
pects give statements in light of a variety of factors, including their
treatment from the police. One, therefore, must make a series of fool-
hardy assumptions to conclude that any purported decrease in confes-
sion rates is due to Miranda, rather than other factors. Further, some
evidence indicates that the police have adjusted to Miranda's require-
ments.3 16 Even if one accepts Cassell's conclusion that Miranda has
led to a decrease in statements to the police, Miranda still might ac-
complish its purposes efficiently. If Miranda significantly reduces the
incidence of coerced or false confessions and leads police to respect
Fifth Amendment values, it functions exactly as the Court intended,
even if it reduces the number of cases that face prosecution.
Perhaps to compensate for these difficulties with his earlier work,
Cassell has turned his attention to crime clearance data that the FBI
collects from local agencies. 317 Cassell first published a simple chart,
purportedly showing that the clearance rates for violent crimes fell
sharply in the wake of Miranda and have not returned to pre-1966
levels.3 18 When Schulhofer disparaged this effort for failing to ac-
313 See Schulhofer, supra note 108, at 544-47.
314 Cassell, supra note 288, at 416-17. Because the studies Cassell used reported drops
in confession rates following Miranda that ranged from 6% to 34.5%, see id., and further,
because these studies were conducted in cities with quite different demographics, one won-
ders whether an "average" of rates has any meaning at all.
315 See id. at 459 tbl.3.
316 See sources cited supra note 307. To his critics who point to a "rebound" effect,
Cassell initially responded that "[i t seems appropriate to assign to those who take this view
the burden of proof." Cassell, supra note 288, at 450. Why? Cassell, not Miranda's support-
ers, seeks to abrogate Miranda and alter the status quo. Inasmuch as it may be impossible
to demonstrate the impact of Miranda empirically, Cassell merely seeks to shift to Miranda's
supporters the burden of answering the unanswerable.
317 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 305, at 1063.
318 See Cassell, supra note 289, at 1090.
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count for crime rates and police resources, 319 Cassell teamed with
economist Richard Fowles to' produee a- more nuanced analysis.320
Cassell and Fowles conducted a multiple regression analysis of crime
clearance rates from 1950 to 1995.321 They assert that Miranda has
had a statistically significant and long-term effect on clearance rates
for total violent and total property crimes in general, as well as for the
individual crimes of robbery, burglary, larceny, and vehicle theft, but
has had no statistically significant effect on clearance rates for the
crimes of murder, rape, and assault.322 According to Cassell and
Fowles, Miranda has caused the clearance rate for total violent crimes
to drop 6.7% and the clearance rate for total property crimes to fall
2.3%.323
As with Cassell's earlier work, these claims also have drawn a with-
ering critique. John Donohue has analyzed the Cassell and Fowles
study closely.3 24 As an initial matter, Donohue notes that FBI clear-
ance data have proven unreliable because, in addition to the manipu-
lation of clearance rates by local authorities, a perceived decline in
clearance rates may reflect nothing more than the improved report-
ing of crime.325 Donahue points out that murder is generally the
most accurately reported crime, yet Cassell and Fowles show no statis-
tically significant relationship between Miranda and the clearance rate
for murder.326 Donohue also doubts Cassell's and Fowles's conclu-
sion that Miranda alone lies at the root of any perceived drop in clear-
ance rates in the late 1960s. 327 Cassell's regression analysis establishes
only the significance of a "post-1966" variable. The regression analysis
itself does not identify Miranda as the event that led to a perceived
decline in clearance rates within that time period.328 Further, Mi-
randa should not have a substantial impact upon clearance rates be-
cause solving a crime clears it whether or not an arrest or prosecution
319 See generally Schulhofer, supra note 312, at 280-90 (critiquing Cassell's work).
320 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 305.
321 See id. at 1063.
322 See id. at 1086 tbl.II, 1088 tbl.II.
323 See id. They report a statistically significant "Miranda effect" on individual crimes as
follows: robbery (5.3%); burglary (2.5%); larceny (2.4%), and vehicle theft (4.1%). See id.
324 SeeJohn J. Donohue III, Did Miranda Diminish Police Effectiveness, 50 STA. L. REv.
1147 (1998).
325 See id. at 1152-55. If data for total crime were underreported, clearance rates would
be artificially high, as crimes "cleared" would appear as an unduly high percentage of the
underreported total number of crimes. See id. Gradual improvements in the reporting of
crime might lead to a perceived declining trend in clearance rates because crimes cleared
would be a smaller percentage of the increasing (but more accurate) total number of
crimes. See id.
326 See id. at 1153-55.
327 See id. at 1155-56.
328 See id.; see also Cassell & Fowles, supra note 305, at 1107-1119 (arguing that Miranda
is the cause of the perceived drop).
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occurs, and Miranda only operates after a suspect is in custody.3 29
Donohue's own regression model, using data from Cassell and Fowles,
reveals a statistically significant post-1966 effect only for the clearance
rates for total violent crime and for the individual crime of larceny.330
After his careful study, Donohue could neither substantiate nor reject
Cassell's and Fowles's claims. 331
So where does Cassell's work fit in our comparison of the original
and the new visions of Miranda? If we agree with the proponents of
the new vision and believe that Miranda's rules are truly non-constitu-
tional, we should consider whether Fifth Amendment values and
other interests should prevail over the needs of the police. While one
may question Cassell's motives,332 he deserves credit for suggesting a
serious examination of the cost of Miranda, and all must agree that
Miranda impacts law enforcement. If suspects assert their Fifth
Amendment rights, a certain number of crimes will remain unsolved,
and a certain number of cases will escape prosecution. Were we to
overlook Cassell's flawed methodologies, we could assume that the
new vision, and the practice of questioning "outside Miranda' would
affect police conduct, though somewhat less than the more fulsome
original vision of Miranda, which Cassell studied. In the end, however,
Cassell provides the wrong answers to the wrong questions. The Mi-
randa debate can have no empirical resolution. That Miranda has an
329 See Donohue, supra note 324, at 1155-56. Miranda thus may have its only real im-
pact upon clearance rates if it prevents a suspect already in custody from giving informa-
tion that would allow officers to solve other crimes. See id.
330 See id. at 1162-65, 1170. Moreover, Donohue is not entirely confident of the results
for the crime of larceny. See id. at 1170.
331 Donohue finds "some evidence that the measured violent crime clearance rate is 10-
12% lower in the post-mid-1966 period than would have been expected." Id. at 1170. But
this result is a "long way from proof of a statistically significant drop in actual clearance
rates caused by the Supreme Court's Miranda decision." Id. at 1171. Due to difficulties
with the data and with the model, Donohue admits to "unbridgeable uncertainty about
how much confidence to repose in any of the statistical results." Id. at 1172.
332 See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Using the Innocent to Scapegoat Miranda: An-
other Reply to Paul Cassell, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557, 575 (1998) (arguing that
Cassell's empirical work is driven by his ideological commitments and that his resort to
.quantitative guesswork... appears to be rooted in Cassell's long-standing contempt for
Miranda and offers him yet another rhetorical weapon in his highly-charged anti-Miranda
crusade"). In addition to whatever conclusions one might draw about Cassell from his law
review articles, Cassell has presented his views as an advocate in litigation. He recently
filed an amicus curiae brief in the United States Supreme Court, arguing that the Court
should review a decision from California that called questioning "outside Miranda" "police
misconduct" and "illegal." Brief of Amici Curiae Washington Legal Foundation, et al., in
Support of Respondent's Response Concurring in Request for Certiorari at 2-3, Peevy v.
California (No. 98-6125) (Nov. 12, 1998). In this brief, Cassell refers to his own work and
argues that "[t]he mounting empirical evidence demonstrates that the Miranda rules lead
to the release of tens of thousands of dangerous criminals every year." Id. at 17 (citing
Cassell, supra note 288; Cassell & Fowles, supra note 305; Cassell & Hayman, supra note
150). Cassell does not cite to Schulhofer's or Donohue's critiques of his work or otherwise
acknowledge that his empirical analyses are much disputed. See id.
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impact may mean nothing more than it works as the Court intended.
And even if we believe there ever :could be an empirical resolution to
this debate, Cassell's work, with its dubious methods, sets a poor
benchmark from which to base a revision of Mirandds settled rules.
Looking at the two visions of Miranda qualitatively-as we must-
only the original vision provides substantial protection to Fifth
Amendment values, fits with our constitutional jurisprudence, pro-
vides necessary bright-line rules for police and trial judges, and main-
tains public confidence in our courts and police. We still need the
strong protections of the original vision of Miranda.
IV
SAVING ALTRANDA
If we must reject the new vision of Miranda, how do we lead of-
ficers to adhere to the original' vision? How do we protect Fifth
Amendment values and craft an incentive for officers to follow Mi-
randa's rules without simultaneously creating new obstacles for them?
This Part of the Article contrasts Fourth and Fifth Amendment exclu-
sionary rules, revisits Harris v. New York, Oregon v. Hass, and Michigan v.
Tucker, and concludes that Miranda should regain its status as a consti-
tutional rule. Further, Miranda itself excludes for all purposes state-
ments that police obtain in violation of its procedures, and it indicates
that courts should exclude- the fruits of those statements for all pur-
poses.333 Harris, Hass, and Tucker describe a narrower rule of exclu-
sion that is served solely when officers act in good faith.334 Only by
returning to the more robust exclusionary rule when officers deliber-
ately violate the law can we induce the police to follow Miranda.
A. Exclusionary Rules Compared
When the Supreme Court determined in Harris that prosecutors
may impeach with statements that police have obtained without ad-
ministering Miranda warnings, the Court stated that it merely was fol-
lowing Walder v. United States,335 which had established a similar rule
under the Fourth Amendment. The Harris Court asked why a differ-
ent holding should result under the Fifth Amendment.336 Following
the Court's lead in Harris, this section compares the scope and pur-
poses of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment exclusionary rules.
The Supreme Court first applied the Fourth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule to federal prosecutions in Weeks v. United States.337 The
333 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
334 See supra Part I.C.
335 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
336 See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
337 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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Supreme Court recognized that the exclusionary rule was necessary
lest, as Justice Holmes wrote, the Fourth Amendment represent
merely "a form of words."338 The Court, however, did not extend the
exclusionary rule to the states until Mapp v. Ohio in 1961. At that time,
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule included the familiar "fruit
of the poisonous tree" doctrine.33 9 Under this doctrine, the exclu-
sionary rule prohibits the prosecution's use of direct or derivative evi-
dence that the police obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
unless the link between the violation and the evidence is "so attenu-
ated as to dissipate the taint,"340 unless the authorities inevitably
would discover the evidence,3 41 or unless the government can estab-
lish an independent source of the evidence. 342 As already noted, the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not forbid using illegally
obtained evidence for impeachment. 343 In 1984, the Court held in
United States v. Leon344 that the government may use in its case-in-chief
evidence that police seized in reasonable reliance on a warrant that a
neutral and detached magistrate had issued, even if the seizure vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment.345 The Court further held that this
"good faith" exception would operate only when the officers' conduct
was objectively reasonable.346
The Supreme Court's justifications for the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule have evolved since Mapp. In Mapp, the Court gave
several reasons why the rule was an essential part of the Fourth
Amendment and should thus apply to the states. In addition to deter-
ring officers from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures,347
the rule also preserves judicial integrity.348 After Mapp, the Court de-
cided a series of cases in which it limited and then ignored this second
reason for the rule; the Court began to focus solely on the deterrence
rationale.349 In United States v. Calandra,350 for example, the Court
held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule did not limit the
338 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
339 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).
340 Id.; accord Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
341 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443-44 (1984) (applying exception to Sixth
Amendment exclusionary rule, but discussing it in the context of the Fourth Amendment).
342 See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805 (1984); Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341.
343 See supra text accompanying notes 294-96.
344 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
345 See id. at 913.
346 Id. at 922-25.
347 See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656-58.
348 See id. at 659-60.
349 Commentators rightly have criticized the Court for overlooking the "judicial integ-
rity" rationale for Mapp. See, e.g., CHARLES H. WHrrEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIM-
INAL PROCEDURE 24 (3d ed. 1993).
350 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
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grand jury's power to compel a witness. to answer questions concern-
ing evidence that police had seized in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.351 The Court determined that the Fourth Amendment
violation had been "fully accomplished by" the unreasonable search
or seizure. 352 Calandra provides that the purpose of the exclusionary
rule is to deter future misconduct, rather than redress a past injury,
and that the incremental deterrent effect of excluding evidence from
the grand jury is minimal.353 Following Calandra, Stone v. Powell354
took Fourth Amendment claims out of the reach of federal habeas
corpus for essentially the same reason. Powell expressly states that con-
cerns about 'judicial integrity" have "limited force" in framing the
proper scope of the exclusionary rule.3 55
Leon represents the culmination of this shift in the Court's ap-
proach to the exclusionary rule. This opinion completes the Court's
abandonment of the 'judicial integrity" rationale for Fourth Amend-
ment exclusion.356 After rejecting out-of-hand, and somewhat disin-
genuously, Mapp's central holding that the exclusionary rule is the
necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment,3 57 the Court in Leon
concluded that the costs of exclusion outweighed the benefits when
police acted in good faith and attempted to obey the law.358 Calandra,
Powe, and Leon demonstrate the Court's willingness to consider the
efficacy of exclusionary rules on their own terms, regardless of
whether a remedy of exclusion exists within the Constitution itself,
particularly when the purpose for exclusion is to deter future
misconduct.
To compare Fourth Amendment and Miranda/Fifth Amendment
exclusion, one must consider when a Fifth Amendment violation oc-
curs. Several Supreme Court decisions build upon Kastigar v. United
States,359 which upholds the federal use immunity statute; these deci-
sions characterize the Fifth Amendment as a "trial right" that the pros-
ecution does not violate until it introduces evidence against the
defendant in court.3 60 Of course, if the prosecution can violate the
351 See id. at 354-55.
352 Id. at 354.
353 See id. at 347-52.
354 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
35 Id. at 485.
356 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-08 (1984) (discussing the purposes of
the exclusionary rule without mentioning the goal of preserving judicial integrity).
357 See id. at 905-06.
358 See id. at 922.
359 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
360 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990) (citing Kastigar
and stating that a Fourth Amendment-violation is complete when the search is conducted,
as opposed to a Fifth Amendment violation, which occurs at trial); see also United States v.
Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218, 2232 n.12 (1998) (quoting Verdugo-Urquidez); Withrow v. Williams,
507 U.S. 680, 691 (1993) (same); Klein, supra note 65, at 439-43 (arguing that Miranda
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Fifth Amendment only at trial, then a grant of use immunity by defini-
tion could not violate the Constitution because the prosecution can-
not introduce the compelled testimony at trial. But the Court did not
decide Kastigar on this theory. The Fifth Amendment does not pro-
hibit all compelled testimony, only compelled incriminating testimony.
Indeed, courts issue subpoenas to trial witnesses, every day in this
country, and these witnesses must appear in court and testify. Wit-
nesses may assert the privilege only to avoid testifying if there is a real
and substantial chance that the testimony will be incriminating.361
Kastigar simply holds that use immunity does not violate the Fifth
Amendment because the grant of immunity removes the "danger of
incrimination."362 Moreover, a number of cases have found Fifth
Amendment violations in circumstances in which witnesses suffered
penalties for asserting the privilege against self-incrimination, even
though they faced no criminal charges and had no criminal trial.363
These cases are impossible to square with the notion that Fifth
Amendment violations occur only at trial.
If police question a suspect in violation of Miranda, and under
Miranda, there is a presumption of a Fifth Amendment violation,
when does the violation occur? Perhaps the best view is that the viola-
tion occurs at the station house, but continues or recurs at trial. The
values that underlie the Fifth Amendment include preserving auton-
omy, maintaining our adversarial system, curtailing inhumane treat-
ment and police misconduct, avoiding false confessions, and
complying with our sense of fair play.364 Custodial interrogation can
undermine most of these values in the station house at the time that
the questioning occurs. The exclusion of evidence at trial may ame-
liorate some of the damage, yet that does not prevent, for example,
the harm to autonomy. Perhaps in recognition of the fact that a viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment is complete at the time that an unlawful
interrogation occurs, the Court in Michigan v. Tucker concluded that
violations are difficult to raise in civil rights actions because the Fifth Amendment is only
violated in court).
361 See United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 128-29 (1980); Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39, 53-54 (1968).
362 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 459.
363 See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801,,804-08 (1977) (holding that grand
jury witness cannot be divested of political office as a penalty for exercising Fifth Amend-
ment privilege); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77-84 (1973) (holding that architects
called before grand jury cannot lose the right to enter into public contracts due to exercise
of their Fifth Amendment privilege); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276-79 (1968)
(holding that police officer may not be discharged due to assertion of Fifth Amendment
privilege before grand jury).
364 See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
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deterring future police misconduct is a primary purpose of the Mi-
randa/Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule.3 65
By the same token, one cannot confine the violation to the inter-
rogation room. The Fifth Amendment may be a trial right in that it is
a right that the accused asserts or waives by deciding whether to testify
at trial. The actions of the police in violating Miranda long before
trial can impinge the exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege
greatly at trial. As already noted, an accused is less able to assert the
privilege effectively at trial if police have forced him or her to give a
statement prior to trial.366 If the police violate a defendant's Fifth
Amendment rights during a custodial interrogation, the violation oc-
curs again when a court admits the statement or its fruits at trial.
With this background, a comparison of the Fourth and Miranda/
Fifth Amendment exclusionary rules reveals something of a puzzle. A
past constitutional violation triggers the Fourth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule, which operates solely to deter future violations; a past
violation triggers the Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule, which oper-
ates through Miranda both to deter future misconduct and also to pre-
vent continuing violations. The deterrent effect of the Fourth
Amendment rule is stronger than that of the Miranda/Fifth Amend-
ment rule-the former also excludes "fruits"-even though the
Fourth Amendment rule admits of a "good faith" exception. When
officers intentionally violate the Fourth Amendment, they do not act
in good faith, and courts also exclude the "fruits" of seized evidence.
In excluding fruits of a violation, the Fourth Amendment rule does
more to honor the underlying right than does the Miranda/Fifth
Amendment rule, even though the Miranda/Fifth Amendment rule
also seeks to prevent a continuing violation. It is difficult to rational-
ize these differences in the two exclusionary rules.
B. Hanis, Hass, and Tucker, Revisited
As we have seen, the new vision of Miranda relies on language
from Harris v. New York, Oregon v. Hass, and Michigan v. Tucker that
undermines the legitimacy of Miranda by characterizing violations of
Miranda as something other than violations of the Fifth Amend-
ment.3 67 Although exploring the Justices' unstated motives is always
risky, this section asks why the Court uncoupled Miranda from the
Constitution in these cases, in the hope of learning whether the same
reasons for the Court's actions continue to apply.
365 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1974); see also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S.
714, 721 (1975) (discussing the deterrent effect of exclusion); Harris v. NewYork, 401 U.S.
222, 225 (1971) (same).
366 See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
367 See supra Part I.C.
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At the time that the Supreme Court decided Harris, Hass, and
Tucker, only one outcome could have followed a conclusion that a Mi-
randa violation was a violation of the Fifth Amendment. In Mallay v.
Hogan the Court had equated Fourteenth Amendment "voluntariness"
with Fifth Amendment "compulsion." Hence, courts treated state-
ments that police had taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment in
exactly the same fashion as statements obtained in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.3 68 Accordingly, Miranda itself provides for
complete exclusion of a compelled statement and its fruits.8 69
At that time our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence con-
tained no room for any sanction other than exclusion of the state-
ment for all purposes.370 In fact, the courts viewed the admission of
an involuntary statement as so great a denial of fundamental fairness
that until the Court decided Arizona v. Fulminante371 in 1991, the
courts did not review the admission of these statements for harmless
error.3 72 But the Court decided Harris, Hass, and Tucker before it an-
nounced Leon and thereby completed its revision of the holding in
Mapp. Leon looks at the exclusionary rule through a different lens
than Mapp, showing a greater willingness to examine whether exclu-
sion will deter unlawful conduct, even assuming that the govern-
ment's conduct violates the Constitution. If the Justices believed that
some remedy, rather than full exclusion, was appropriate in Harris,
Hass, and Tucker, it may have been simpler for the Court at that time
to pronounce the violations "non-constitutional," rather than to find
constitutional violations and then to struggle to explain why the Fifth
Amendment permitted some lesser remedy. In other words, separat-
ing the violations from the Fifth Amendment was the easiest way for
the Court to limit Miranda's exclusionary rule. Following the lessons
of Calandra, Powel4 and Leon, the Court now might confront the scope
of exclusion on its own terms, even if the Court determines that fail-
ing to comply with Miranda violates the Fifth Amendment per se.
368 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (stating that "[t]he Fourteenth Amend-
ment secures against state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guaran-
tees against federal infringement").
369 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 463, 479 (1965) (stating that "imless and until such warn-
ings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a
result of interrogation can be used against [the accused]").
370 See, e.g., Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558 (1954) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids "[t ] he use in a state criminal trial of a defendant's statement obtained
by coercion"); see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 396-402 (1976) (ruling, in a case
postdating Miranda, that statements taken in violation of the Due Process Clause may not
be introduced for any purpose at trial, including impeachment).
371 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
372 See id. at 306-12 (finding that the use of an involuntary confession may be reviewed
for harmless error); see also Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1956) (reversing a
conviction due to use of coerced confession, even though there was sufficient other evi-
dence to support the conviction).
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Furthermore, revisiting Harris, Hass, and Tucker, particularly in
the wake of Leon, requires us to consider what these cases do not hold.
In none of these cases did officers set about to violate Miranda. None
of these cases authorizes the police to violate Miranda deliberately.
Clearly, the officers in Harris and Tucker did not conduct interro-
gations in deliberate violation of Miranda. Police arrested and ques-
tioned Viven Harris on January 7, 1966.373 Police arrested and
interrogated Thomas Tucker on April 19, 1966.3 74 Though officers
did not question these defendants in compliance with Miranda's rules,
the Supreme Court did not decide Miranda until June 13, 1966,
months after these two interrogations took place. We demand much
of our police, but we cannot fault these officers for failing to predict
Miranda.
Hass presents a closer question. William Hass allegedly stole bi-
cycles from two garages, and the police arrested him for burglary.375
An officer read Hass his Miranda warnings, and Hass initially waived
his rights. On the way to the police station, Hass told Officer Bjorn
Osterholme that he was "in a lot of trouble" and would like to tele-
phone his attorney.37 6 The officer told Hass that he could call a law-
yer when they reached the police station.3 77 On the way to the station,
Hass asked whether he had to locate one of the bicycles. Osterholme
replied that he would not force Hass to disclose the bicycle's location,
but that Osterholme wanted to resolve the matter that night.3 78 Hass
then showed the officer where he had hidden the missing bicycle.3 79
Two points are worth noting. First, Officer Osterholme did not
appear to violate Miranda deliberately. After Hass invoked his right to
counsel, Osterholme did not ask Hass any additional questions until
Hass himself spoke. Second, a court reviewing these facts today would
probably not find a Miranda violation at all. Under Duckworth v.
Eagan, a modem court would view Osterholme's statement that Hass
could telephone an attorney at the police station to be a perfectly ap-
propriate response to Hass's invocation.380 Moreover, pursuant to Ed-
wards v. Arizona, officers may speak freely with a suspect who has
invoked the right to counsel when the suspect himself "initiates fur-
373 See Harris, 401 U.S. at 223.
374 See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 435-36.
375 See Hass, 420 U.S. at 715.
376 Id.
377 See id.
378 See Appendix at 21-23, Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (No. 73-1452).
379 See id. at 23-24.
380 In Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989), a suspect was told that a lawyer would
be appointed "if and when you go to court" Id. at 198. The Court determined that this
truthfully represented the local procedures for appointment of counsel and did not violate
Miranda. See id. at 203-04. "Miranda does not require that attorneys be produc[ed] on
call." Id. at 204.
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ther communication ... with the police."381 In this' case Hass, not
Osterholme, sought to continue their exchange.
Harris, Hass, and Tucker provide the primary authority for the new
vision of Miranda. Those who claim that the Supreme Court has ex-
pressly approved the practice of questioning "outside Mirandd' rely on
these cases. But the facts of these cases do not support this claim.
Quite simply, the officers in Hanis, Hass, and Tucker did not violate
Miranda deliberately. Consequently, these cases cannot establish the
"bad faith" exception to the Miranda rule that lies at the heart of the
new vision.
C. Reviving the Original Vision
Reviving the original vision of Miranda requires a simple prescrip-
tion: the Court should restore the presumption that violations of Mi-
randa are violations of the Fifth Amendment and should reaffirm that
Miranda's complete rule of exclusion applies when officers objectively
act in bad faith.
The Court must reaffirm the constitutional underpinnings of Mi-
randa. If the Court's pronouncement in Miranda is to receive the re-
spect of law enforcement, it needs a legitimate foundation. Until the
Court restores Miranda's link to the Fifth Amendment, Miranda can-
not escape the attack and evasion of those who claim that it describes
merely optional procedures. Prophylactic or not, Miranda's require-
ments stand firmly on the Fifth Amendment and epitomize our sys-
tem's concern for the amendment's underlying values. United States v.
Leon and Withrow v. Williams leave no doubt that the Constitution de-
mands protections at least as effective as Miranda's explicit rules. Un-
less a state substitutes Miranda's procedures with other fully effective
measures, the Constitution commands police officers to abide by Mi-
randa's safeguards.
Next, we need a rule of exclusion that does not tolerate deliber-
ate transgressions. In addition to excluding Miranda-violative state-
ments from the prosecution's case-in-chief, which prevents additional
Fifth Amendment violations at trial, the Court must adopt a rule of
exclusion that deters officers from deliberately breaching Miranda.
For guidance, we may look to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule. This rule focuses on officers' objective good faith and thus leads
the police to adhere to the law. In Miranda, the Court ruled that if a
custodial interrogation occurs without counsel, "a heavy burden rests
on the government" to demonstrate that the suspect "knowingly and
intelligently waived" his or her rights.38 2 If the government then seeks
381 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
382 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
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to use a Miranda-violative statement or its fruits for impeachment, the
government should bear the burden of showing that the officer's con-
duct is objectively reasonable. As under the Fourth Amendment, if
the government fails to meet this burden, the Fifth Amendment
should require the prosecution to, establish that it derived its evidence
from a source that is independent of the accused's statement.
This rule of exclusion should prove relatively simple to adminis-
ter. The standard is objective, not subjective. Courts have clarified
Miranda's parameters during the last thirty years, so that a suspect
must unequivocally assert Fifth Amendment rights for protection dur-
ing a custodial interrogation. Consequently, courts should not experi-
ence any difficulty determining when an officer has acted in objective
good or bad faith. Thus, when a court finds a genuine dispute
whether the suspect was truly in custody or whether an officer's con-
duct amounted to interrogation, the prosecution may use the state-
ment for impeachment, and the court may admit its fruits. But if an
officer continues to question a suspect over the unambiguous invoca-
tion of Fifth Amendment rights, the court should not admit the state-
ment or its fruits for any purpose.
This rule of exclusion also would restore some reason and consis-
tency to the Court's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendmentjurisprudence.
In Kastigar v. United States and New Jersey v. Portash, the Supreme Court
determined that any statement that authorities obtained pursuant to a
grant of use immunity is inadmissible for all purposes, including im-
peachment, and that the courts also must exclude the fruits of that
statement.8 83 Applying the same rule for deliberate Miranda viola-
tions would establish parity when officers seek to obtain a statement
over the express invocation of Fifth Amendment rights.
Determinations of the admissibility of evidence that authorities
obtain independently of the accused's statement would follow the
structure of hearings on "Kastigar taint s3 8 4 and would remove the in-
centive for officers to circumvent the immunity process. Moreover,
consistent with the social science literature, which acknowledges the
coercive power of deliberate questioning in violation of Miranda,385
this rule of exclusion essentially would equate bad faith Miranda viola-
tions with Fourteenth Amendment violations.
Finally, those who still doubt the necessity of this rule of exclu-
sion should consider again the training of officers in California. In
People v. Bradford386 the California Supreme Court upheld a capital
conviction despite the police's continued questioning of a suspect
383 See supra notes 202-08 and accompanying text.
384 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
385 See supra text accompanying notes 261-63.
386 929 P.2d 544 (Cal. 1997).
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who had asked for a lawyer.387 The court criticized the officers, stat-
ing that their conduct "was unethical and it is strongly disap-
proved. ' 388 In a publication that postdates the Bradford decision, the
California Attorney General's office notes that the court upheld Brad-
ford's conviction and comments that the court "went on to gratuitously
observe that the practice of intentionally disregarding a suspect's invo-
cation of Miranda rights is 'unethical' and 'strongly disapproved.' '3 8 9
The publication does not instruct officers to obey the "gratuitous" ad-
monition of the state's highest court; rather, it reviews other cases and
tells officers that "the question of what happens when police deliber-
ately ignore a suspect's invocation of Miranda rights is very controver-
sial and probably will not be settled for a long time to come. '3 90
Recently, in People v. Peevy391 the California Supreme Court held
that a statement that police took in deliberate violation of Miranda was
admissible for impeachment.392 The court declined to reweigh the
balance that Harris and Hass struck, in part because the California
Constitution excludes Miranda-violative statements from evidence only
to the extent that the federal Constitution requires.393 The court,
however, firmly rejected the argument that Miranda and Edwards are
simply rules of evidence that do not regulate police conduct.3 9 4 The
California Supreme Court held that a statement is made inadmissible
under Miranda "because the evidence [is] obtained illegally" and that
"it is indeed police misconduct to interrogate a suspect in custody who
has invoked the right to counsel."3 9 5
In rejecting the practice of questioning "outside Mirandd' in
Peevy, the California Supreme Court was much more specific and em-
phatic than in Bradford. One might think that Peevy would force police
in California to cease questioning "outside Miranda." At the very least,
one would expect that the California Attorney General's office-the
leading state agency charged with enforcing the law-would advise of-
ficers not to engage in a practice that the state's highest court has
declared to be illegal. Yet in the wake of Peevy, the Attorney General's
office has not disavowed the practice of questioning "outside Mi-
randa." In a publication issued after Peevy, the Attorney General's of-
fice discusses Peevy's holding in detail, pointing out that the Court
387 See id. at 581.
388 Id. at 567.
389 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 144, at § 7.40d (Rev. Mar. 1997) (quoting Bradford) (em-
phasis added).
390 Id.
391 953 P.2d 1212 (Cal. 1998).
392 See id. at 1224.
393 See id. at 1214, 1219.
394 See id. at 1224-25.
395 Id. at 1225.
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permitted evidence taken in deliberate violation of Miranda to be
used for impeachment.39 6 Acknowledging that Peevy held that officers
who question "outside Miranda' act illegally, the Attorney General's
office characterizes this holding as dicta and claims that the decision
"is questionable on several fronts."3 97 After describing the arguments
against this part of Peevy, the Attorney General's office again con-
cludes that "[i] t may take a decision from the United States Supreme
Court to finally settle this question."398 Thus, after the California
Supreme Court's decision in Bradford and even after the clear ruling
in Peevy, the California Attorney General's office has not instructed
officers to stop questioning "outside Miranda."
396 See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 144 § 7.40a (Rev. July 1998) (citing Hass and Peevy and
asserting that an "outside Miranda" statement "may be used to impeach the defendant
regardless of whether the police non-compliance with Miranda's procedures was negligent
(accidental) or intentional"); see also id. § 7.48b (Rev. July 1998) (stating that "if you fail to
comply with the Miranda guidelines in a non-coercive way, although any statement you ob-
tain will be inadmissible at trial to prove guilt (i.e., in the prosecution's 'case-in-chief'), that
is the only 'penalty.' The statement will be admissible in rebuttal to impeach" and advising
that "you can also use the statement for any other purpose") (citing Harris, Hass, and
Peevy); id. § 7.83 (Rev.July 1998) (stating that if a suspect in custody invokes his rights, "you
must cease all questioning" but then noting that "[o]f course, this rule . .. must be ob-
served only if you are wanting anything the suspect may say later to be admissible against
him at trial since the entire purpose behind the Miranda decision was to provide a means
for police to obtain an admissible statement").
397 Id. § 7.40b (Rev. July 1998).
398 Id. The Sourcebook does indicate that Peevy could be taken to the United States
Supreme Court. See id. Of course, the Attorney General would be within his rights to seek
further review of Peevy if he disagreed with it. In that case, the Attorney General's office
should tell officers to obey the ruling in Peevy and cease questioning "outside Miranda"
pending any review by the United States Supreme Court. The Attorney General's training
materials, however, contain no such clear instruction. See id.; see also CALIFoRNIA COMM'N
ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING, BASIC COURSE WORKBOOK SERIES STUDENT
MATERALs: LEARNING DoMAIN # 30, PRELiMINARY INVESTIGATION, INTERROGATION 4-36
(1998) (on file with author) (describing the uses of an "outside Miranda" statement and
then noting- "Noncoercive police questioning that departs from Miranda does not violate a
suspect's civil rights or their Fifth Amendment rights. Nevertheless, the California
Supreme Court recently stated that continued interrogation after a suspect has invoked his
Miranda rights is 'illegal' and 'unlawful'").
Interestingly, the California Attorney General did not file a petition for writ of certio-
rari in Peery. Counsel for Mr. Peevy sought Supreme Court review. See Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to the California Supreme Court, Peevy (No. 98-6125) (docketed Sept. 23, 1998).
The Attorney General initially waived his right to answer the petition but was requested by
the Court to file a response. See Letter from William K Suter, Clerk, to Sara Gros-Cloren,
Office of the Attorney General (Oct. 13, 1998) (on file with author). The Attorney Gen-
eral then filed a response, asking the Supreme Court to take the case and "once and for all
clarify that non-coercive non-compliance with Miranda does not constitute 'illegal' or 'un-
lawful' conduct." Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, PeeUy (No. 98-6125)
(Nov. 6, 1998). On December 7, 1998, the Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of
certiorari.
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CONCLUSION
Since its 1936 decision in Brown v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court
has struggled to balance the power of the State and the rights of the
citizen in the interrogation room. The Court's initial case-by-case ap-
proach left law enforcement officers and trial courts with little real
guidance and failed to curtail abusive police practices effectively.
Eventually the Court decided Miranda v. Arizona, which prescribes
bright-line rules rooted in the Fifth Amendment. Miranda's safe-
guards protect Fifth Amendment values, end many abusive practices,
and largely obviate the need for lower courts to decide whether state-
ments are involuntary under traditional standards. To induce officers
to observe the new procedures, Miranda excludes for all purposes evi-
dence that police obtain without compliance.
But a series of decisions following Miranda does not apply Mi-
randa's rule of exclusion fully. In all of these decisions, the officers
acted in good faith; they did not intend to violate Miranda. Perhaps to
justify a more modest principle of exclusion, the Court characterized
Miranda's rule as merely "prophylactic." A number of law enforce-
ment officials mistakenly have taken "prophylactic" to mean "non-con-
stitutional" and "optional." Although the Court in the past has
considered it a "speculative" possibility that officers might violate Mi-
randa deliberately, the evidence now shows that many receive training
to do just that. In California and to a certain extent in other states,
police have developed the tactic of questioning "outside Miranda," or
questioning over a suspect's direct and unambiguous assertion of
Fifth Amendment rights. If the Court allows it to continue, this prac-
tice signifies the end of Miranda, or at least the original vision of Mi-
randa. Miranda no longer will safeguard Fifth Amendment values,
prevent coercive interrogations, or assist courts in avoiding more diffi-
cult determinations of voluntariness.
In light of this new tactic, the Supreme Court must revisit Mi-
randa and restore its constitutional stature. It must establish a
stronger rule of exclusion to deal with officers who act objectively in
bad faith. Nothing less will deter officers from violating Miranda. Un-
less our courts respond to this open and direct defiance of Miranda,
Miranda is untenable. When courts are unwilling to act in the face of
open and direct defiance of a principle of law, that principle cannot
survive.
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APPENDIX
EXCERPT OF TRANscRIPT OF TRAINING VIDEOTAPE
Excerpt of Transcript of Deputy District Attorney Devallis Rutledge, in
Videotape: Questioning: "Outside Miranda" (Greg Gulen Productions
1990):
You guys wake up out there cuz we got something a little contro-
versial this week. In fact, I'm gonna preface this one by suggesting
that before you do anything based on what we're gonna talk about the
next few minutes, you check with your command personnel and see
what they wanna do. And they may wanna check with their civil legal
advisor or your local prosecutor. Remember I don't set policy for you,
I just wanna tell you what tools are out there-if you choose to use
them in your jurisdiction-it's up to you.
This has to do with questioning "outside Miranda." Should you
do it? When should you do it? What if you do? What if you don't?
You've got somebody in custody and you Mirandize him and he in-
vokes. Either way, he says "I want a lawyer" or "I want to remain si-
lent"; whichever way he does it, he shuts you down. What should you
do? Should you just stop, fold up your papers and walk away and say
"well that's that"? Or should you say "well, okay, so you want a lawyer,
you wanna stop talking. Let's go ahead and go off the record and talk
anyway." Should you do that?
You probably should not do that if you're gonna be holding on to
the guy for a while, because he may change his mind. He may change
his mind. Before you go "outside Mirandd' give him a chance to sit
and stew in the cell for a little while and see if he changes his mind.
Now, that's in those cases where you're gonna have a chance for
him to reinitiate. What if you've got a guy that you've only got one
shot at? This is it, it's now or never because you're gonna lose him-
he's gonna bail out or a lawyer's on the way down there, or you're
gonna have to take him over and give him over to some other offi-
cials-you're never gonna have another chance at this guy, this is it.
And you Mirandize him and he invokes. What you can do-legally
do-in that instance is go "outside Mirandd and continue to talk to
him because you've got other legitimate purposes in talking to him
other than obtaining an admission of guilt that can be used in his
trial. And that's what Miranda protects him against-you compelling
him to make a statement that is later used in trial to convict him of the
charge.
But, you may want to go "outside Mirandd' and get information
to help you dear cases. If you wanna clear paper on a bunch a cases
that look a whole lot like the one you popped him on, and you think
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this is your chance to do it-it's true his statements will not be admis-
sible in court on those cases or on this one that he's talking about, his
statements won't be admissible in court-but they'll help you clear
some files out of the file drawer, go right ahead on.
Or, maybe it will help you recover a dead body or missing person.
If he's kidnapped or killed somebody and you're still looking for a
body, go "outside Mirandd' if he invokes on you and you're not gonna
have another chance to talk to him and see if you can recover a body
for some bereaved family.
You may be able to recover stolen property. He tells you where
the property is ditched, his statement will not be admissible against
him in trial if you go "outside Miranda," but you'll get the property
back and the owner will get the property back. That's a legitimate
function.
Maybe his statement "outside Miranda' will reveal methods-his
methods of operation. How he was able to obtain these credit cards
and how he was able to pull off this scam or whatever. So sometimes
use it for G-2, to get yourself some intelligence. Go "outside Miranda,"
take his statements, knowing you're not going to be able to use them
in trial against him, but you are gonna be able to use them to figure
out how this guy operates and how other criminals like him operate so
that you can do a better job of shutting him down next time.
Maybe his statement will identify other criminals that are caper-
ing in your community. Sources for whatever it is he's doing-if he's
doing drugs, maybe he'll give you some kind of a line on a connec-
tion. Fences, if he's fencing stolen property, maybe he'll finger the
fence for you; location where crime is going down. So use it for all
this intelligence information even though the statements wouldn't be
admissible in court. He may reveal the existence and identity and lo-
cation of other accomplices that he had in this crime and we may be
able to go and arrest them or other witnesses on the case and we may
be able to track them down and get them to come in and testify.
Or, his statements might reveal the existence and the location of
physical evidence. You've got him, but you'd kinda like to have the
gun that he used or the knife that he used or whatever else it was. But
he ditched it somewhere and you can't find it. And so you've arrested
him, he's invoked Miranda and you say, "Well I'd still like to find the
evidence in the case." So you go "outside Miranda," and if he talks
"outside Miranda"-if the only thing that was shutting him up was the
chance of it being used against him in court-and then you go
"outside Mirandd' and take a statement and then he tells you where
the stuff is, we can go and get all that evidence.
And it forces the defendant to commit to a statement that will
prevent him from pulling out some defense and using it at trial-that
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he's cooked up with some defense lawyer-that wasn't true. So if you
get a statement "outside Mirandd' and he tells you that he did it and
how he did it or if he gives you a denial of some sort, he's tied to that,
he is married to that, because the U.S. Supreme Court in Harris v. New
York and the California Supreme Court in People v. May have told us
that we can use statements "outside Miranda' to impeach or to rebut.
We can't use them for our case-in-chief. The D.A. can't trot them out
to the jury before he says "I rest," but if the defendant then gets up
there and gets on the stand and lies and says something different, we
can use his "outside Mirandd' statements to impeach him. We can use
it to rebut his case. Perfectly legitimate said both the California and
U.S. Supreme Courts to use non-Mirandized statement[s] if they're
otherwise voluntary. I mean we can't use them for any purpose if you
beat them out of him, but if they're voluntary statements, the fact that
they weren't Mirandized will mean we cannot use them in the case-in-
chief but it does not mean we can't use them to impeach or rebut. So
you see you got all those legitimate purposes that could be served by
statements taken "outside Miranda."
Let me back up for a second because you may have raised an
eyebrow when I ran across a couple of these. I said maybe he'll tell us
about other witnesses or the location of physical evidence and we can
go and get that. We can use those witnesses against him, said Michigan
v. Tucker. The U.S. Supreme Court said, even though you only discov-
ered that there was a witness because you took a statement "outside
Miranda," the witness can still come and testify. All you lose under
Miranda is the defendant's own statement. The Miranda exclusionary
rule is limited to the defendant's own statement out of his mouth.
That is all that is excluded under Miranda. It doesn't have a fruits of
the poisonous tree theory attached to it the way constitutional viola-
tions do. When you violate Miranda, you're not violating the Consti-
tution. Miranda is not in the Constitution. It's a court-created
decision that affects the admissibility of testimonial evidence and
that's all it is. So you don't violate any law. There's no law says you
can't question people "outside Miranda." You don't violate the Consti-
tution. The Constitution doesn't say you have to do that. It's a court
decision. So all you're violating is a court decision controlling admis-
sibility of evidence. So you're not doing anything unlawful, you're not
doing anything illegal, you're not violating anybody's civil rights,
you're doing nothing improper. The only consequence of your talk-
ing to somebody who has invoked his rights is we will not be able to
use his statement in the case in chief in trial against him. But it
doesn't have the consequence of excluding fruits of his statement. Or-
egon v. Elstad, from the U.S. Supreme Court, and a bunch of federal
cases and some state cases that-too numerous to show up here on
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the screen, but I've listed them for you in this week's syllabus-a lot of
cases have said "the fruit of the poisonous tree" derivative products
doctrine does not apply to Miranda violations. All we lose is the state-
ment taken in violation of Miranda. We do not lose physical evidence
that resulted from that. We do not lose the testimony of other wit-
nesses that we learned about only by violating his Miranda invocation.
Now, some people worry, "Gee, if I question a guy 'outside Mi-
randa,' won't I get prosecuted myself?" "Won't I go to jail for doing
something illegal?" 'Won't I get sued in civil court for violating his
civil rights?" Well just ask yourself, have you ever seen hundreds-
hundreds and hundreds-of published cases where a court found a
Miranda violation. Hundreds of them on the books where courts have
found Miranda violations. Did any of those police officers get sued?
Zero. Did any of those police officers get charged with a criminal of-
fense? Zero. None of those police officers who should have
Mirandized somebody but didn't, who thought they were asking clari-
fying questions and the court later held it was an interrogation, who
didn't think that Miranda applied but it really did Miranda none of
those police officers who has made what the courts later found to be a
Miranda mistake, has been sued over it, has been filed on in criminal
court over it-there's nothing illegal about continuing to talk to
somebody. It simply has a consequence, an evidentiary consequence
in the case-in-chief in trial that we cannot use that statement. It does
not have any penal consequence for you. You're not doing anything
unlawful, you're not violating any statute, you're not violating the
Constitution, you're not violating his civil rights, you're not incurring
any civil liability. All you're doing is limiting the admissibility of evi-
dence-you're limiting it to the impeachment and rebuttal phase of
the trial-but you can accomplish all of these legitimate purposes that
don't have anything to do with the prosecution of the case, and some
that do, by talking to the guy "outside Miranda."
So, whether you do it is up to you. I don't tell you what to do.
Can you do it? Sure you can. All of these cases have said there's legiti-
mate uses that a Miranda-violative statement can be put to. The only
use it can't be put to is to prove the person's guilt in a trial. But it can
be used to prove that he's a liar when he gets on the stand and tells a
different story. It can be used to discover other evidence that will
prove his guilt in trial. Okay? So you may want to consult with folks
there in your department and maybe your local prosecutor to see if
they have a strong feeling one way or another. But you're up to date
on what the law tells you about going "outside Miranda."
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